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Federal regulators have invoked the D'Oench Doctrine in 5,145
instances since 1989. Ninety-seven percent of the claims filed by
vendors and individuals resulted in dismissal because of the D'Oench
Doctrine.'
INTRODUCTION
A rash of commercial bank and savings and loan association
(S&L)2 failures has caused severe American financial crises twice
in this century.' The first occurred during the Great Depres-
sion.4 Then, following years of healthy and stable growth in the
banking industry,5 disaster struck again. From 1985 to 1994,
1315 national banks failed.6 Because the federal government
insured most of these institutions,7 the costs of these failures,
coupled with the failures of national S&Ls, have been estimated
1. The D'Oench Duhme Reform Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. 2 (1995)
[hereinafter S. 648 Hearings] (statement of Sen. William S. Cohen (R-Maine)).
2. This Article focuses on commercial banks and S&Ls because they have
accounted for the majority of the financial failures of depository institutions in
the 1980s and early 1990s. Other financial institutions such as credit unions,
securities firms, mutual fund brokerages, and life insurance and pension plans
are omitted.
3. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 21-36 (1992) (comparing the extensive financial panic that occurred
during the Great Depression in the early 1930s to the recent commercial
banking crisis and S&L debacle of the late 1980s and early 1990s).
4. Over 10,000 commercial banks failed between 1929 and 1933. BARRY
STUART ZISMAN, BANKS AND THRIFTS: GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND
RECEIVERSHIP 1-15 § 1.04[2] (1992).
5. From 1934 through 1942, an average of [only] 54 [commercial]
banks failed each year. From 1943 until 1974 average failures per
year dropped to approximately five out of 14,000 [commercial] banks.
This is quite a contrast to the average of 588 failures per year between
1920 and 1929 and an average of over 2,277 [commercial banks that
failed] annually from 1930 to 1933.
EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW: TEACHING
MATERIALS 547 (3d ed. 1991).
6. See CALIFORNIA STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT, 85TH ANN. REP. 8 (1994)
[hereinafter 85TH ANNUAL REPORT].
7. See infra notes 66-87 and accompanying text (explaining the federal
government's duty in insuring depositors' deposits in financial institutions).
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to range from $150 billion to $1 trillion.8 Fortunately, a distinct
downward trend in commercial bank failures began in 1990, 9
and by 1994, such failures had subsided substantially. °
Despite the recent decline, however, the litigation resulting from
the many failures of the late 1980s and early 1990s continues to
wind through the courts."
8. See infra note 51 for an estimate of total costs.
9. Between 1982 and 1989, commercial bank failures were as follows:
1982, 42; 1983, 48; 1984, 79; 1985, 120; 1986, 138; 1987, 184; 1988, 200; and
1989, 206. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 5, at 547. Beginning in 1990,
however, the trend reversed. In 1990, 169 commercial banks failed; in 1991,
124 failed. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 628. In 1992, 120 commercial
banks failed, in 1993, 42 failed, and in 1994, 13 failed. 85TH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 8. While commercial bank failures decreased nationwide
during these years, however, they increased in California. In 1991, only 3 of the
124 failures nationwide occurred in California. This proportion later increased:
8 of the 120 failures in 1992, 16 of the 42 failures in 1993, and 8 of the 13
failures in 1994 occurred in California. Id.
10. The federal government reported that only 11 national commercial
banks failed in 1994, with no commercial banks failing in the fourth quarter.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., THE FDIC QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE,
COMMERCIAL BANKING PERFORMANCE-FOURTH QUARTER, 1994. The years 1993
and 1994 also saw record profits for commercial banks. As of March 20, 1995,
only two commercial banks had failed nationwide, and both were located in
California. Lesia R. Bullock, U.S. Banks Earn Record $44.7 Billion in 1994,
Despite Losses on Securities, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 64, at 565 (Mar. 20, 1995).
11. See S. 648 Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (estimating that the federal
government has prevailed against borrowers and vendors in failed bank
litigation over 5000 times since 1989). See, e.g., Bank Shareholders Sue Ex-
Chairman Jailed in S&L Failure, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 4,1995, available
in WESTLAW, Allnews Database (reporting a suit filed by Pacific Inland
Bankcorp shareholders against the bank's founder and former Chairman
Richard J. Meyer alleging abuses identical to the charges which sent him to
prison in 1993); Dick Phillips, Hurwitz Accused in S&L Loss Suit: Failure Cost
Taxpayers $1.6 Billion, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Dec. 27, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, Allnews Database (reporting that the OTS charged Maxxam Inc.
and its chairman Charles Hurwitz with unsafe and unsound acts that resulted
in the collapse of United Savings Association of Texas in 1988); David G.
Savage, Supreme Court to Hear Cases on Credit Fees and S&L Bailout, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1996, at D2 (reporting that the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to
decide a $10-billion dispute growing out of the S&L crisis of the 1980s);
Supreme Court Lets Stand Ruling that Keating Must Repay Failed S&L, THE
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 3, 1995, at 10-C (reporting that the U.S. Supreme Court,
without comment, let stand rulings that financier Charles Keating must repay
$36.4 million to Lincoln Savings & Loan, whose collapse in 1989 cost taxpayers
$2.6 billion to pay off depositors and cost about 17,000 small investors $190
million). Additionally, "[t]here have been more court decisions and statutory
amendments to this system since 1985 than during the entire period between
1933 and 1985." MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 249 (Supp. 1994)
[hereinafter MACEY & MILLER SUPPLEMENT].
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One of the most notorious legal weapons the federal
government uses against borrowers of failed financial institu-
tions in this resulting litigation is a powerful federal common
law estoppel doctrine known as the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, 2
and its statutory analogue, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).'" The federal
government, through one of two federal agencies, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 4 or the Resolution
Trust Corporation (RTC), 5 employs these special legal pow-
ers 6 in actions to collect debts still owed to a federally-insured
financial institution after the institution fails.1" As originally
conceived, the D'Oench doctrine precluded a borrower and a
bank from using a secret side agreement to deceive a bank
12. The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine is named after the Supreme Court case
that established the doctrine: D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S.
447 (1942). See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text (describing the
D'Oench case).
13. In 1950, eight years after the Supreme Court established the D'Oench
doctrine, Congress codified and expanded the doctrine. Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, ch. 967, § 13(e), 64 Stat. 873, 889 (1950), (codified and expanded
at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1994)), amended by The Reigle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 317, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 2160, 2223. The four requirements are now embodied
in subsection (e)(1)(A)-(D) after the recent amendment. Most cases, however,
refer to the four requirements as they existed before the amendment. Prior to
the amendment, subsection (e)(1)-(4) contained the four requirements. For
consistency, this Article refers to the statute before and after amendment as
"9 1823(e)".
14. The FDIC is a federal agency created by Congress pursuant to the
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 12B(a), 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933);
Federal Reserve Act, § 8,48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-
1835 (1994)). The FDIC insures bank deposits and serves as a "receiver," which
is essentially a bankruptcy trustee for a failed financial institution. See infra
notes 69-75 and accompanying text (explaining the role of the FDIC in failed
bank litigation).
15. See infra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the RTC, which
serves as a receiver for failed S&Ls and savings banks). As of December 1995,
however, the RTC has been dissolved and the FDIC has absorbed the RTC's
receivership duties. See infra note 73. Unless otherwise stated, the term FDIC
hereinafter will incorporate by reference the RTC.
16. See infra notes 91-130 and accompanying text (providing a full
description of the D'Oench doctrine's original justifications and current
operation). See generally Fred Galves, FDIC and RTC Special Powers in Failed
Bank Litigation, 22 COLO. LAw. 473, 473-80 (1993) (criticizing the federal
government's use of these powers in failed bank litigation).
17. A commercial bank or S&L is deemed to have "failed" when current
assets are insufficient to meet its obligations. See generally 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(c)(5) (1994) (listing the various specific grounds under which a financial
institution is deemed to have failed and the appointment of a conservator can
be justified).
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examiner, and eventually a bank receiver such as the FDIC,
about the status of the borrower's loan.'" Currently, however,
courts broadly apply this doctrine to bar many claims and
defenses a borrower or vendor otherwise could have asserted
before the FDIC took over.'9 Accordingly, the application of the
D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) often creates an unfair windfall
for the federal government. °
The dispute between Mrs. Rhetta B. Sweeney's family and
the RTC is one of many recent examples of the inequities that
the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) create.2' In 1987, Mrs.
Sweeney, on behalf of her corporation, entered into a commercial
loan agreement with ComFed Savings Bank ("ComFed"), a
federally-insured S&L. Mrs. Sweeney originally requested a
18. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc., v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 459-60 (1942). See
infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text (explaining the original D'Oench
case). Many commentators still support the fundamental soundness of the
original D'Oench doctrine. See, e.g., Steven A. Weiss & Kenneth E. Kraus,
D'Oench, Protection for Private Institutions Assisting the FDIC: A Necessary
Component of the Thrift and Bank Bailout, 108 BANKING L.J. 256,269-82 (1991)
(arguing that the D'Oench doctrine must apply to private participants in bank
bailout efforts); Stephen W. Lake, Note, Banking Law: The D'Oench Doctrine
and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e): Overextended but Not Unconstitutional, 43 OKLA. L.
REV. 315, 325-36 (1990) (analyzing potential constitutional issues regarding the
far-reaching powers of the FDIC); William A. MacArthur, Comment, Who Will
Stop the Rain? Repairing the Hole in the D'Oench, Duhme Umbrella by
Protecting the FDIC Against Fraudulent Transferee Liability Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1271, 1296-1334 (1990) (examining the
conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the federal and statutory common
law FDIC "super" powers).
19. See infra notes 106-275 and accompanying text (explaining the
doctrine's current application).
20. According to an FDIC representative, "[a] very rough estimate of the
exposure which the FDIC has avoided through the use of D'Oench and [§1
1823(e) in just the last two years is more than $1 billion in claims and
counterclaims." See Oversight of the FDIC and the RTC's Use of D'Oench
Duhme: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management and the District of Columbia of the Committee on Government
Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 141, 161 (1995) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings]
(statement of John F. Bovenzi, Director, Division of Depositor and Asset
Services, FDIC).
21. See Sweeney v. RTC, 16 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 291
(1994). The Sweeneys' dispute with the RTC has been covered widely in the
press. See, e.g., World Headline News (CNN television broadcast, July 1-2,
1994); WBUR Boston FM 90.9 (NPR radio broadcast, July 5, 1994) (reporting
the legal plight of the Sweeney family and the harsh application of the D'Oench
doctrine by the RTC). For a full treatment of the dispute from the Sweeneys'
point of view, see Oversight Hearings, supra note 20, at 161 (statement of
Rhetta B. Sweeney).
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loan of $600,000, but ComFed expressed an interest in lending
much more than that amount by becoming her comprehensive
lender for the entire real estate project. Accordingly, Mrs.
Sweeney agreed to borrow $1.6 million.22
After relying on ComFed's financing commitments and
spending thousands of dollars and several months preparing for
the project, Mrs. Sweeney learned that ComFed intended to
suspend financing. Because the project remained incomplete,
Mrs. Sweeney was unable to generate any revenues. She fell
into debt to ComFed and to the many contractors she had hired.
ComFed then initiated foreclosure proceedings on her proper-
ty.23
During the loan negotiations, ComFed and its lawyer had
made material misstatements to Mrs. Sweeney regarding key
aspects of the loan.24 Mrs. Sweeney thus argued that ComFed
never intended to lend her the full amount necessary for
financing the entire project, and that ComFed engaged in fraud
in extending the loan.25 She sued ComFed in Massachusetts
state court for fraud and other statutory violations.2 Although
the court first held Mrs. Sweeney liable for the $1.6 million loan,
it later held that ComFed violated various state and federal laws
in addition to committing fraud,2" and awarded Mrs. Sweeney
$4 million in consequential damages.28
22. Sweeney, 16 F.3d at 2. Mrs. Sweeney also alleged that Comfed agreed
to lend her an additional $900,000 for later construction financing. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The various state and federal violations included the following: unfair
and deceptive trade practices under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Act, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A; loan-to-value violations, 12 C.F.R. § 545.32 (1996);
illegal kickbacks, 18 U.S.C. § 215 (1994); knowingly and willfully falsifying and
concealing a material fact, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994); false entries in bank
documents, 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1994); and various other fraud statutes.
28. The timing of the two-part state court judgment is confusing. It was
based on a nine count lender liability/fraud lawsuit against ComFed and
ComFed's counterclaim for nonpayment on the $1.6 million loan. In March,
1990, the court awarded ComFed $2 million for the Sweeneys' breach of the
note; interestingly, however, the court also awarded Mrs. Sweeney $65,000 for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and reserved judgment on two counts
of the fraud counts against ComFed. On January 30, 1991, some ten months
later, the court then ruled on those remaining two fraud counts and found for
the Sweeneys for nearly $3 million, plus costs, interest, and attorneys' fees, as
well as granting an additur for the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
for a total award of nearly $4 million. Sweeney, 16 F.3d at 2-3. See generally
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Mrs. Sweeney never collected the damages, however. Just
six weeks before the state court entered judgment, the RTC was
appointed as ComFed's conservator due to ComFed's unsafe and
unsound practices.29 As the appointed conservator, the RTC
stepped into ComFed's shoes in the Sweeney lawsuit. The RTC
then removed the case to federal court30 twenty days before the
state court ruled on Mrs. Sweeney's final two counts. Once in
federal court, the RTC used the D'Oench doctrine to bar all fraud
claims based on any side agreements or verbal misrepresenta-
tions,3 ' which formed the basis for the remaining two counts of
Mrs. Sweeney's lender liability claims. The RTC obtained
summary judgment on those claims and ultimately convinced the
court to vacate Mrs. Sweeney's $4 million state court judg-
ment." Thus, although a state court had adjudicated ComFed
the wrongdoer, the RTC used the D'Oench doctrine to persuade
the federal court to dismiss Mrs. Sweeney's claims. The RTC,
furthermore, successfully urged the federal court to retain the
state court's earlier $1.6 million judgment against Mrs. Sweeney
for the original loan. 3 The ruling forced Mrs. Sweeney's
company into Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
3 4
The recent banking disaster and Mrs. Sweeney's exemplary
case highlight the need for significant reform of the federal
government's powers in failed bank litigation.35 Indeed, both
Ex ComFed Customers Win $4 Million 'Lender Liability' Suit, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 26, 1991, at 46, 48 (reporting on the $4 million award).
29. See Sweeney, 16 F.3d at 2 n.1.
30. There were alleged procedural irregularities regarding the removal to
federal court. On January 11, 1991, the RTC removed the case to federal court
in Massachusetts. Id. at 3. Although 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(1)(3) at the time
allowed for removal of RTC cases only to the U.S. District Court for the D.C.
Circuit, the Sweeneys failed to object within 30 days and therefore the court
held that they waived that objection. Id.
31. Id. at 4-5.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. ComFed had been in the process of suing its own officers for fraud
when the RTC took over as conservator, but when the RTC successfiflly eluded
the Sweeney lawsuit via the D'Oench doctrine, it then abandoned the officer
fraud suit. ComFed v. Baldini, et al., No. 90-6712, (Mass. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 1,
1990), removed sub nom. And later dismissed per stipulation, ComFed/RTC v.
Baldini, et al., No. 91-CV-10032-S (D. Mass. dismissed Aug. 9, 1991).
34. Telephone Interview with Rhetta B. Sweeney (Apr. 4, 1996). The
Sweeneys also face eviction from their home, as the RTC is in the process of
seizing it. Id.
35. On June 14, 1995, the author of this Article testified before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on reform legislation that
addresses the D'Oench doctrine controversy.
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legal commentators36 and the judiciary" have addressed this
concern in recent years. A citizens' group also has formed solely
36. Numerous law review articles have criticized the D'Oench doctrine in
the last ten years. See generally Richard E. Flint, Why D'Oench Duhme? An
Economic, Legal and Philosophical Critique of a Failed Bank Policy, 26 VAL. U.
L. REV. 465 (1992) (arguing that the application of D'Oench not only has been
unfair to debtors but has saddled society with the cost of mounting personal
bankruptcies); W. Robert Gray, Limitations on the FDIC's D'Oench Doctrine of
Federal Common-Law Estoppel: Congressional Preemption and Authoritative
Statutory Construction, 31 S. TEX. L.J. 245 (1990) (explaining Justice Scalia's
overly broad interpretation of the term "agreement" in § 1823(e) and the nexus
between D'Oench, Duhme and § 1823(e)); Kevin A. Palmer, The D'Oench
Doctrine: A Proposal for Reform, 108 BANKING L.J. 565 (1991) (arguing for an
amendment of § 1823(e) that would force borrowers to prove they had clean
hands and that would impose a rebuttable presumption favoring the FDIC);
Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J.
469 (1992) (arguing that § 1823(e) creates a "black hole" effect in which weak
banks almost inevitably are forced into insolvency); Marsha Hymanson, Note,
Borrower Beware: D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823 Overprotect the Insurer
When Banks Fail, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 253 (1988) (arguing for a narrow
interpretation of § 1823(e) that would reflect the limited debate given it by
Congress). Perhaps one of the most scathing is also one of the most recent. See
generally J. Michael Echevarria, A Precedent Embalms a Principle: The
Expansion of the D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 745 (1994)
(arguing that the D'Oench doctrine and its statutory and federal common law
heirs should have been abandoned); see also Chris Atkinson, Note, Defending
the Indefensible: Exceptions to D'Oench and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1337 (1995) (arguing that rules allowing for logical application of
D'Oench can only be derived by examining the interaction of exceptions and the
concepts of agreement and asset).
37. Many federal judges have voiced their disdain for the harsh application
of the D'Oench doctrine, but nevertheless reluctantly apply it. See FDIC v.
Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 877 (3d Cir. 1994) (admitting that, while the D'Oench
doctrine and § 1823(e) lead to harsh results, such results are compelled by
federal precedents); FDIC v. Kasal, 913 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1990) (agreeing
that the result in the case was harsh, but unavoidable due to statutory and
federal precedent constraints); L & R Prebuilt Homes, Inc. v. New England
Allbank for Savings, 783 F. Supp. 11, 14 (D. N.H. 1992) (affirming, though not
condoning, the FDIC's application of the D'Oench doctrine while empathizing
with the plaintiffs resulting dilemma); Webb v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr.
581, 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (sympathizing with the plaintiffs position, but
affirming application of the D'Oench doctrine). Judge John E. Conway created
the following "fight song" of the federal regulators, sung to the tune of "Onward
Christian Soldier," revealing his concern regarding the federal government's
cavalier use of the powerful "D'Oench, Duhme doctrine" in failed bank litigation:
Onward Banking Soldiers, marching as if to war, with D'Oench, Duhme
and Congress we'll prevail for sure. We needn't worry, we will win the
fight, since we lack accountability, we are always right.
RTC v. Ocotillo, 840 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (D. N.M. 1993).
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for the purpose of abolishing the D'Oench doctrine. 3 In fact,
the need for reform is so acute that the FDIC itself recently
enacted certain internal agency guidelines' 9 in an effort to
preempt congressional reform of the D'Oench doctrine. The
FDIC's actions apparently were to no avail, however, because
Congress is still considering reform.4 °
This Article considers the history and current status of the
D'Oench doctrine, analyzes the prospects for legislative reform,
and advocates further reform. Part I sets forth the general
contextual framework within which financial institution failures
occur and discusses the FDIC's crucial role with respect to
institutional failures. Part II describes the creation of the
D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e), and their disturbing expansive
interpretation and resulting harsh application over the years.
It explains how the doctrine and statute enable the federal
government, through the FDIC, to bar claims and defenses of
former borrowers and others involved in lawsuits against failed
financial institutions. Part II also delineates the four require-
ments of § 1823(e), highlighting the special problems that its
strict interpretation has caused former borrowers of failed
financial institutions. It then chronicles the growth and
expansion of § 1823(e) and considers exemplary cases for which
its application produced unfair results.
38. Doctor David S. Hess, an irate Florida cardiologist whose negligence
claim against a failed bank was barred by the operation of the D'Oench
doctrine, founded the "Citizens and Business for D'Oench Duhme Reform." Dr.
Hess stated before Congress that "[this] organization [has become] a 'clearing
house' for other 'victims' of the D'Oench doctrine. In the past two years, the
organization has been contacted by victims throughout the United States who
became aware of the organization through the media." Oversight Hearings,
supra note 20, at 1-2 (statement of Dr. David Hess).
39. In November 1994, the FDIC implemented internal guidelines requiring
FDIC attorneys not to use the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) in certain cases,
unless they first received prior approval from FDIC headquarters in Washing-
ton, D.C. See infra notes 302-07 and accompanying text (discussing new
guidelines).
40. On March 30, 1995, Senator William S. Cohen, a member of the Senate
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, introduced S. 648,
called the D'Oench Duhme Reform Act. 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Senators
Alfonse D'Amato of New York, Lauch Faircloth of North Carolina, and Robert
F. Bennett of Utah are co-sponsors. As Senator Cohen stated: "When
application of the law leads to gross unfairness and inequitable results, the
public loses confidence in government and all of our legal institutions are
degraded. Before more damage is done, we must reform the D'Oench Duhme
doctrine and restore it to its original, narrow scope." Oversight Hearings, supra
note 20, at 2 (statement of Sen. William S. Cohen).
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Part III addresses academic reform proposals and legislative
reform prospects4' by analyzing and critiquing suggested
terminology in a reform bill. This part culminates with a
proposal to make the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) more
equitable to debtors of failed financial institutions, without
sacrificing the FDIC's original, legitimate interests in protecting
itself and the insurance funds it administers. This proposal
consists of a simple disclosure and filing system requiring
bankers to inform all potential borrowers of the necessity of
reducing to a writing any side agreement made with, or any
verbal representation made by, an institution regarding a loan.
Filing that writing with the institution and its federal regulators
will ensure that such side agreement or verbal representation
will be recognized if the institution fails and is taken over by the
FDIC.42 This filing arrangement can be enacted in lieu of, or
in addition to, more ambitious and controversial legislative
reform. Before discussing reform, however, it is necessary to set
forth the contextual background in which the D'Oench doctrine
and § 1823(e) currently are applied and interpreted.
I. BANK FAILURE, THE FDIC, AND THE APPLICATION
OF THE D'OENCH DOCTRINE AND SECTION 1823(e)
A. RECENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES IN THE
LARGER CONTEXT-INCREASING THE OPPORTUNITIES TO
APPLY D'OENCH
My friends, there is good news and bad news. The good news is that
the full faith and credit of the FDIC and the U.S. Government stands
41. Part IlI uses as a backdrop S. 648, the D'Oench Duhrne Reform Act, the
Senate's recent legislative reform effort. See infra notes 319-23 (citing relevant
portions of the Act).
42. This represents the original policy justification for § 1823(e). Langley
v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1987). A prerequisite for banks to disclose the
existence of § 1823(e) and its requirements would give borrowers critical
information of which they often are unaware. Currently, they often do not
understand the applicability of§ 1823(e) until after their institution has failed,
which is too late. See infra Appendices A-B for sample disclosure and filing
forms. Note that § 1823(e) currently requires that any side agreement be kept
in the institution's official files under the unilateral control of the institution.
Although the D'Oench Duhme Reform Act eliminates the current § 1823(e)(1)(D)
requirement that the agreement must be kept as an official record in the
institution's file, a disclosure requirement would serve the additional function
of duly memorializing the agreement with the banking regulators. Regulators
would then have immediate access to this important information which would
assist them in keeping abreast of the assets in each bank's loan portfolios.
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behind your money in the bank. But the bad news is that you, my
fellow taxpayers, stand behind the U.S. Government."
The years 1985 through 1991 marked the height of the
commercial banking and S&L crisis.' Only the number of
commercial bank failures during the Great Depression surpassed
the number of commercial bank failures during those seven
years.45 S&L failures were notoriously rampant throughout
this period as well.4" By 1991, the FDIC had exhausted its
entire bank insurance fund and had to request $70 billion from
Congress to replenish it.' Meanwhile, the RTC petitioned
Congress for an additional $80 billion in funding to assist with
the S&L bailout.4" These recent financial institutional failures
43. L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE GREAT S&L
DEBACLE AND OTHER WASHINGTON SAGAS xiii (1993). Mr. Seidman, the
Chairman of the FDIC from 1985 to 1991, used this telling introductory
statement in nearly every speech he gave during the commercial banking crisis
and S&L debacle of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Id.
44. Amid all the gloom and doom, or perhaps more appropriately, "Duhme,"
which is pronounced "doom," about the harsh application of the D'Oench
doctrine and financial institutional failures in general, at least one observer has
found some humor in the very serious issue of bank failures. Comedian David
Letterman devoted one of his "Top Ten" lists to the issue:
The 'Top Ten Signs" that your bank is failing:
10. Free handful of Cheetos with every new account;
9. They hand out calendars one month at a time;
8. Security guard offers to walk you back to your office for five bucks;
7. Overhear branch manager muttering to himself, "I wonder if you
can eat squirrel";
6. Free giveaway toaster is made by G.E.;
5. Teller machine replaced by fat guy with carton of twenties;
4. You glimpse inside the vault and notice it's stacked with empty
soda bottles;
3. You deposit cash; an officer runs over, sticks it in his pocket and
dances around yelling, "Lordy, we're having biscuits tonight!";
2. You recognize some of the tellers as carnival people;
1. [Drum roll], and the Number One Sign that your bank is failing:
They can't change a twenty!
Late Night with David Letterman: The Top Ten Signs that Your Bank Is Failing
(NBC television broadcast, Jan. 9, 1990).
45. ZISMAN, supra note 4, at 1-15 § 1.04[2].
46. The number of annual S&L failures from 1982-1995 follow: 1982, 76;
1983, 54; 1984,27; 1985,35; 1986, 51; 1987,47; 1988, 222; 1989, 329; 1990, 213;
1991, 144; 1992, 59; 1993, 9; 1994, 2; 1995, 2. These statistics were gathered
from Mr. Brad Moore, of the Office of Statistics, FDIC, on July 24, 1995.
47. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. Seeks Much Bigger Amount to Shore Up
Bank Deposit Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1991, at Al (describing the FDIC's
request for additional funding).
48. Semi-Annual Report of the Resolution Trust Corporation, 1991:Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 18-95 (1991) [hereinafter RTC Oversight Board Hearing] (statement
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adversely affect the economic well-being not only of bankers and
financial experts, but also of every U.S. taxpayer, banking
consumer,49 and ultimately every citizen. Indeed, U.S. citizens
will continue to be affected, for even though the immediate crisis
appears to be over,"° it will take many years before the debts
are completely paid.51
Much has been written about the various causes of the bank
and S&L failures.52 During the 1980s, commercial banks saw
of Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury).
49. All FDIC-insured financial institutions must pay insurance premiums
to the FDIC to be covered in the event of failure or to receive financial
assistance in the event of financial difficulties. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(1)(A),
(e)(2)(A) (1995). The FDIC charges annual insurance premiums based on the
riskiness of the institution's activities and the general risk of failure. See
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements Act (FDICIA), Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A) (1994))
(requiring the FDIC to "establish a risk-based assessment system for insured
depository institutions"). Within this system, a bank's risk-adjusted insurance
premiums become part of the institution's costs and ultimately are passed along
to consumers in the form of higher interest rates and service fees. See MACEY
& MILLER SUPPLEMENT, supra note 11, at 275-78.
50. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
general downward trend in financial institutional failures in 1990 and noting
the dramatic drops in 1992 and 1994).
51. Estimates of the cost of the federal bailout reach as high as $500 billion
over the next few years, and more than $1 trillion over the next several
decades. KATHLEEN DAY, S&L HELL: THE PEOPLE AND POLITICS BEHIND THE
$1 TRILLION SAVINGS AND LOAN SCANDAL 9 (1993). Recent bank failures have
cost the FDIC nearly $5 billion for 1992 and $570 million for 1993, or
approximately $1 billion less than the agency's bank insurance fid earned
from premiums. NEWSDAY, Mar. 18, 1993, at 47. But see MACEY & MILLER
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 11, at 249:
The actual cost of the bailouts is hotly debated, but no one doubts that
they are astronomical. Most observers put the [price] tag for the
savings and loan clean up at between $150 and 175 billion in present
value terms (and much more if interest payments on the debt needed
to fund the bailout are included). The costs of rescuing the bank
insurance fund [for commercial banks] are not yet clear .... [However,
the] improvement in the economic health of the banking industry in
1992 and 1993 has caused the FDIC significantly to lower its estimates
of the costs of bank failures.
Id. Although the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) insuring commercial banks is
currently well-funded, the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) insuring
S&Ls is not. Pamela Atkins, Hefler Says Congress Should Not Stop SAIF Exits;
Main Issue Must Be Addressed, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 591-93 (Mar. 20,
1995).
52. See generally PAUL Z. PILZER & ROBERT DEITZ, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY:
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE S&L MESS (1989) (examining the costs of bailing out
the thrift industry and explaining why it did not have to happen); Fred E. Case,
Deregulation: Invitation to Disaster in the S&L Industry, 59 FORDHAM L. REV.
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their traditional customer base dwindle as corporations began to
place greater emphasis on stock and bond offerings to raise
funds.53 In addition, bank regulators hindered the industry's
ability to compete effectively with non-banks and foreign banks
by continuing to limit their market activities,54 securities
investments, 55 and geographical expansion."5 Banks turned
S93 (1991) (expanding upon and defining the consequences of deregulation);
Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7 (1991)
(distinguishing between commonly stated reasons for the S&L collapse and
those intrinsic to the S&L system); G. Christian Hill, A Never Ending Story: An
Introduction to the S&L Symposium, 2 STAN L. & POL'Y REV. 21 (1990) (citing
poor financial management as a major reason for failures); Irvine Sprague,
Unrelated Series of Events Led to S&L Crisis, AM. BANKER, May 3, 1989 at 4
(claiming that a cause of the S&L debacle is a series of unrelated events, dating
back twenty years).
53. See Roberta S. Karmel, A Close Look at the Fiasco in the Banking
System, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1992, at 3 (describing how non-bank institutions have
obtained traditional bank customers); Tom Herman, Year-End Review of
Markets and Finance: Many Expect Bonds to Continue Success Early in '87,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1987, at 3B (explaining the popularity of bonds with money
managers); Year-End Review of Markets and Finance: 1985-A Year for the
Bulls, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1986, at 1B (describing the increase in stock and
bond popularity during the mid-1980s).
54. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1994) (furnishing the primary statutory authority
for allowing banks to engage in activities of any sort other than clearing checks,
keeping savings accounts, and making loans, and stating specifically that "a]
national bank ... shall have power ... to exercise ... all such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking...."). This
"incidental powers" clause has been interpreted narrowly over the years. See,
e.g., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 438 (1st Cir. 1972) (prohibiting
bank's travel agency services). Recently, however, the Supreme Court expanded
the incidental powers clause by giving it a very broad reading. See
NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 814 (1995)
(calling into question the previous conclusions of the various circuits concerning
the scope of the incidental powers clause by giving it a very broad reading and
allowing for much greater deference to the bank regulator in interpreting it).
55. Traditional commercial banking (clearing checks, keeping savings
accounts, and making loans) is supposed to be kept separate from direct
investment activities, such as investing in equity and in most bond securities.
Such is known as the "Glass-Steagall Wall," named after certain portions of the
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.). See S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); 75 CONG. REC.
9887 (1932); see also Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and
Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 496 (1971) (justifying
actions that keep banking and investment separate). But see Senator
D'Amato's recent bill, S. 337, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), and Representative
Leach's recent bills, H.R. 18 and redrafted, H.R. 1062, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995), for the current legislative call for the partial abolition of the
Glass-Steagall Wall. See also Kelly Holland et al., Waiting for Glass-Steagall
to Shatter, Bus. WK., Mar. 27, 1995, at 166.
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to riskier loans and investments which at first appeared to
strengthen their dwindling loan portfolios, but then fell into even
weaker financial positions when many of their risky loans
defaulted. 7
The double-digit inflation of the 1970s 58 hastened the
demise of S&Ls. Faced with a portfolio of fixed-rate mortgages
during a period of sustained inflation, the S&L industry lobbied
successfully for a general loosening of regulations and controls
to allow them to engage in seemingly more lucrative, but less
stable, lending activities. 9 S&Ls exacerbated their problems
by offering very high interest rates to attract needed deposits. °
56. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 387-88 ("At the federal level, the
McFadden Act generally subjects national banks to the branching limitations
applicable to similarly situated state banks, and the Douglas Amendment to the
Bank Holding Company Act prohibits bank holding companies from acquiring
subsidiary banks in other states"). With the recent passage of the Reigle-Neal
Interstate Banking Efficiency Act of 1994, however, interstate banking is now
certain to become a legal reality. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See generally Murray A. Indick
& Satish M. Kini, The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act: New
Options, New Problems, 112 BANKING L.J. 100 (1995) (explaining the salient
features of the new act regarding interstate banking).
57. See MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY 92-93 (1990)
(discussing the effects of allowing the banking-especially the S&L-industry
to engage in more and higher risk loans).
58. Timothy B. Clark, Years of Economic Trauma Have Left a Painful Mark,
NAT'L J., Jan. 12, 1985, at 89, 91.
59. See LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS
FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 61-62 (1990) (describing the "borrowing
short and lending long" pattern). See generally Ronald L. Weaver & Andrew M.
O'Malley, The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980: An Overview, 98 BANKING L.J. 100 (1981) (summarizing the banking
deregulation movement which began in 1980). S&Ls were further deregulated
by the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-320, 95 Stat. 132 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994)). The goal
was to allow S&Ls to engage in more under-regulated, lucrative, and higher
risk loan activities in an effort to compete with commercial banks. The result
in many cases, unfortunately, was that the "foxes were left to guard the chicken
coups." Case, supra note 52, at S109 (demonstrating how home mortgages
comprised 86% of an average S&L's assets in 1965, and how that percentage
dwindled to just 35% by 1988).
60. This phenomenon was referred to as the "brokered deposit problem."
A brokered deposit occurs when a depositor asks a broker to search nationwide
for the highest current interest rate being offered on deposits and then makes
a deposit in that particular financial institution to take advantage of that rate.
See generally MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 262-63 (describing this process
and congressional attempts to regulate brokered deposits more stringently).
See, e.g., Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, OTS, 934 F.2d 1127, 1133-35 (10th
Cir. 1991) (detailing an instance in which brokered deposits led to the failure
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The combination of low returns on fixed rate mortgages,
uncertain returns on risky loan portfolios, and high interest rate
payments on brokered deposits inevitably caused many S&Ls to
fail.6
1
Probably the most notorious cause of the crisis, for both
commercial banks and S&Ls, was the negligent management of
these financial institutions during the 1980s, together with
unprecedented director and officer fraud and insider abuse.62
One state S&L commissioner may have summarized the
situation best when he quipped: "The best way to rob a bank is
to own one."63
Regardless of the causes of the financial institutional
crisis,64 the federal government, principally through the FDIC,
of an S&L in the 1980s); see also Paul Hemp, Mass. Bank in Brockton Is 11th
Bank Failure of'92, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1992, at 31 (discussing the failure
of Massachusetts Bank and Trust Company). In 1989, however, Congress
regulated brokered deposits in response to the crisis. Currently, depository
institutions that are not "well capitalized may not accept funds obtained,
directly or indirectly, by or through any deposit broker for deposit into one or
more deposit accounts." 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(a) (1994); see Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank
Control, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1153, 1199-1202 (1988) (further criticizing brokered
deposits).
61. Between 1989 and 1991 alone, over 600 S&L failures completely
depleted the RTC's resources. RTC Oversight Board Hearing, supra note 48, at
9-75, 93-141 (1991) (statement of Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury).
62. See generally DAY, supra note 51, at 9 (arguing that the causes of the
crisis had a number of sources, including the regulators, politicians, and former
directors and officers of the failed financial institutions); STEPHAN PIZZO ET AL.,
INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS (1989) (detailing
the downfall of the thrift industry and the players involved); Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, An Evaluation of the Factors Contributing to the
Failure of National Banks: Phase II, 7 OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY Q.J. 9, 9
(1988) (detailing policies and procedures of banks' management and board of
directors as major reasons for failed banks); James J. White, The S&L Debacle,
59 FORDHAM L. REV. S57 (1991) (arguing that simple accounting concepts can
provide insight into the demise of the thrift industry); James S. Granelli,
Forecast Is Now $3.4 Billion to Litigate Lincoln Savings, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1993, at 1, 1 (describing officials' negligent management and abuses).
63. DAY, supra note 51, at 373 (quoting William Crawford, California S&L
Commissioner).
64. Indeed, the debate over the causes is one where ideological fin-
ger-pointing will go on for many years. At its most basic level, that debate
involves "pro-free market forces" advocates on one side-those who tend to
advocate less government regulation while heaping much of the blame for the
crisis on the bank regulators and examiners themselves and on the entire
outdated banking regulatory framework in general. See, e.g., Macey & Miller,
supra note 60, at 1153; Weaver & O'Malley, supra note 59, at 101, 116. At the
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was left to pay for it. That burden eventually fell, and continues
to fall, on U.S. taxpayers. It is in this context then-the
resolution process and federal bailout of these failed financial
institutions-that the federal government employs the D'Oench
doctrine and § 1823(e) against former borrowers and creditors in
failed bank litigation.
B. BANK FAILURE, THE FDIC, AND THE RoAD TO D'OENCH
An understanding of the development of the D'Oench
doctrine and § 1823(e) begins with the creation of the FDIC
during the Great Depression.65 Congress established the FDIC
to eliminate bank runs, which occur when risk-averse depositors
withdraw entire accounts from their financially-troubled
institutions, causing them to become insolvent or to fail.66
Today, the FDIC discourages bank runs by insuring deposits in
each institution up to $100,000 per depositor.6 " This insurance
eliminates depositors' risk-related reasons to withdraw all of their
deposits simultaneously, and thus makes "bank runs" unlikely.
other end of the political spectrum are the "pro-regulatory forces" advo-
cates-those who place the blame for the crisis squarely on the lax regulation
wrought by the deregulation movement. See Ronald R. Glancz, Thrift Industry
Restructured:An Overview of FIRREA, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 472,472-73 (1989)
(arguing that the S&L failures are part of the legacy of deregulation); see also
Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank
Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 131-32 (1986) (rejecting the argument that
depositor discipline will cause banks to control their risk-taking); see generally
Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation
in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 521-37 (1989) (analyzing the
shift in regulatory strategy that has accompanied deregulation of banking).
65. By 1933, the political and economic need for the creation of reliable
federal deposit insurance was so great that the bill to create deposit insurance
passed in the House after just forty minutes of debate and was approved by the
Senate just hours thereafter. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 38 (1984).
66. A bank run occurs when many of the bank's customers try to
withdraw their money in a short period of time. Because the liquida-
tion value of even a healthy bank may be less than the value of its
outstanding deposits, a bank run can exhaust a bank's assets in a
short period of time, leading to the failure of the bank.. .. Because of
their sudden and violent nature, bank runs were described traditional-
ly in terms of irrational behavior; a series of bank runs may be called
a financial panic.
THE NEW PALGRAvE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 171 (Peter Newman
et al. eds., 1992).
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1994). Thus, a depositor with a $1 million dollar
deposit in one institution is at risk of losing $900,000; that same depositor,
however, could insure all of the $1 million by depositing $100,000 at ten
different FDIC-insured financial institutions.
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In addition to preventing bank failures,68 the FDIC also
plays a role after a bank fails, when it is appointed as a "receiv-
er." When a bank or S&L fails, its primary federal regulator69
declares it officially "insolvent." The regulator then appoints a
receiver ° or conservator 7---usually the FDIC 2 for commer-
cial banks and the RTC for S&Ls through 1995.7" Thus, in
68. See K.A. Randall, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation:
Regulatory Functions and Philosophy, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 696, 702
(1966) ("The FDIC does not merely engage to reimburse the depositor for the
loss of his deposits but undertakes to minimize bank failure [and preserve]
public confidence in banks.").
69. In the case of federal commercial banks, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) is the primary regulator. 12 U.S.C. §§ 191, 203(a)
(1994). The FDIC also has indirect closure powers. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2),
(d)(10). The primary regulator for S&Ls is the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS). 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (1994).
70. If it is acting in its "receivership" capacity, the FDIC behaves much like
a bankruptcy trustee, marshaling the assets and determining the liabilities of
the failed institution. A receiver is appointed for the purpose of liquidation:
"collecting assets and paying creditors." SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 5, at 604.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) grants to the FDIC and RTC the traditional functions of a
common law conservator or receiver. For example, much like a trustee in
bankruptcy, the FDIC is provided with an automatic stay pending litigation.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(B) (1994). Also, much like a bankruptcy trustee, the
FDIC has the power to repudiate contracts. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (1994); ef
11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994) (discussing powers of a common law bankruptcy trustee).
71. If it is acting in its "conservatorship" capacity, the FDIC maintains the
going concern value of the institution in an attempt to nurse the institution
back to health by overseeing its operation. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(B), (D)
(1994) (discussing the FDIC's responsibility to take action necessary to put the
insured institution into a sound condition, including operation of the institu-
tion).
72. The OCC must appoint the FDIC as receiver and the FDIC must accept
the appointment as receiver. 12 U.S.C. §§ 191, 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
However, the OCC may appoint the FDIC as conservator and the FDIC may
accept the conservatorship appointment. 12 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 1821 (c)(2)(A)(I).
The FDIC may be appointed receiver by state-chartered institutions as well. 12
U.S.C. § 1821(c)(3)(A)-(B) (1994).
In either its receivership or conservatorship capacities, the FDIC behaves
very differently than when it acts in its "corporate" role as an insurer charged
principally with the responsibility of insuring deposits. See supra note 67
(explaining the FDIC's role in its corporate capacity which entails reimbursing
each depositor at each institution up to $100,000); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1817
(1994) (providing that a financial institution, for an annual insurance fee, can
obtain FDIC deposit insurance and/or financial/operational assistance should
the institution fail or need assistance during the coverage period).
73. In late 1995, the RTC ceased to exist and all of its responsibilities were
transferred to the FDIC. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A) (1994) (describing the
FDIC's powers as the same as the RTC's). Before 1989, the appointed receiver
or conservator of a failed S&L was the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
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1996, the FDIC became the receiver of S&Ls. As receiver, the
FDIC assumes all of the legal responsibilities of the failed
institution, including the right to pursue, and the duty to defend,
all pending or potential legal claims and liabilities. One of the
FDIC's fundamental responsibilities is to collect the financial
institution's remaining assets, primarily borrowers' loan
obligations, '4 in an effort to meet its liabilities. 5
However, when the FDIC attempts to recover a debt still
owed to the institution, it often will face a borrower's counter-
claims or defenses. Such claims and defenses usually are based
on either (1) alleged verbal side agreements or special arrange-
ments the borrower made with the institution," or (2) the
borrower's alleged reliance on negligent or intentional verbal
Corporation (FSLIC). In 1989, Congress abolished the FSLIC, which by then
had insufficient funds to reimburse depositors due to the S&L crisis, by
enacting the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. The Act also abolished the
primary regulator of S&Ls-the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FLHBB, coyly
pronounced "FLUB" by critics and detractors). In their stead, Congress created
the OTS to act as the primary regulator of S&Ls and other thrift institutions,
and the RTC to act as a receiver and conservator in the place of the FSLIC (as
well as to act as receiver or conservator for state-chartered savings associa-
tions). However, the insuring responsibilities of FSLIC flowed not to the newly
created RTC, but to the FDIC. As a result, the FDIC currently administers two
insurance funds: (1) the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) - formed under FIRREA
§ 211(5), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(5)(B) (1994)-and (2) the successor to
the FSLIC fund, the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) (perhaps a
good omen in that the acronym is pronounced "safe")-formed under FIRREA
§ 211(6), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(6)(A) (1994).
74. FiNANCLL INsTrrUTIoNS 72 tbl. 3-1 (Richard I. Robinson ed., 3d ed.
1960) (demonstrating how loans constitute 41.3% of a bank's total assets, which
is the largest percentage of any asset).
75. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(3), (13) (1994) (requiring the FDIC to maximize
the returns on remaining assets and minimize the loss realized in the resolution
of cases). 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(ii) provides that the FDIC, as conservator or
receiver, may collect all obligations and money due to the institution. Similarly,
12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d)(2)(D)(ii) states that in its capacity as conservator, the FDIC
may take appropriate action to carry on the business of the institution and
preserve its assets and property. See FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 865 F.2d 1134,
1136-37 (10th Cir. 1988) (describing the FDIC's use of purchase and assumption
transactions to avoid problems associated with full-scale liquidation); Gunter v.
Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865-66 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982)
(same). See generally Michael B. Burgee, Purchase and Assumption Transac-
tions Under the Federal Deposit and Insurance Act, 14 FORUMI 1146 (1979)
(describing how the FDIC functions when taking over a failed bank).
76. E.g., Robinowitz v. Gibraltar Sav., 23 F.3d 951, 954-57 (5th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, Robinowitz v. RTC, 115 S. Ct. 725 (1995) (dismissing a suit alleging
breach of oral representations regarding a failed S&L's intentions to continue
funding for a project based on D'Oench).
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misrepresentations made by the institution."
These types of counterclaims and defenses are common in
collection and lender liability cases. A borrower often alleges
that before or during the repayment period, he and the lending
institution reached a verbal "understanding" or side agreement
that modified their original written loan agreement. For
instance, borrowers frequently assert that the parties agreed to
revise the interest rate or the time of repayment,78 establish
the liquidation procedures for collateral, 9 or extend, modify, or
renew the debt obligation-agreements that changing business
circumstances make necessary or desirable. ° Alternatively,
borrowers may claim that there was poor communication
between the lender and the borrower or even intentional deceit
on the part of the lender at the inception of the loan. For
example, a borrower might allege that her lender promised to
extend additional or unrelated financing or that it induced her
to borrow more funds than originally requested.8 She then
would argue that the financial institution negligently or
intentionally misled her and that she therefore should not be
liable for the remaining debt obligation. 2
77. E.g., FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 869 (3d Cir. 1994) (refusing to
enforce an oral extension agreement against the FDIC).
78. See, e.g., Reisig v. RTC, 806 P.2d 397, 400 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)
(dismissing a suit based on fraud, where the institution allegedly changed the
fixed-rate financing to a variable interest rate).
79. See, e.g., Abrams v. FDIC, 944 F.2d. 307, 310 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding
that a bank president's alleged promise not to collect any deficiency remaining
under loan and contract entered into after borrower defaulted could not prevent
the FDIC from relying on literal words of loan and contract to collect deficiency),
appeal after remand, 5 F.3d. 1013 (6th Cir. 1993).
80. See Deborah Addis, Comment: Tide May be Turning to Banks in Lender
Liability Lawsuits, AM. BANKER, May 25, 1993, at 4 (noting a trend toward
court rulings in favor of banks in lender liability lawsuits); A. Barry Cappello
& Frances E. Komoroske, Lender Liability Based on Undue Control Over a
Borrower, TRIAL, Dec. 1992, at 1, 19 (suggesting that lenders risk liability based
on undue control when they become involved in borrowers' business affairs);
Mark A. Cohen & Paul J. Marfinek, Lender Liability Suits Facing Major Drop-
Off, MASS. LAw. WKLY., Feb. 7, 1994, at 1 (noting a decline in the number of
lender-liability claims during the last several years).
81. See, e.g., Simms v. Biondo, 816 F. Supp. 814, 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(dismissing a claim based on an oral representation about the value of
mortgaged property).
82. See, e.g., McCullough v. FDIC, 788 F. Supp. 626, 627 (D. Mass. 1992)
(barring a suit by purchasers of condominium units against the FDIC based on
the bank's failure to disclose the existence of a state environmental cleanup
order affecting the subject property).
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Side agreements or verbal misrepresentations can, and often
do, constitute perfectly viable claims or defenses when the
borrower makes them against a solvent financial institution.83
The statute creating the FDIC, however, requires the
minimization of taxpayer cost.84 The FDIC, then, must resolve
a failed institution in the manner that is least costly to its
insurance fund. This is a powerful incentive for the FDIC to
employ the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) to deny otherwise
valid borrower claims and defenses, to dismiss claims, and thus
to save money. 5 Even with respect to a former creditor or
vendor of a failed financial institution-such as a bank's landlord
or provider of janitorial services-the D'Oench doctrine and
§ 1823(e) powers prohibit many of these types of otherwise viable
counterclaims or defenses.86 Fueled by its desire and statutory
duty to spare its own insurance fund, the FDIC takes cover
behind the statutory "least cost resolution" requirement tojustify
using D'Oench whenever it can, despite the inequitable results
and windfall recoveries it obtains in failed bank litigation.87
83. Such actions are known as "lender liability" actions because borrowers
are able to defend and often obtain damages on claims that their lenders acted
negligently in making the loan in the first place, negligently failed to continue
to provide financing after the initial loan was made, or generally violated the
law during the term of the loan such that the borrower should not be held liable
for the remaining loan obligation. Lender Liability Cases Dominate 1987"s List
of Largest Verdicts, INSIDE LrrIG., May 1988, at 9-10; see generally Cappello &
Komoroske, supra note 80, at 19 (warning that lenders may expose themselves
to lender liability claims based on undue control when they become involved
with borrowers' business operations).
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii) (1994).
85. See infra Part II (explaining in detail how the D'Oench doctrine and
§ 1823(e) operate in actual practice to prohibit many claims and defenses that
a former borrower would have against the failed financial institution in a
collection action).
86. See Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 937 F.2d 845, 858 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) prohibit a creditor from
asserting a side agreement, or any verbal misrepresentation, as a claim against
the FDIC standing in the shoes of the failed financial institution); see also
Hawke Ass'n v. City Fed. Sav. Bank, 707 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D. N.J. 1991)
(holding the plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements of § 1823(e)). But see
Cote d'Azur Homeowners Ass'n v. Venture Corp., 846 F. Supp. 827, 831 (N.D.
Cal 1994) (showing that D'Oench does not apply to creditors in non-lending
transactions). The D'Oench Duhme Reform Act would make it impossible to
apply D'Oench to these kinds of cases under the vendor and tort exceptions
explicit in the reform bill. See infra Part III (analyzing and critiquing likely
terminology in a reform bill and proposing statutory reform measures).
87. See S. 648 Hearings, supra note 1, at 52-53 (arguing that D'Oench and
§ 1823(e) are necessary components of the FDIC's arsenal against former
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Significant statutory reform of § 1823(e) therefore is necessary
to alleviate these injustices.
II. THE EXPANSION AND FUNCTION OF THE D'OENCH
DOCTRINE AND SECTION 1823(e)
A. FROM SOUND POLICY TO OVERGROWN SUPERPOWER
Recall from the introduction that a federal court dismissed
Mrs. Sweeney's valid claims against her lender when it became
insolvent and the RTC took its place in the litigation."5 Cer-
tainly this result is not what the 1942 Supreme Court envisioned
when it decided the D'Oench case, nor what the 1950 Congress
intended when it enacted § 1823(e). 9 Courts, after the creation
borrowers and creditors of failed financial institutions).
[Without] the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e), the FDIC would have
difficulty enforcing many valid obligations owed to the failed financial
institution because it often cannot rebut allegations of unwritten
agreements or arrangements as effectively as the failed institution.
After an institution fails, the FDIC does not have ready access to its
officers and employees. In such circumstances, the receiver frequently
is unable effectively to counter allegations that the institution entered
into written agreements or challenge the terms of such alleged
agreements. The ability of the FDIC to enforce the obligations due to
the failed institution in reliance upon the written records of loans and
other assets prevents fraudulent claims and unnecessary legal expense.
Id. at 53 (statement of Sharon Powers Sivertsen, Assistant General Counsel,
FDIC). Of course, this argument assumes that all claims are invalid simply
because the FDIC might have difficulty meeting its burden of proof as a receiver
substituted for the failed financial institution in the lawsuit. However, all
substituted parties are still required to present evidence and carry their burden
of proof at trial. Should the fact that the burden is a bit onerous on the
government be a justification to create and apply a harsh doctrine and statute
in order to summarily bar the claims and defenses of a party-opponent? This
seems to reduce the search for justice to a simple inquiry concerning whether
the FDIC is involved in the lawsuit against a former debtor or vendor.
88. See supra text accompanying note 32.
89. Most commentators agree that the D'Oench doctrine has been greatly
expanded from its equitable underpinnings. See, e.g., Warren Dennis, The Rise
and Expansion of the D'Oench Doctrine, 767 ALI-ABA 157, 177 (1992) ("With
guidance from the Supreme Court in Langley, the D'Oench doctrine has
expanded far beyond its foundation in the D'Oench decision."); see also
Echevarria, supra note 36, at 746 ("Through the course of subsequent case law,
D'Oench has been dramatically expanded in its application and now essentially
precludes the assertion of fraud defenses or causes of action against successors
to failed banks and savings and loan institutions."); Flint, supra note 36, at 466-
67 ("In the last fifty years the D'Oench doctrine has been greatly expanded by
the courts."); Hymanson, supra note 36, at 255 ("Although the D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine is rooted in equitable principles, many courts have lost sight of its
source and have applied the doctrine as a blanket protection of the FDIC.").
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of D'Oench and § 1823, began interpreting them to such an
expanded degree that they now work injustice upon thousands
of individuals who simply have had the misfortune of dealing
with financial institutions that eventually failed.90
1. The Original Policy Goals of the D'Oench Doctrine
Despite harsh results in many modern applications, the
D'Oench doctrine originally sprang from legitimate policy con-
cerns.9 To understand these concerns, it is important to consider
the facts of the original case. D'Oench, Duhme & Company, a
securities dealer, sold bonds to Belleville Bank & Trust Company
on which D'Oench later defaulted.92 To protect its image and to
enable the bank to hide the past due bonds on its books, D'Oench
executed non-negotiable promissory notes to the bank to cover the
value of the defaulted bonds. D'Oench and the Belleville Bank
understood, however, that these promissory notes were never to be
collected. In fact, the parties included a receipt with the notes,
stating: "[T]his note is given with the understanding it will not be
called for payment. All interest payments to be repaid."93
90. See infra notes 234-261 and accompanying text (setting forth the many
claims and defenses barred by the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e)).
91. The three main policy concerns of D'Oench, as presented by a
representative of the FDIC before the Senate Banking Committee, include:
First, the D'Oench doctrine ensures that regulators can rely on a
financial institution's records for supervisory purposes and in order to
protect the deposit insurance funds they administer.... Second, the
D'Oench doctrine promotes careful consideration of lending practices,
assures proper recordation of various financial activities, and protects
against collusive or erroneous structuring or restructuring of terms,
especially just before the institution fails. Third, the D'Oench doctrine
protects the innocent depositors and creditors of a failed institution,
including the FDIC, from absorbing the losses resulting from agree-
ments that do not appear in the records and books of the institution
and helps to facilitate the quick return of a failed institution's assets
to the community.
S. 648 Hearings, supra note 1, at 52 (statement of Sharon Powers Sivertsen,
Assistant General Counsel, FDIC). But see Echevarria, supra note 36, at 771
(suggesting that when the D'Oench case was decided the Supreme Court was
more concerned with asserting the existence of a federal common law in the
wake of Ere R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), than with expanding the
powers of the FDIC); see also Oversight Hearings, supra note 20, at 4 (arguing
D'Oench was primarily a case working out some of the implications of federal
common law under Tompkins, rather than the basis for the sweeping banking
doctrine it has become) (statement of Professor Michael P. Malloy).
92. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 454 (1942).
93. Id. Note that D'Oench paid certain interest payments on the notes in
order to keep them from defaulting and then executed renewal notes in 1933.
Id.
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The FDIC later obtained one of these notes as collateral for
a $1,000,000 loan it made to the failing Belleville Bank. When
it attempted to collect on the note, D'Oench claimed that the
note was unenforceable for lack of consideration. Although this
would have been a valid defense against Belleville Bank, the
Supreme Court held that D'Oench could not raise the defense
against the FDIC because D'Oench participated in a scheme to
make the bank appear more financially solid than it actually
was.94 As the Court stated, "one who gives such a note to a
bank with a secret agreement that it will not be enforced must
be presumed to know that it will conceal the truth from the
vigilant eyes of the bank examiners.""
The D'Oench Court devised a strict test for secret agree-
ments with a bank to conceal the true state of the bank's assets:
The test is whether the note was designed to deceive the creditors or
the public authority or would tend to have that effect. It would be
sufficient in this type of case that the maker lent himself to a scheme
or arrangement whereby the banking authority on which [the FDIC]
relied in insuring the bank was or was likely to be misled. 6
Such a test, the Court noted, reflected the federal policy of
protecting the FDIC from misrepresentations concerning the
integrity of bank portfolios that it insures.97
An FDIC representative has summarized D'Oench's policy
justifications as follows:
The public policies achieved by [using D'Oench] lie at the core of the
ability of the FDIC and other bank regulators effectively to supervise
open banks and to resolve the failures of failing banks. The ability to
rely upon the records of a failed bank in order to evaluate its assets
and liabilities is essential to protect the deposit insurance funds and
the public interest in a sound banking system.
The public policies achieved by D'Oench and section 1823(e)
include insuring the ability of bank regulators to accurately evaluate
the books and records of open or failed institutions, the validity of the
asset information provided on Call Reports submitted by banks to
regulators, fairness to the creditors and depositors of a failed bank, and
protection of the deposit insurance funds."
This statement illustrates that bank examiners must be able to
rely on a bank's written records about the existence of any side
94. Id. at 459.
95. Id. at 460.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 459.
98. Oversight Hearings, supra note 20, at 143 (statement of John F.
Bovenzi, FDIC ).
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agreement that may impair or affect the value of any bank asset.
Such reliance is necessary to fulfill the government bank
examiners' duty to ascertain the value of the loans both while
the financial institution is solvent, and especially at the time the
institution fails and is being seized by the FDIC.99 Inspecting
loan files will not make federal examiners aware of oral side
agreements or verbal understandings related to those loans.'00
In the case of an FDIC seizure of an insolvent institution, where
its examination and loan valuation process must be performed
as quickly and efficiently as possible, sometimes in only a few
days or even a few hours, discovery is even less likely.' °'
Thus, the D'Oench case, which arose in the context of on-site
bank examinations by the government, should have a limited
holding grounded primarily in estoppel and equity. 2
D'Oench's main emphasis is on the "secret agreement" between
the debtor and the bank.'0 3 In fact, the separate concurring
opinion of Justice Jackson grounded D'Oench on equitable
99. Id.
100. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862,872 (11th Cir.) (explaining that
the FDIC, having acquired the note for value in good faith as part of a purchase
and assumption agreement, had a complete defense to the fraud claims raised),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
101. See Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 540 F. Supp. 1374, 1380
(N.D. Cal.), reversed, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining how a seizure and
closure of an insolvent financial institution occurs over a weekend similar to a
police raid), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); see also FDIC v. Bank of Boulder,
865 F.2d 1134, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining how the various ministerial
functions that take place during the seizure of a failed bank must take place as
quickly and efficiently as possible to have the closed bank operating again
under new management within a few days).
102. See Palmer, supra note 36, at 569 (explaining that "the clear rationale
of the D'Oench doctrine was that the borrower should be estopped from
asserting his defense because of his unclean hands. D'Oench was never
intended to reach those cases where an innocent borrower is defrauded and did
not materially participate in the fraud."); see also Hymanson, supra note 36, at
275 (viewing D'Oench as an equitable estoppel case that applies to any defense
a borrower may assert, but that must be tempered with the equitable principles
of insolvency law).
103. [F]or the D'Oench doctrine to bar a defendant's wrongful act as a
defense to an obligation on a note as against the corporation, three
elements are required: there must be a secret arrangement; there must
be a possibility that the corporation [the FDIC] could suffer loss (but
proof of such loss is not required); and the borrower need not have
fraudulent intent, it is enough that his actions might cause the
authorities to be misled.
Jack S. Sacks, Red Alert: The D'Oench Doctrine's Expansion Can Cause
Financial Ruin for Borrowers When Insured Lenders Become Insolvent, 17 NOVA
L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1993)
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principles and would not have allowed the FDIC to recover
absent a "secret agreement" made to deceive the bank's receiv-
er."4 Estoppel and equity principles dictate that the D'Oench
doctrine should apply only when the borrower, along with the
bank, seeks to deceive bank examiners, because no injustice
results therefrom. Unfortunately for many borrowers in the last
decade, however, the D'Oench doctrine has become divorced from
its original equitable underpinning.
10 5
2. The Common Law Judicial Expansion of the D'Oench
Doctrine
Until 1980, courts construed the D'Oench doctrine narrowly
by adhering to the original equitable requirements of the
D'Oench case.10 6 During this period of relative calm, D'Oench
was used simply as a tool to prevent secret agreements between
the borrower and his financial institution.' Consistent with
D'Oench, cases during this period usually prohibited claims only
by borrowers who had engaged in fraudulent behavior.'
Because few banks failed between 1950 and the early 1980s,10 9
104. D'Oench, Dubme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,474 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
105. See infra notes 111-261 (describing the expansion of the D'Oench
doctrine through judicial common law and statutory interpretation).
106. For example, in FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1974), the
court relied on Justice Jackson's concurrence in D'Oench to rule that D'Oench
did not apply to a notemaker who is "wholly innocent" of the bank's wrongful
conduct. Meo would have limited the application of D'Oench to its equitable
roots, but the decision was hardly followed after the late 1970s. In fact, most
commentators refer to Meo as an historical footnote or "dead law." See, e.g.,
Michael J. Barry, Ways Around the Wrath: Exploring the Remaining Exceptions
to the D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine and Section 1823(e), 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 1127,
1134-37 (1993) (arguing that subsequent case law rejected the Meo equitable
exception).
107. FDIC v. Alker, 151 F.2d 907, 908-09 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 799 (1946) (barring a debtor from asserting a claim against the FDIC that
the lender agreed not to collect on a promissory note or demand possession of
collateral if the debtor paid all interest payments).
108. See Meo, 505 F.2d at 792 (concluding that D'Oench did not apply to a
wholly innocent borrower); see also First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361,
1369-71 (9th Cir.) (holding that the FDIC, when it acts as a receiver, must be
controlled by the equitable principles of receivership, and therefore refused to
apply the D'Oench doctrine), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 906 (1981); Hymanson, supra note 36, at 284 (citing First Empire Bank as
a pre-1980's case that used equitable principles in applying the D'Oench
doctrine).
109. Between 1943 and 1974, the number of bank failures per year in the
United States never exceeded ten. With the exception of 1975 (14 failures) and
1348
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however, relatively few substantive decisions interpreted the
D'Oench doctrine."0 Thus, before 1980, as a matter of judicial
interpretation, the D'Oench doctrine remained largely unchanged
from the original holding in the D'Oench case, primarily because
bank failures and general problems in the banking industry were
too few to give the courts many opportunities to apply the
doctrine.
The judicial expansion of D'Oench accelerated in the early
1980s, however. The increase in bank failures spurred many
courts to apply D'Oench more broadly to protect the FDIC's
financial insurance interests."' One of the most critical
common law expansions occurred when various courts began
ruling that the FDIC's knowledge of a "secret" side agreement
was irrelevant.' Side agreements of which the FDIC was
aware, however, could not deceive or mislead the FDIC. Thus,
these rulings, which allowed courts to bar claims and defenses
based on agreements that clearly were no secret, represented a
1976 (17 failures), the number of bank failures from 1944 to 1981 per year still
did not exceed ten. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CoRP., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 101 tbl.
122 (1990); see also supra note 5 (discussing trends in bank failures from 1920
to 1974).
110. Most commentators, in fact, simply skip the period from 1950 (the
enactment of § 1823(e)) to the early 1980s (the beginning of the rash of bank
failures) in the analysis of the growth and expansion of the D'Oench doctrine.
This is due to the dearth of case law interpreting the doctrine and statute
during this period. See, e.g., Echevarria, supra note 36, at 771 n.178 (noting
that from 1942 to 1970 only one federal appellate decision was decided
substantively under D'Oench).
111. To the extent that banks were failing and the FDIC needed to obtain
and protect assets (former loans) owed to the institution, the D'Oench doctrine
and the application of § 1823(e) served to defeat many claims and defenses of
former borrowers and creditors and therefore lowered the overall cost of the
bailout. See Oversight Hearings, supra, note 20, at 35 (statement of John F.
Bovenzi, FDIC Director Division of Depositor & Asset Services); see also
Chatham Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC, 651 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1981) (using D'Oench
as authority in protecting the FDIC's interests), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972
(1982); Sacks, supra note 103, at 1428 ("Today, it is generally accepted that
D'Oench bars affirmative claims as well as defenses arising from a scheme or
arrangement likely to deceive bank examiners.").
112. See, e.g., FDIC v. Krause, 904 F.2d 463,466 (8th Cir. 1990) (precluding
defense of accord and satisfaction between borrower and lender even though
evidence of agreement existed in bank records according to affidavit of the failed
bank's president); FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 162 (6th Cir.) ("The FDIC
cannot, therefore, be charged with knowledge of a defense merely because that
information could be found in the bank's files."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944
(1985); FDIC v. Merchant's Natl Bank, 725 F.2d 634,640 (11th Cir.) (determin-
ing that the FDIC is not imputed with knowledge of an agreement which bank
examiners may have discovered), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984).
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significant departure from the D'Oench doctrine's original policy
justification. 113
The judicial extension did not stop with making the FDIC's
knowledge of any side agreement irrelevant. Courts also decided
that the FDIC could assert the D'Oench doctrine even when the
former lending institution defrauds an innocent borrower. For
example, in FDIC v. Hatmaker,"4 the borrower had a close
working relationship with the bank and therefore agreed to sign
a blank promissory note after the lender promised to write in the
agreed-upon loan amount of $12,000.1" Although the borrower
received the $12,000 pursuant to their agreement, the lender
actually inserted "$60,000" as the loan amount to make the
bank's books appear stronger financially." 6 When the bank
failed, the FDIC successfully used the D'Oench doctrine to collect
the full, imaginary $60,000 and block the innocent borrower's
defense that he had repaid in full the actual $12,000 loan.
117
Consequentially, where the D'Oench doctrine once was used only
to protect the innocent FDIC against a borrower's fraud, the
FDIC now could use it to benefit from a $48,000 fraud that a
bank perpetrated against an innocent borrower."'
Finally, although borrowers are affected by D'Oench in
significantly larger numbers, and thus have been the focus of
this Article, creditors perhaps have been subject to the most
highly publicized abuses of D'Oench."9 In one such case, a
bank asked a roofer to complete a job for a property that the
bank had taken over. When the bank failed, the FDIC refused
to pay the roofer because his agreement did not comply with the
requirements of § 1823(e). 2°
113. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942)
(explaining the federal policy protecting the FDIC and public funds).
114. 756 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985).
115. Id. at 35-36.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 36.
118. Id.
119. See Peter A. Brown, Workers Holding Bills Owed by Failed Banks Left
Holding the Bag, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Weekend Release, May 7-8,
1994; Stephanie Finucane, Small Business Alert: Have You Been D'Oenched by
the FDIC?, FAIRFIELD COUNTY Bus. J., Feb. 14, 1994, 13, 13.
120. Brown, supra note 119. Another example of a subcontractor who had
completed work on properties financed by failed institutions but was never paid
for goods and services is Ramins & Sons, Inc. v. RTC, No. CIV.A.92-4919, 1993
WL 210551 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1993) (mem.) (regarding a Pennsylvania roofer
who never received the $11,000 in repairs he completed on a property that the
1350
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3. The Common Law Expansion of the D'Oench Doctrine: The
Federal Holder in Due Course Doctrine
The Federal Holder In Due Course (HIDC) doctrine repre-
sents yet another judicial expansion of the D'Oench doctrine's
application, because it, like the D'Oench doctrine, allows the
FDIC to acquire the assets of a failed institution without being
subject to the debtor's personal defenses.' 2 ' Technically
D'Oench did not apply in some cases where a failing bank
fraudulently induced borrowers to purchase its stock.
122
D'Oench applied only to "agreements," and courts did not
interpret borrowers' claims of tortious misrepresentations as
agreements.'" D'Oench also did not apply because the borrow-
ers did not engage in deceit. The FDIC thus had to argue that
it was an HIDC to obtain a result consistent with D'Oench.
RTC subsequently sold).
David Hess, of "Citizens & Business for D'Oench Duhme Reform,"
summarized D'Oench's power against creditors as follows:
[I]f a bank fails and the FDIC steps in, a claim against the bank may
be worthless because it isn't based on a written "agreement" approved
by the board of directors and kept as an official record. This affects
thousands of small businesses that perform services for banks
(carpenters, computer vendors and window washers among others), as
well as innocent plaintiffs in personal injury or other tort lawsuits
against banks.
Finucane, supra note 119, at 13.
121. Various cases have applied the HIDC doctrine. See, e.g., FSLIC v.
Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1256-57 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying the HIDC doctrine to
FSLIC); FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir.) (using HIDC to bar state
usury law defense), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985). Actually, FDIC v.
Rockelman, 460 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Wis. 1978) appears to be the first case to
apply the HIDC doctrine. In Rockelman, the Court was very concerned with
more than forty cases it was handling from the failure of one bank, so the Court
found that Congress intended to clothe the FDIC in HIDC status to shield it
from many ordinarily available defenses. Id. at 1003.
122. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 871-73 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 826 (1982); see, e.g., FDIC v. Cremona Co., 832 F.2d 959, 964 (6th Cir.
1987) (holding that § 1823(e) does not bar properly recorded side agreements
but that the HIDC doctrine bars them for lack of knowledge), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1017 (1988); Wood, 758 F.2d at 159 (holding that D'Oench may or may not
bar state usury law defenses, but that the HIDC doctrine does bar them); New
Conn. Bank & Trust Co. v. Stadium Management Corp., 132 B.R. 205, 208-10
(D. Mass. 1991) (stating that the D'Oench doctrine does not bar impairment of
collateral claim because it is not an agreement, but that the HIDC doctrine does
bar such a claim, as long as it is a negotiable instrument).
123. But see Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 87 (1987) (extending the
interpretation of the term "agreement" in § 1823(e) to include tortious
misrepresentations as well as formal contractual agreements).
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The FDIC is not qualified to become a regular HIDC under
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)12 because when it
acquires assets from a failed institution, it normally does so in
a liquidation, 5 as a receiver in a purchase and assumption
transaction, 25 or when" it buys assets at face value to assist a
failing institution. 27  None of these methods of acquisition
meets the UCC's requirement of acquiring assets "in the
ordinary course of business."" Nonetheless, courts decided
that the FDIC qualified as a federal HIDC.129  By creating a
124. A holder in due course must take the instrument for value, in good
faith, and without notice of any defense or claim against the instrument.
U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2) (1987).
125. The deposit payoff is the banking law equivalent of a simple
liquidation. When an institution fails, the FDIC as insurer (in its
"corporate capacity") pays off all of the insured depositors immediately
in cash or by transferring the deposits to another institution (it may
also pay off the uninsured depositors if it believes that doing so will
minimize the costs of the resolution). The FDIC in its corporate
capacity is then "subrogated" to-stands in the shoes of-the former
depositors and has a claim against the receivership along with other
creditors. Meanwhile, the FDIC as receiver marshals the assets and
distributes them ratably to all creditors (including itself) according to
their order of priority. At the conclusion of the process the former
institution has disappeared completely, although its assets and
liabilities remain in the economy in other hands.
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 644.
126. See supra notes 69-75 (discussing the FDIC's role in receivership). The
purchase and assumption transaction has become the preferred method for
dealing with bank failures because depositors are paid off completely and the
transaction can be conducted with great speed, usually overnight. See
Hymanson, supra note 36, at 260-61 (noting that a purchase and assumption
transaction is the most common method of dealing with bank failures and that
typically the FDIC will keep the assets that are difficult to collect and sell the
rest to other banks, or form a bridge bank, while the FDIC in its receivership
capacity pursues the bad assets); see also Barry, supra note 106, at 1128
(explaining that the FDIC may engage in a "Purchase & Assumption transac-
tion" when a bank fails).
127. See Hymanson, supra note 36, at 262-63 (citing the FDIC's handling of
the Continental Illinois Bank in 1984). Perceiving that the Continental Illinois
Bank was "too big to fail," the FDIC infused the bank with a large amount of
capital and purchased a large number of non-performing loans from it. Id. In
this and similar bailouts, the FDIC works in its corporate capacity because the
bank in question has not yet failed, so the FDIC has not been appointed as
receiver or conservator. Id.
128. The FDIC is not considered a holder in due course because the assets
are not received in the ordinary course of business; instead, the FDIC receives
the assets of a failing institution in bulk. U.C.C. § 3-302(c).
129. But see RTC v. Oaks Apartments Joint Venture, 966 F.2d 995, 1001-02
(5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a $2 million debt "or so much thereof as may be
advanced" was not a sum certain, making the note non-negotiable and therefore
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special federal HIDC status, courts allowed the FDIC to preclude
the borrowers' claims of tortious misrepresentation-the same
result as if the D'Oench doctrine itself applied.3 0 Although the
federal HIDC doctrine may be largely irrelevant in the wake of
the general common law and statutory expansions of D'Oench
and § 1823(e), courts occasionally refer to the HIDC doctrine as
part of the overall D'Oench doctrine. It thus exemplifies the
continuing expansion of the application of D'Oench.
4. The Expansion of the D'Oench Doctrine by Legislation:
Section 1823(e)
a. D'Oench Codification Through the 1950 Enactment of
Section 1823(e)
The statutory expansion of the D'Oench doctrine began in
1950, when Congress codified the doctrine in 12 U.S.C. §
1823(e).' 3 ' Congress's codification, however, ultimately did
more to dismantle the reasoning of D'Oench than to codify it.
This legislation enlarged the D'Oench doctrine's scope by failing
to include the requirement of deceit on the part of the borrower.
Although the legislation harmonized the D'Oench doctrine with
the statute of frauds by requiring a writing to uphold an
agreement," 2 it excluded an integral part of the doctrine's
making the HIDC doctrine inapplicable to the RTC); Desmond v. FDIC, 798 F.
Supp. 829, 839-41 (D. Mass. 1992) (finding that a variable interest rate note
was not negotiable so the FDIC did not qualify as an HIDC). But see generally
Firstsouth v. Aqua Constr., Inc., 858 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[Tlhe
federal law is evolving toward the view that FSLIC as receiver enjoys the status
of [an HIDC] regardless of the manner in which it acquires notes and
comparable instruments."); Flint, supra note 36, at 469-70 (arguing that courts
created the HIDC doctrine as a mere fiction to expand the D'Oench doctrine).
130. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 873 (11th Cir.) (determining
that as a matter of common law the FDIC had a complete defense to state and
common law fraud claims ff the FDIC otherwise acquired the note in good
faith), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
131. Section 1823(e) amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, supra note
13, ch. 967, § 2(13), 64 Stat. 888 (1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e)).
132. The underlying purpose of a statute of frauds is to provide an incentive
to reduce agreements to writing.
A writing [has] several functions. Its original purpose was evidentiary,
providing some proof that the alleged agreement was actually made.
Another function was a cautionary one; by bringing home to the
promisor the significance of his act and preventing ill-considered and
impulsive promises. The final function a writing serves is that of
channeling. It allows the ability to mark off unenforceable agreements
from enforceable ones.
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original purpose by barring otherwise valid claims and defenses
of innocent borrowers.
As enacted in 1950, § 1823(e) invalidated any agreement
that impaired the FDIC's interest in an acquired asset unless:
(1) the agreement was in writing; (2) the bank and the borrower
or creditor executed the agreement contemporaneously with the
bank's acquisition of the asset; (3) the bank's board of directors
or loan committee approved it; and (4) it was continuously
maintained in the bank's official records.133  Section 1823(e)
thus gives borrowers a means to enforce legitimate side agree-
ments in the event of bank failure despite D'Oench.
Given the dearth of legislative history on § 1823(e), it is
unclear whether Congress originally enacted § 1823(e) to codify
D'Oench, limit its scope, or expand its reach.13 Representative
Francis Walters, co-sponsor of the legislation, offered the
following guidance during the floor debate on the bill:
It was never the intention of Congress to give to the FDIC a stronger
position than that of the bank, and the adoption of the amendment, my
amendment [§ 1823(e)], is offered to prove heretofore it was the intent
of Congress that any agreement in the absence of fraud is binding on
the FDIC."3'
Commentators disagree on the significance of Walters' state-
ment. Some commentators argue that it limits § 1823(e) to the
fraud requirement present in the original D'Oench case,136
while others essentially ignore it, arguing that the specific
language of § 1823(e) speaks for itself.'37 This disagreement
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.1 (1982) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS].
133. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
134. See, e.g., Hymanson, supra note 36, at 270 ("[S]ection 1823(e) was added
as an amendment to a much larger bill covering other aspects of the FDIC's
operation, without the benefit of public hearings or congressional debate, and
without an explicit statement of congressional intent to preempt the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine.").
135. 86 CONG. REc. 10,732 (1950) (statement of Rep. Walters).
136. See, e.g., Echevarria, supra note 36, at 768-69 (arguing that the
comments of Representative Walters demonstrate that Congress was not
interested in expanding the FDIC's existing powers, but in defining them more
rigidly); Robert W. Norcross, The Bank Insolvency Game, the D'Oench Doctrine,
and Federal Common Law, 103 BANKING L.J. 316, 328 (1986) (arguing that
Congress intended to limit D'Oench's application with § 1823(e)).
137. See, e.g., FDIC v. O'Neil, 809 F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding
that § 1823(e) faithfully preserved, yet extended and clarified, the basic
elements of D'Oench); Gray, supra note 36, at 251-52 (discounting the comments
of Representative Walters, and instead relying upon the plain meaning of
§ 1823(e)); see also Flint, supra note 36, at 468 n.8 (arguing that Representative
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has caused controversy and confusion among courts as well as
commentators regarding whether § 1823(e) "superseded"
D'Oench,' or whether Congress merely codified D'Oench
without preempting it.'39 The most practical way to under-
stand the interplay between D'Oench and § 1823(e), however, is
to perceive the two as having merged into a single, powerful
doctrine with the common law's flexibility for expansive applica-
tion and the rigidity of a statute for strict enforcement purpos-
es.140  This hybrid of simultaneous flexibility and rigidity
serves as the interpretive foundation upon which courts
subsequently have expanded the application of the D'Oench
doctrine in a manner never contemplated in 1942 or 1950.141
Walters' statements do not mar the plain words of§ 1823(e) and dismissing this
recourse to legislative history when the statutory language of § 1823(e) is
unambiguous).
138. See, e.g., Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 871-72 (11th Cir.) (noting
that § 1823(e) "superseded"D'Oench), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). Indeed,
the issue has continuing relevance, as the D.C. and Eighth Circuits recently
held that § 1823(e) completely preempted the D'Oench doctrine. See Murphy v.
FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the passage of § 1823(e)
preempted D'Oench and citing O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048,
2052 (1994) for the proposition that FIRREA, also possibly preempted D'Oench);
DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatman's First Nat'l Bank,
69 F.3d 1398, 1401-02 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that § 1823(e) preempted
D'Oench). See generally Edgar Class, The Precarious Position of the FDIC After
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 373, 399-402 (1995)
(discussing the implications of O'Melveny). Recent reports concerning the
imminent demise of the D'Oench doctrine have been premature, however, for
these courts did not reject § 1823(e) or the principles upon which the D'Oench
doctrine is based.
139. See Sacks, supra note 103, at 1411 ("The majority of jurisdictions view
section 1823(e) as a codification of the D'Oench doctrine but not a preemption."
(citation omitted)).
140. Oversight Hearings, supra note 20, at 14-15 (arguing that this is the
proper way to conceive of the D'Oenchl§ 1823(e) doctrine) (statement of
Professor Michael P. Malloy); see Dennis, supra note 89, at 168-69 (citing seven
cases that used the D'Oench doctrine as a unified doctrine and arguing that
"[diespite some apparent differences between the common law and statutory
sources, by interpreting the D'Oench decision and § 1823(e) together, often
juxtaposing case law arising under each (particularly when finding that both
apply), courts have merged jurisprudence from the two sources into a single
'D'Oench doctrine"); see also Robert J. Stillman, Enforcing Agreements with
Failed Depository Institutions: A Battle with the FDICIRTC Superpowers, 47
Bus. LAw. 99, 101 n.19 (1991) ("D'Oench and section 1823(e) have been
construed in tandem, and the statute's specific requirements have been
incorporated into the common law through the D'Oench doctrine.").
141. See infra Part H.C. (building upon this conceptual foundation in
explaining and analyzing the common law judicial expansion of the scope of
both the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e)).
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b. The Expansion of the D'Oench Doctrine by Judicial
Interpretation of Section 1823(e)
The United States Supreme Court revisited D'Oench and
implicitly approved prior judicial expansion in 1987 in Langley
v. FDIC.42 In Langley, borrowers executed a promissory note
to the bank in exchange for a large portion of land. After they
failed to pay the first installment due on the promissory note,
the bank sued to collect. 43 The Langleys claimed that the
bank orally misrepresented the actual size and value of the
land.' They also claimed the bank fraudulently induced
them to sign the promissory note 45 and that § 1823(e) did not
apply because the bank's oral misrepresentations were not
"agreements" within the meaning of § 1823(e). 46
The Langleys' plight did not sway a single Justice. The
unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, first decided
to interpret broadly the term "agreement" as set forth in
§ 1823(e). It then concluded that a bank's express oral warranty
is an "agreement" subject to the strict requirements of
§ 1823(e). 47 Finally, the Court ruled that fraud in the induce-
ment is not a defense to § 1823(e). 48 Justice Scalia viewed
this interpretation of § 1823(e) as necessary to allow federal and
state examiners to rely on the bank's records because most failed
bank liquidations are conducted overnight. 49 He also viewed
this broad application of § 1823(e) as necessary to ensure mature
consideration of all unusual transactions by senior bank officials,
and to prevent fraud and collusion between a borrower and a
failing bank. 5 °
Langley thus expanded the D'Oench doctrine by interpreting
§ 1823(e) to include any agreement, not simply "secret agree-
ments" or participation in "schemes that tend to deceive."' 5'
In effect, Langley now allows the FDIC to use the D'Oench
doctrine to prevent a borrower from bringing forward a legiti-
142. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
143. Id. at 88.
144. Id. at 89.
145. Id. at 93.
146. Id. at 90-91.
147. Id. at 91.
148. Id. at 93.
149. Id. at 91-92.
150. Id. at 92.
151. Id.
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mate fraud claim against a bank even though the borrower has
not engaged in any culpable conduct. As such it represents a
critical change in the overall interpretation of the D'Oench
doctrine. Moreover, by defining a bank's duty not to make
verbal misrepresentations to a borrower as an "agreement"
within § 1823(e), Langley moved away from the customary
definition of "agreement" as something more akin to a contract
than a tort.'52 Langley, therefore, has allowed courts to apply
§ 1823(e) as a strict liability statute without D'Oench's equitable
underpinnings. 15 3
c. The 1989 Legislative Expansion of Section 1823(e) by
FIRREA's Application of Section 1823(e) to Additional
Parties
Congress again revisited and expanded § 1823(e) in 1989.
As originally enacted, § 1823(e) applied only to the FDIC in its
corporate insurer capacity, when it purchases assets of a failed
bank for which it is not acting as a receiver.' That section
made no mention of its application to the FDIC as a receiver of
a failed financial institution.'55 In 1989, however, Congress
152. Id. at 92-93. "An agreement is the meeting of two or more minds; a
coming together in opinion or determination; the coming together in accord of
two minds on a given proposition." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 67 (6th ed. 1990)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter BLACK'S].
153. The Langleys could not have lent themselves to a scheme because they
did not know of a scheme, so the court in Langley came to the wrong decision
with respect to the D'Oench case. See Hymanson, supra note 36, at 310
(discussing Langley as an example of analyzing § 1823(e)); see also Jane Depper
Goldstein, Langley v. FDIC: FDIC Superpowers-A License to Commit Fraud,
8 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 559, 580-81 (1989) (expressing deep concern over the
expansion of the D'Oench doctrine by Langley and arguing both that Langley
has endorsed a policy whereby the FDIC can recoup the public's losses from a
few unfortunate individuals who have significant liability and that the FDIC,
backed by insurance premiums and a 90% rate of recovery, is better positioned
to bear the loss).
154. See FDIC v. Ashley, 585 F.2d 157, 161 (6th Cir. 1978) ("The FDIC was
authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to act in its corporate capacity to purchase
certain assets of a closed bank"); accord FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Ctr., Inc.,
766 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1985).
[The] FDIC insures bank deposits; as an insurer one of [the FDIC's]
primary duties is to pay the depositors of a failed bank. In the course
of fulfilling this duty, [the] FDIC frequently purchases the assets of a
failed bank and then attempts to collect on them to minimize the loss
to the insurance fund.
Id. at 748.
155. Before 1989, § 1823(e) applied only to assets "acquired by [the FDIC]
under this section, either as security for a loan or by purchase [with no mention
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directly addressed the issue in the FIRREA,'56 a comprehen-
sive statute significantly changing the regulatory landscape of
the banking industry in response to the banking crisis and S&L
debacle of the late 1980s.'57
FIRREA widened the purview of § 1823(e) to apply to the
FDIC in its receivership capacity, as well as its corporate
of FDIC as receiver]." 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988) (amended 1989 & 1994). This
result was confirmed in 1982 in the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 113(m)(2), 96 Stat. 1469, 1474 (1982) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1994)), which revised § 1823(e) but did not
extend it to the FDIC as receiver. The pre-1989, pre-FIRREA language of
§ 1823(e) reflected the dichotomy between the FDIC in its corporate form and
the FDIC in its receivership capacity, and the idea that the FDIC had to choose
between liquidating a failed institution (as FDIC-Receiver) or pursuing other
means to assist it such as purchasing some of its failed assets (which it could
do as FDIC-corporate).
156. See supra note 73 (describing the adoption of FIRREA). See generally
Lake, supra note 18, at 322 (calling FIRREA the "most fundamental reorganiza-
tion of financial institution regulation since the Great Depression."). Lake
describes the primary purposes of FIRREA as:
(1) to promote a safe and stable system of affordable housing finance,
(2) to improve the supervision of savings associations, (3) to place
Federal Deposit Insurance funds in sound financial condition for the
future, (4) to provide funds from public and private sources to deal
expeditiously with failed financial institutions, and (5) to strengthen
the enforcement powers of federal regulators of financial institutions.
Id.
157. See generally Swire, supra note 36 (analyzing the sweeping legislative
and regulatory reforms brought about by FIRREA); Anthony C. Providenti, Jr.,
Note, Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned: Statutory Overview of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. S323 (1991) (same). FIRREA first abolished the FSLIC.
FIRREA, supra note 73, § 401(a)(1), 103 Stat. 183, 354 (1989) (repealing 12
U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730). The FSLIC was created in 1934, Act of June 27, 1934, ch.
847, tit. IV, § 402, 48 Stat. 1256 (repealed 1989), to perform functions for thrifts
analogous to the functions performed by the FDIC for banks, such as insuring
deposits. See supra notes 66-74 (discussing the functions of the FDIC).
FIRREA also abolished the FHLBB. FIRREA, supra note 73, § 401(a)(2), 103
Stat. 183, 354 (1989) (repealing 12 U.S.C. § 1437). FHLBB, recall, chartered
federal thrifts before FIRREA created the OTS to take its place. Id. § 301, 103
Stat. 183, 278 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1462(a) (West Supp.
1996)). FIRREA also granted the FSLIC's powers to the FDIC. H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C-.N.
432, 433; see FIRREA, supra note 73, §§ 202, 209(1), 103 Stat. 183, 188, 216
(1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811(a), 1819 (1994)) (amending the
FDIC's duties and powers to include S&Ls). FIRREA also created the RTC to
administer the assets of insolvent thrifts. Id. § 501, 103 Stat. 183, 369 (1989)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(1)(A), (b)(3)(A), (1994)); see supra
note 73 (highlighting these major changes).
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form. 5 ' This expansion had far-reaching implications because
the FDIC's D'Oench powers now can be invoked whenever it is
appointed or is acting as a receiver of a failed institution.'59
Additionally, the original § 1823(e) did not apply to the FSLIC,
the predecessor to the RTC, in either its corporate or receiver-
ship capacity.'60  Although some courts began to apply
§ 1823(e) to the FSLIC before 1989,6' FIRREA affirmatively
expanded the statute's reach to include the RTC in its receiver-
ship capacity.'62 This tripled the application of § 1823(e)
158. Section 1823(e) now refers to [n]o agreement which tends to diminish
or defeat the interest of the [FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this
section [corporate]... or [acquired by it] as receiver of any insured depository
institution . ... " 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (emphasis added). FIRREA thus
modified the first sentence of § 1823(e) to allow the FDIC its protections in
either its corporate or its receivership form. FIRREA, supra note 73, § 217(4),
103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1994)).
159. Although § 1823(e) did not include the FDIC in any form other than its
corporate capacity until FIRREA expanded it to FDIC-Receiver in 1989, courts
began to apply it to FDIC-Receiver even before this statutory expansion. See
FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1986). There, the debtor signed
a blank promissory note with the understanding that terms would be filled in
later. Id. at 516. The bank falsely told the debtor that his loan had been
turned down, but kept the promissory note on its books. Id. at 514. When the
bank failed, the FDIC, in its receivership capacity, successfully used the
D'Oench doctrine to prevent the debtor from asserting his defenses. Id. at 516.
To expand the D'Oench doctrine in this way the court had to rely on common
law flexibility of the D'Oench case, but the court dropped the equitable
background of D'Oench and applied the rigid four-part test of § 1823(e). Id.
160. Congress did not refer to the FSLIC in § 1823(e). It referred only to the
FDIC. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1994).
161. These decisions were based upon two early post-D'Oench, pre-§ 1823(e)
cases. See FSLIC v. Third Nat'l Bank, 153 F.2d 678, 680 (6th Cir.) (citing
D'Oench), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 718 (1946); FSLIC v. Kearney Trust Co., 151
F.2d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 1945) (citing D'Oench in an FSLIC case). But see Gray,
supra note 36, at 276-77 (arguing that these two cases are not compelling
because D'Oench was cited only for jurisdictional and choice of law purposes
rather than on the merits). Other cases expanded on the concept that D'Oench
applies to the FSLIC. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Two Rivers Ass'n, 880 F.2d 1267, 1274
(11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the FSLIC has duties and powers "parallel" to
those of the FDIC). It was not until the passage of FIRREA, however, and its
abolishment of the FSLIC, that the matter was put to rest. See supra notes 73,
157 (describing the creation of FIRREA and abolition of the FSLIC). Still, prior
to the passage of FIRREA a majority of courts applied the D'Oench doctrine to
the FSLIC as well as the FDIC. Lake, supra note 18, at 316-17 n.14.
162. See FIRREA, supra note 73, § 217(4), 103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989)
(amending § 1823(e) to extend coverage to the FDIC when acting in its
receivership capacity); id. § 21A(b)(4) (assigning the RTC, when acting as a
receiver, the same rights and duties exercised by the FDIC in its receivership
capacity). The RTC has no "corporate capacity," as the FSLIC's insuring
corporate function was absorbed by the FDIC, not the RTC. See supra notes 73,
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because D'Oench and § 1823(e) are now available to use against
those individuals who have a dispute with: (1) a failed S&L (by
the RTC); 63 (2) a failed commercial bank (by the FDIC-
Receiver); 6 and (3) a commercial bank in financial trouble (by
the FDIC in its corporate capacity).165
FIRREA also amended other banking code sections to allow
successor institutions and transferees of the FDIC to employ
D'Oench and § 1823(e) powers. These amendments removed the
disincentive on the part of successor institutions and transferees
to assume assets and liabilities of failed institutions by putting
the successor or transferee on equal footing with the FDIC. For
example, D'Oench and § 1823(e) now can be invoked by "bridge
banks,"66 successor institutions organized by the FDIC to absorb
the remaining assets of a failed bank.'67 With the old bank
dissolved, and the bridge bank using the D'Oench shield against
claims, wronged individuals of the old bank have no avenue for
relief.168
The statutory changes outlined above explicitly expanded
the scope of § 1823(e)'s application. But by 1989, when FIRREA
was passed, judicial interpretation already had expanded
significantly the scope of both D'Oench and the original
157 and accompanying text (noting that FIRREA assigned certain fumctions of
the FSLIC to the FDIC).
163. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
RTC in its receivership capacity).
164. See supra notes 72, 155 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
the RTC in its receivership capacity).
165. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
FDIC in its corporate capacity).
166. Bridge banks are
temporary institutions organized by the FDIC in order to take over the
operations of a failed bank and preserve its going concern value while
the FDIC seeks a more permanent solution to its problems.... Bridge
banks, under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n), are designed as temporary reposito-
ries of the business of a failed institution during a period in which the
FDIC or RTC is attempting to arrange a permanent resolution of the
institution. [They] are generally required to terminate operations
within two years, wither by purchase and assumption transaction with
a solvent institution, "privatization" through sale of stock to nongovern-
mental entities, or dissolution by means of a receivership.
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 648-49.
167. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4) (1994).
168. See Bell & Murphy and Assocs. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, NA., 894
F.2d 750, 754-55 (5th Cir.) (allowing a bridge bank, if authorized by FDIC to
acquire the assets and liabilities of a failed financial institution, to invoke the
D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) against a former debtor of the failed institution),
cert. denied, Bell & Murphy and Assocs. v. FDIC, 498 U.S. 895 (1990).
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§ 1823(e).'69 Consequently, although evidence of specific intent
to give an expansive reading of the D'Oench doctrine may have
been lacking both at D'Oench's inception and at the enactment
of § 1823(e), FIRREA's failure to restrain this expansive trend in
1989 demonstrated Congress's implicit approval of judicial
interpretation to that point.170
5. The Common Law Expansion of the D'Oench Doctrine:
Allowing Additional Parties to Take Advantage of D'Oench
Even before Congress extended the parties who can use
D'Oench and § 1823(e) to include the RTC, bridge banks, and the
FDIC as receiver, courts had stretched the application of
§ 1823(e) to include some of these additional parties. Moreover,
even private parties, in certain circumstances, now can take
advantage of D'Oench and § 1823(e). For example, a private
solvent financial institution often will purchase some or all of a
failed bank's assets from the FDIC.17' Because the remaining
169. See infra Part II.C. (detailing the common law, judicial expansion of the
D'Oench doctrine and the judicial interpretation of § 1823(e)). Note that much
of that expansion occurred before FIRREA's passage in 1989.
170. See Sherman v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 516, 520 (1st Cir. 1961) ("It is a
well settled rule of statutory interpretation that when a statute has been the
subject ofjudicial construction and the statute is substantially reenacted, there
is a strong indication of an intent to adopt the construction as well as the
language of the former enactment."), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 820 (1962). But see
FCC v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 311 U.S. 132, 137 (1940) ("We are not,
however, willing to rest decision on any doctrine concerning the implied ...
construction upon reenactment of a statute. The persuasion that lies behind
that doctrine is merely one factor in the total effort to give fair meaning to
language."). In response to the argument regarding implied expansion by
silence, is the retort that FIRREA was not a "substantial" reenactment of
§ 1823(e), but only a mere modification of it. In any event, Congress certainly
had the chance to limit the scope of application of § 1823(e) as it was being
interpreted by the courts in 1989, but did not do so. There is an argument
therefore that FIRREA represents congressional approval of the courts' common
law judicial expansion of D'Oench and § 1823(e).
171. This is known as a "purchase and assumption" transaction.
In purchase and assumption transactions, a solvent depository
institution purchases assets and assumes liabilities of the failed
institution. In some respects the purchase and assumption transaction
resembles a merger of the failed institution into a solvent one, with the
solvent institution paying something for the goodwill of the failed
institution as well as for any regulatory advantages (such as relaxation
of restraints on geographic expansion) that the transaction may offer.
The FDIC makes up the remaining shortfall by cash assistance to the
acquiring institution.
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 646; see also FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911
F.2d 1466, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (describing a purchase and assumption
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assets include loan obligations, the private bank usually enforces
those obligations through collection actions. When the private
institution attempts to collect from the former debtor, cases have
ruled that the debtor often is precluded from raising any claim
or defense against the institution. In such situations, the
private institutions essentially have "stepped into the shoes" of
the FDIC. 72
Sound policy reasons support this particular extension from
the standpoint of the original D'Oench doctrine. If such private
parties could not take advantage of D'Oench, purchasing a loan
from the FDIC would include assuming the risk that the debtor
could avoid repaying the loan by alleging a secret agreement or
verbal misrepresentation by the original bank. 173 D'Oench and
§ 1823(e) now free private parties174 of such risk.171
B. FoRM OVER SUBSTANCE AND THE INTERPRETiVE
STRAIGHTJACKET OF 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)
Section 1823(e) appears to provide a "safe harbor" 76 for
borrowers wishing to protect the enforceability of their oral side
agreements or verbal understandings. As primarily post-Langley
transaction), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991).
172. See Porras v. Petroplex Sav. Ass'n, 903 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that claims and defenses barred as to FSLIC by D'Oench and 1823(e)
are also barred as to a private party who purchased assets of the failed
institution from the receiver).
173. Weiss & Kraus, supra note 18, at 274.
174. G. Douglas Welch, D'Oench, Duhme Protections Extend to Private
Parties Who Purchase a Failed Institution's Assets from the FSLIC: Porras v.
Petroplex Savings Association, 903 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1990), TEx. TECH L. REV.
237, 253 (1991).
175. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 89, at 174 n.36, 182 (noting that D'Oench
recently has been applied to the Bridge Savings Association, the Farm Credit
Administration, and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation and noting
that courts have taken the once "pristine" D'Oench doctrine to "unforeseen
territory" by applying it to parties such as those purchasing the assets of a
failed institution). The author relies upon FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47 (8th
Cir. 1989), as proof of his claim. In Newhart, the FDIC purchased assets of a
failed institution in its corporate capacity as part of a purchase and assumption
transaction. Id. at 48. When the FDIC sued Newhart to recover on the failed
assets, the purchaser substituted in place of the FDIC and continued the suit.
Id. The court ruled this permissible, labeling the purchase and assumption
transaction a valuable tool for the FDIC and stating that a contrary ruling
would "emasculate" the use of the purchase and assumption transaction. Id. at
50.
176. The term and concept of a "safe harbor" are borrowed from Peter P.
Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment
Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349, 349 (1993).
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case history illustrates, however, it is often impossible for
borrowers to satisfy all of the stringently interpreted require-
ments of § 1823(e).17 The hyper-technical requirements of
§ 1823(e),' no less than the D'Oench doctrine itself, thus often
serve as a barrier for former borrowers opposing the FDIC.
1. The Writing Requirement
The first and most elemental requirement of § 1823(e)'s
"categorical recording scheme"' is a writing." °  A writing
requirement is an historically and legally sound method of
record keeping and prudent loan consideration.' 8' For that
reason, no commentator or policy maker has proposed dismissing
this requirement in favor of relying on the mere word of the
177. See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U. S. 86, 94-95 (1987) (construing the
requirements of § 1823(e) narrowly when determining whether a borrower has
entered into an enforceable side agreement or arrangement with the institution
that will be later recognized by the FDIC and not prohibited by the D'Oench
doctrine and refusing to engraft an equitable exception upon the plain terms of
the statute such that borrower culpability is no longer required); Beighley v.
FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the four § 1823(e)
requirements are "certain and categorical"); FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well Servicing
Co., 837 F.2d 1369, 1372 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that Congress erected a "stout
barrier" when it enacted § 1823(e)); RTC v. J.B. Centron Dev. Co., 637 N.E.2d
23, 27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that § 1823(e) affords no equitable
exceptions where the agreement does not meet the four requirements). This
does not necessarily mean, however, that a borrower cannot benefit from a strict
application of § 1823(e). In a recent Third Circuit case, the court held that
D'Oench does not apply to claims against bank subsidiaries. See Lesal
Interiors, Inc. v. Echotree Assoc., L.P., 47 F.3d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 1995). The
court refused to infer that "depository institutions", as required by § 1823(e)(2)
(now (e)(1)(B)) includes bank subsidiaries. Id. This case raised the conflict
between § 1823(e) and FDIC rules requiring bank subsidiaries to maintain
independence. Id. at 613 & n.7.
178. Similar attention could be focused on strictly D'Oench Duhme cases
rather than just § 1823(e). The use of the phrase D'Oench for purposes of this
exposition refers to the overall application of D'Oench and § 1823(e) as a single
doctrine.
179. Langley, 484 U.S. at 95.
180. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)(A) provides that "[n]o agreement which tends to
diminish or defeat the interest of the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation
in any asset acquired by it... either as security for a loan or by purchase...
shall be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement (A) is in
writing. . . . " (emphasis added).
181. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 91-92 (noting that the requirements of
§ 1823(e) allow bank examiners to rely on a bank's records and ensure that
bank officials properly considered loans that the bank issued).
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bank and borrower.'82 Although this basic requirement is
logically necessary, no consensus yet exists regarding what
constitutes an agreement "in writing" within the meaning of
§ 1823(e)(1)(A).
In RTC v. J.B. Centron,'83 for example, appellants argued
that the terms of a proposed loan workout"s outlined and
approved by the S&L's loan committee constituted a writing
under § 1823(e).'85 The agreement was in writing, had been
approved by S&L officials, and would have been formally
executed if the lender had not changed management and altered
the terms of the workout agreement.'86 Despite this formality,
the trial court ruled, with great dissatisfaction, that § 1823(e)
did not protect the borrower against the RTC: "No writing exists
that encompasses any final agreement. Therefore appellant has
not established that his agreement is a writing under section
1823(e)." 8 ' The court interpreted § 1823(e)'s "in writing"
requirement to mean that the side agreement must be a formally
executed, binding written contract to be enforceable against the
RTC. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held that a written
document that states the terms of the agreement and is kept in
the lender's files is insufficient to satisfy the writing require-
ment.88 The court construed § 1823(e) to include only formal-
ly executed agreements and rejected a claim that a written lien
182. One of the stated purposes of the D'Oench Duhme Reform Act, as
introduced, is "to return the D'Oench doctrine to its original purpose by
continuing to bar the enforcement of unrecorded agreements." S. 648, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (emphasis added). The amended language retains the
writing requirement. Id. See also FDIC v. Hamilton, 939 F.2d 1225, 1230 n.5
(5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting appellant's argument that pursuant to local banking
customs, a farmer and his bank both understood the lending arrangement
despite the fact that such was not memorialized in writing).
183. 637 N.E.2d 23 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
184. A loan workout refers to modifications in the loan agreement arrived
at between the borrower and lender usually due to changed economic
circumstances of the borrower. So, for example,
the parties typically will agree on such matters as the revision of the
interest rate or the time of repayment; the liquidation procedures of
collateral prior to collection; or other similar extensions, modifications
or renewals of the debt obligation which may be necessary or desirable
due to changing business circumstances.
Galves, supra note 16, at 473.
185. Centron, 637 N.E.2d at 27.
186. Id. at 25-26.
187. Id. at 28.
188. Twin Constr., Inc. v. Boca Raton, Inc., 925 F.2d 378, 383-84 (11th Cir.
1991).
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subordination consent signed by the lender constituted a
writing.189
The Fifth Circuit took a broader approach in determining
what may serve as evidence of the existence of a writing. That
circuit allows borrowers to introduce a series of documents that
make reference to an alleged agreement to prove the existence
of a written agreement if the documents are signed and kept in
the bank records. 90 In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth
Circuit applied basic contract law principles and held that
multiple documents, when read as a whole, could prove that a
sufficient written agreement existed between the parties.
As the preceding discussion highlights, the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits disagree on the propriety of using general
contract principles to decide what satisfies the writing require-
ment. Regulators obviously would prefer the Eleventh Circuit's
approach, which simplifies and hastens the task of examining
the bank records. Borrowers, in contrast, would prefer the Fifth
Circuit's more relaxed and open approach. In either event, the
existing uncertainty over how to prove that there is a written
and executed side agreement makes it difficult for borrowers to
189. Id. at 383. Section 1823(e)(1)(B) requires approval by the institution's
loan committee or board of directors. The Twin Construction court addresses
this requirement as it relates to execution to clarify what type of writings
satisfy Subsection (1)(A). In Twin Construction, the owner of a shopping mall
obtained a construction loan from Vernon S&L. Id. at 380. The owner hired
the appellant contractors to build the mall. Id. When the owner failed to pay
for the work performed, the appellants requested that Vernon S&L subordinate
its lien as the lender in favor of that of the appellants. Id. Vernon refused to
comply, however, despite the existence of a written consent form to do so which
Vernon kept in its files. Id. Later, when Vernon failed and the FSLIC became
the receiver, the FSLIC successfully argued that the appellants' claim based on
the consent form was barred because it had not been executed. Id. at 381. See
also Franklin Asaph Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC, 794 F. Supp. 402, 408 (D.D.C.
1992) (holding that evidence of an unexecuted agreement found on the bank's
books, along with documents reflecting loan committee approval of the
agreement, did not to meet the statutory requirements for a writing under
§ 1823(e)).
190. See Bank One Texas Nat'1 Ass'n v. Morrison, 26 F.3d 544, 548 (5th Cir.
1994) (stating that loan applications, supporting bank documents, and banks'
own internal memoranda are relevant to determine parties' intent with respect
to a loan guarantee); RTC v. Daddona, 9 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
that documents such as letters, appraisals and loan committee minutes did not
create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an enforceable
written agreement); Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1989)
(allowing appellants to introduce 71 documents to prove that a writing existed),
reh'g denied (Apr. 27, 1989).
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know what is required to memorialize their side agreements.' 91
2. The Contemporaneous Requirement
Section 1823(e)'s second element requires that the agree-
ment be executed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the
asset by the depository institution and the borrower.192 This
requirement promotes sound lending practices and prevents
fraudulent schemes,193 such as the insertion of new terms
through collusion with bank employees, when a bank appears
headed for failure.' Because many courts have held that
nothing short of same day execution satisfies the contemporane-
ous requirement,'95 however, borrowers have been left wonder-
191. See infra Part III.E. for a full explanation of the advantages of a
disclosure and filing system. In short, uncertainty would be reduced because
borrowers would be made aware of the application of § 1823(e) and its
requirements whenever they obtain a loan.
192. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)(B) provides that the agreement must have been
"executed by the depository institution and any person claiming an adverse
interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the
acquisition of the asset by the depository institution."
193. Such as that found in the D'Oench case. See supra notes 92-93 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts of D'Oench).
194. See, e.g., RTC v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank of Minot, 4 F.3d 1490,1492-93
(9th Cir. 1993).
195. See, e.g., Cardente v. Fleet Bank, 796 F. Supp. 603, 610-11 (D. Me.
1992) (refusing to accept that several loan documents constituted a single
closing binder going into effect at the same time, and implying that nothing
short of same day execution would satisfy the contemporaneous requirement).
In Cardente, a commitment letter was issued on April 12, 1988; the lease was
entered into on May 19, 1988; and two weeks later, on June 2, 1988, defendants
executed and delivered to the bank the loan closing documents, including the
note, mortgage and agreement. Id. at 607.
Under section 1823(e)(2) [now (e)(1)(B)], an agreement not executed by
the bank "contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset" by that
bank cannot serve to defeat the FDIC's interest in that asset. See, e.g.,
FDIC v. P.L.M. Intl, Inc., 834 F.2d 248, 253 (1st Cir. 1987) (release
agreement dated April 17, 1983, was not executed contemporaneously
with the letter of guaranty dated December 31, 1981); FDIC v.
Cremona Co., 832 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir. 1987) (Partnership Agree-
ment dated April 12, 1974, was not executed contemporaneously with
the acquisition of any of the notes by the bank... and presented to
and signed by the defendant at the same time as one of the notes), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988) [parallel citations omitted]; FDIC v. La
Rambla Shopping Center, 791 F.2d 215, 220 (1st Cir. 1986) (the 1968
lease that is the subject of Defendant's counterclaim was not executed
contemporaneously with the note that evidences the 1970 loan); Fleet
Bank of Maine v. Steeves, 785 F. Supp. 209, 215 (D. Me. 1992) ("[Tlhe
Agreement was executed approximately nine months before the First
Note and more than two years before the Equity Line Agreement. It
therefore fails to meet the second requirement under Section
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ing whether § 1823(e) bars all modifications of loan agree-
ments. 96
Most modifications involve side agreements executed months
or even years after the underlying loan transaction. For
example, releases of personal guaranties almost always occur
after the transaction to which they relate. As such, these
releases could never meet the "contemporaneous" requirement of
§ 1823(e). 197 Yet this type of side agreement would be unnec-
essary if it were made contemporaneously with the original loan,
because it then would be merely a separate provision of the
original loan agreement. By ruling that "contemporaneous"
acquisition is synonymous with "same day execution," courts
reach inane results under the guise of doing justice. 9 '
In response to this troubling interpretation, many borrowers
have advanced equitable arguments to satisfy the contemporane-
1823(e)(2)."); FDIC v. Friedland,'758 F. Supp. 941,943 (S.D. N.Y. 1991)
(investment agreement dated May 10 1984, was not executed contem-
poraneously with acquisition on the same date of a promissory note by
the bank and, therefore, said agreement was not binding on FDIC
under 1823(e)).
Id. at 611; see also RTC v. J.B. Centron Dev. Co., 637 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993) (finding that the contractor's workout agreement, in which the terms
of repayment were simply restructured, did not satisfy the contemporaneous
requirement).
A similar result was reached in FDIC v. Virginia Crossings Partnership,
909 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1990). There, a bank solicited two individuals to buy a
housing project facing foreclosure, informing the individuals that an application
for tax exempt financing of the project had been made to the city redevelopment
agency. Id. at 307-08. Based on these representations, the individuals accepted
the bank's offer and term of personal guaranty, and formed a partnership. In
its acceptance, the newly formed partnership included a letter stating its
understanding that the personal guaranties would be greatly reduced once the
city granted the tax exempt financing. Id. at 308. Despite a call for equity by
the partnership, the court found that this letter was not executed contempora-
neously with the making of the note, and therefore was unenforceable under
§ 1823(e). Id. at 309. The court rejected the appellants' argument that "where
the parties sufficiently evidence their awareness and acceptance of the written
terms of a 'side' agreement at a time prior to approval by senior bank officials
and execution of the final documents, the purpose of mutual contemporaneous
execution is met." Id.
196. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text (discussing modifica-
tions and the requirements of § 1823(e)).
197. Thomas B. Hudson, The RTC and FDIC Use the D'Oench Duhme
Doctrine to Wipe Out Claims by Parties Against the Failed Banks and Thrifts,
MAG. OF BANK MGMT., Mar. 1992, at 64.
198. Of course, some courts realize that they are not doing justice and have
gone to great lengths to complain about this within their opinions. See supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
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ous requirement. Borrowers challenging this portion of§ 1823(e)
have cited the dicta provided in FDIC v. Manatt99 for support.
In a footnote, the Manatt court questioned the assertion that the
contemporaneous requirement would defeat a valid accord and
satisfaction entered into by the bank, reasoning that such an
agreement is never contemporaneously executed with the initial
documents incurring the debt.20 ' The judge surmised that
"[s]urely Congress did not mean to preclude banks from getting
something of value by an accord and satisfaction rather than
nothing at all."20' A federal district court also acknowledged
that such an intent would be contrary to general business
practice and common sense, but nonetheless held that alleged
commitment letters given months after the asset was acquired
by the bank did not satisfy § 1823(e). °2
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in RTC v. Midwest Federal
Savings Bank of Minot, 2°3 however, embraced the sound policy
of Manatt, challenging the logic and commercial practicality of
same day execution despite Langley. °4 In Minot, lenders
executed a commitment letter more than two months before the
final loan documents.0 5 In a victory for common sense, and
despite overwhelming case law to the contrary, the Minot court
held that in the nature of a large real estate loan, "contempora-
neous" may mean up to several months.0 6
199. 922 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1991).
200. Id. at 488 n.4. The court footnoted its discussion of§ 1823(e)(2) because
the contemporaneous requirement was not at issue. The court ruled that the
transfer of seven notes did not complete a valid accord and satisfaction, thereby
eliminating the need to consider § 1823(e)(2). Id. at 489.
201. Id. at 488 n.4. However, this reasoning was not critical to the ultimate
holding of the case.
202. RTC v. Crow, 763 F. Supp. 887, 893-95 (N.D. Tex. 1991). The court also
properly deferred to the legislature in stating that "[tihe Wisdom of an Act of
Congress is an issue we do not consider." Id. at 894 n.6 (quoting FDIC v.
Manatt, 922 F.2d 486, 490 (8th Cir. 1991) (Gibson, J., concurring)). Of course,
the wisdom, or perhaps more appropriately, the lack thereof, is precisely why
this provision must be reconsidered and reformed.
203. RTC v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 4 F.3d 1490 (4th Cir. 1993).
204. Id. at 1501.
205. Id. at 1492.
206. Id. at 1500-01 (applying the Manatt dicta rationale to side agreements
made before the acquisition of the final loan asset is made). The Minot court
stated the following:
We find Manatt persuasive and agree that satisfaction of the
contemporaneousness requirement should be considered in light of
commercial reality. General business practice requires more leniency
than a few days when dealing with loans of this magnitude. Moreover,
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As the Minot court recognized, the contemporaneous
requirement has become nothing more than an arbitrary barrier
to fair claims and defenses of borrowers. Because most judicial
interpretations of this contemporaneous requirement reduce the
amount of work that the receiver has to do in order to determine
the status of an asset, the government has found the require-
ment to be an ideal tool to obtain quick summary judgments
against former borrowers."' Governmental convenience
certainly is not a sound reason for denying otherwise legitimate
claims and defenses of borrowers. Clarification of the contempo-
raneous requirement is necessary so that future judges will not
have to perform such intellectual and definitional contortions as
those in Minot to apply § 1823(e) in a commercially reasonable
and just way.08
3. The Requirement to Obtain the Approval of the Bank
Board or Loan Committee
Section 1823(e)'s third requirement is that the financial
institution must consider, approve, and record any side agree-
ment to the loan transaction."9 Courts consult the minutes of
either the board of director's meeting or the institution's loan
committee to determine whether the lender has complied.
Reviewing the minutes should show that senior officials
prudently considered the loan before it was made210 and should
a Commitment Letter is part and parcel of this type of loan agreement.
Therefore, we cannot say as a matter of law that a period of between
two and three months under these circumstances rendered the
Commitment Letter not contemporaneous. On the facts of the instant
case, we conclude the Commitment Letter was contemporaneous with
the preparation of the final loan documents in the sense that it takes
several months to put together loans of this nature.
Minot, 4 F.3d at 1501; see also Erbafina v. FDIC, 855 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. Mass.
1994) (finding a contemporaneous execution of a Loan Commitment Letter
dated two days before the promissory note, despite the arguments of the FDIC).
207. If the otherwise legitimate agreement is not executed essentially on the
same day as the underlying loan, the FDIC can escape responsibility for that
agreement when it steps into the shoes of the failed bank. As such, collection
on the loan once again becomes an easy windfall victory, instead of an uncertain
and perhaps expensive collection lawsuit.
208. See infra notes 328-34 and accompanying text (arguing for execution in
the ordinary course of business, rather than contemporaneously).
209. 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (e)(1)(C) provides that no agreement is valid against
the government unless it "was approved by the board of directors of the
depository institution or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected
in the minutes of said board or committee. .. "
210. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 91, 92 (1987).
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protect against collusive reconstruction of loan terms by bank
officials and borrowers.21' This requirement thus ensures that
any purported side agreement has the formal authority of the
financial institution to execute the loan.
The problem, however, is that few borrowers know that an
agreement must be documented in the official bank board or
loan committee minutes for the agreement to be enforceable
against the FDIC or RTC.212  For example, in RTC v. Wil-
son,213 thrift officials convinced Wilson to consolidate his
partnership's existing loans with an additional personal loan,
with the new consolidated loan bearing Wilson's name only.
214
Thrift officials assured Wilson, orally and in writing from the
Executive Vice President of the thrift, that he would be responsi-
ble for only 50% of the consolidation loan.215 This letter,
representing a side agreement, never appeared in the meeting
minutes of either the loan committee or the board of direc-
tors.216  Applying the strict language of § 1823(e), the court
held for the RTC, noting that "undocumented side agreements
with a failed institution taken over by the FDIC are legally
inadmissible to diminish or defeat the interests of the
FDIC. 21
7
Other courts have read even more stringent formalities into
this requirement. In RTC v. Ruggiero,215 the court found that
although the "draft" minutes of a board meeting reflected the
approval of the side agreement, the final, "official" board minutes
did not, and therefore § 1823(e)'s requirement was not met.21 9
Though the omission was merely clerical in nature, the court
nonetheless concluded that the draft minutes represented only
"unofficial" acts of the board, and as such failed to constitute an
211. Id.; see also D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456-57
(1942) (noting that a secret agreement between a stockholder and a bank to
defeat the rights of the bank creditors or receivers is indefensible).
212. The disclosure system proposed in Part IIT.E. directly addresses this
problem by requiring banks to disclose to borrowers the existence and
requirements of § 1823(e).
213. 851 F. Supp. 141 (D. N.J. 1994).
214. Id. at 143.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 145.
217. Id. at 144 (quoting Central W. Rental Co. v. Horizon Leasing, 967 F.2d
832, 841 (3d Cir. 1992)).
218. 977 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1992).
219. Id. at 316.
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"official" act of the bank.22 ° The statute, however, does not
require that agreements be reflected in the "official" minutes.
Instead, the court read this additional requirement into the
statute.22'
If other courts follow this trend, a sophisticated borrower,
who has sufficient legal insight to request a copy of the board
minutes to protect her agreement,222 nonetheless might have
an unenforceable agreement if that borrower failed to certify
that the minutes were "official" and not draft minutes. Unrepre-
sented and less sophisticated borrowers223 have even less
opportunity to meet § 1823(e)'s requirements.
A court's current interpretation of this requirement can lead
to additional harsh results. For example, certain loans are
220. Id.
221. Id. Indeed, there is a good argument against the court's decision to
infer the term "official" for this subsection: had Congress meant for the side
agreement to make it into only "official" minutes, it easily could have added the
word "official" as it did in the next subsection (subsection (4) (now (1)(D))
requiring the agreement to be continuously an "official" record. See Thorne v.
Jones, 57 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Mich. 1953). According to the Thorne court:
It is elementary that statutes inpari materia are to be taken together
in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, and that courts will
regard all statutes upon the same general subject matter as part of 1
system. 'In the construction of a particular statute, or in the interpre-
tation of any of its provisions, all acts relating to the same subject, or
having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it,
as together constituting one law.'
Id. (quoting Remus v. City of Grand Rapids, 265 N.W. 755, 756 (Mich. 1936)).
Of course, even if a lending institution records the side agreement in the loan
committee or board minutes, it is important to remember that the agreement
still must satisfy all four requirements-§ (e)(1)(A)-(D) of the statute. See 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)(A), (B), (D) (requiring a valid side agreement to be in
writing, executed contemporaneously, and a continuous and official bank
record); see also Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 856 F. Supp. 111, 111
(N.D.N.Y 1994) (granting summary judgment motion against borrower whose
side agreement satisfied § 1823(e)(3) (now (1)(C)) but not § 1823(e)(1), (2) and
(4) (now (1)(A), (B), and (D)).
222. Requesting a copy of the side agreement from the bank is the essence
of one academic reform proposal regarding the importance of proper recordation.
See David Lawrence I, D'Oench Spells Doom in Litigation Against Federal
Banking Agencies, 68 FLA. B.J. 36, 36 (1994). The problem with this call for
proper recordation, however, is that it still leaves the ultimate authority with
the lending institution to determine whether the agreement remains an
"official" part of the bank's files.
223. Although the disclosure system proposed in Part m may not completely
ensure that every unsophisticated borrower will fully understand all of the
intricacies of § 1823(e), it would be a vast improvement from the status quo of
providing absolutely no disclosure or warning about the harsh requirements of
§ 1823(e).
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approved by the vote of an "executive committee" or other
committee of the board. Section 1823(e), however, includes only
"board" or "loan committee" minutes. Hence, a strict interpreta-
tion of the statute again would find the requirement not
satisfied. Additionally, the statute fails to clarify whether the
minutes need to reflect all specific terms of the agreement or
merely that an agreement exists.224 Again, such a stringent
interpretation might render an otherwise valid written side
agreement unenforceable for lack of detail in the appropriate
minutes. This requirement of § 1823(e), then, rather than
ensuring that actual side agreements are properly approved by
bank officials, often gives the FDIC another legal technicality
through which it can escape responsibility for an otherwise valid
side agreement.
4. The Continuous and Official Recordation Requirement
Section 1823(e)'s final and perhaps most egregious element
is that a valid side agreement, from the time of its execution,
must be continuously maintained as an official record of the
bank.2 5  Borrowers have no way to ensure compliance with
this requirement. Whether a lending institution keeps an
agreement in its official files, and whether the institution keeps
it there continuously, are factors over which the borrower simply
has no control, as banks do not allow customers to inspect their
official files .1 6 Because borrowers must rely on the unilateral
actions of the financial institution to meet this requirement, they
remain at the mercy of their institution's honest filing mistakes
or dishonest behavior.
For example, assume federal agents are scheduled to
examine a bank. Bank employees naturally want the bank's
loan portfolio to appear as strong as possible, with no contingent
224. Stillman, supra note 140, at 112.
225. In order for a side agreement to be valid and enforceable, it must have
"been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the
depository institution." 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)(D).
226. There is no way a borrower can ensure that the bank is fulfilling its
duty to keep the side agreement continuously in the official bank records in
compliance with § 1823(e)(1)(D). See Hudson, supra note 197, at 64 (suggesting
that the borrower obtain a certificate from the bank stating that the agreement
has been executed, approved by the appropriate committee, recorded in the
committee minutes, and kept continuously in the bank's official records).
Although this is probably "better than nothing," it is cumbersome, unrealistic
and still does not ensure the bank's compliance.
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liabilities or collection weaknesses evidenced by § 1823(e) side
agreements.227 A dishonest bank officer thus might physically
remove a particular side agreement from the bank's official files
to hide the weakness of the underlying loan. Alternatively, in a
less sinister plot, bank employees might misfile or lose the
document. In either event, the result is the same: the bank's
federal regulatory examiners charged with analyzing the bank's
books and loans for general "safety and soundness" 22 never
see the missing side agreement. Consequently, the examiners
would not record or acknowledge the side agreement, and
§ 1823(e) would not allow the borrower to rely on it in a lawsuit
against the FDIC.
If this hypothetical bank were to fail, the FDIC, as receiver,
would be responsible for seizing the bank, assessing the value of
the loan assets, and reopening the bank under new management
as quickly as possible.2 9 The congressional directive to resolve
failed institutions with the least cost to the insurance fund,23 °
coupled with the blanket protection of the D'Oench doctrine and
227. "Performing" loans, those in which the borrower has not defaulted, is
paying on time, and is not requesting a modification lowering the interest rate
or a principle reduction, are obviously much stronger assets for the bank than
those where a borrower has obtained a reduction in interest and/or principal
payments, or is being allowed to make late payments or other favorable
treatment pursuant to a side agreement or alleged verbal representations made
by bank officials. Recall that, in the D'Oench case itself, the bank's whole
incentive for engaging in the secret side agreement with D'Oench was to hide
nonperforming assets in an effort to bolster the strength of the bank's balance
sheets. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 454 (1942).
228. Bank examiners have the power to terminate any activity of a bank
that they find to be "unsafe or unsound" administration of bank affairs. See 12
U.S.C. § 1818(b) (empowering the federal banking agency to issue a cease-and-
desist order against a lending institution for an "unsafe or unsound" practice).
In order to assess whether a bank is engaging in such activities, periodic
examinations of the bank must take place. See 12 U.S.C. § 378(2)(c) (requiring
lending institutions to submit to periodic examinations by banking authorities).
229. This assumes that it is not a straight liquidation payout. See supra
notes 154-59 and accompanying text (describing the FDIC's general duties as
a receiver of a failed bank and methods of resolution). Note also that the other
banking regulators, such as the OCC and OTS, lack any incentive to look
beyond the official bank records precisely because they are aware of the
operation of D'Oench and § 1823(e) which do not require them to do so. See
supra note 69 (explaining these agencies' duties and responsibilities as
regulators and examiners of financial institutions). So as long as D'Oench and
§ 1823(e) are in operation, the regulators have no duty, responsibility, or
incentive to look beyond the official bank records.
230. See supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text (discussing the intent for
the FDIC to resolve failed institutions).
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§ 1823(e), encourages bank examiners to look only to the official
bank loan files in their collection actions. In limiting its
inspection to the few files that are considered official, the FDIC
later could claim "honestly" that it never saw the side agreement
either during a routine examination or when reviewing the
bank's loan files after seizure. Moreover, the FDIC even may
argue that because an officer removed the agreement, the
agreement was not "continuously an official bank record" and
thus is unenforceable. As this hypothetical demonstrates, the
FDIC has no incentive to determine the existence of otherwise
valid side agreements unless they reside in the bank's "official"
files.
231
This unbending interpretation of § 1823(e)(1)(D) can lead to
unfair results even when the FDIC is aware of the agreement.
For example, a bank officer might remove a side agreement
temporarily, but long enough that examiners never see it or
record it during subsequent on-site examinations of the bank's
files. Although the officer later returns the agreement to the
"official" files, it is no longer a "continuous" record because its
continuity has been interrupted. The FDIC thus could physical-
ly possess the agreement, but still argue that the agreement's
lack of continuity in the files precludes its use in litigation.
Alternatively, bank records clearly could refer to an agreement
filed elsewhere. In one such case, other documents in the bank's
files referenced the agreement at issue. However, the court
strictly adhered to § 1823(e), reasoning that reference to an
agreement was not sufficient to enable the RTC to make an
overnight evaluation of the thrift's remaining assets. 2
231. See FDIC v. Manuel de Jesus Velez, 678 F.2d 371, 375 (1st Cir. 1982)
(determining that even records kept in the bank president's personal safe still
do not satisfy § 1823(e)(1)(D)).
232. RTC v. McCroy, 951 F.2d 68, 72 (5th Cir. 1992). In McCroy, an
agreement that limited the liability of the general partners for a real estate
purchase had been fully executed, but was stored in the files of the bank's
attorney, who kept offices on the same floor and in the same building as the
bank. Id. at 70; see also Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1990) wherein
the court states:
The doctrine means that the government has no duty to compile oral
histories of the bank's customers and loan officers. Nor must the FDIC
retain linguistics and cryptologists to tease out the meaning of facially
unencumbered notes. Spreadsheet experts need not be joined by
historians, soothsayers, and spiritualists in a Lewis Carroll-like search
for a bank's unrecorded liabilities.
Id. at 1016.
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These cases suggest that courts favor governmental
expediency at the expense of equity and justice,33 when justice
actually should seek to avoid these kind of results. The law
should not punish an innocent borrower by rendering an
otherwise valid written side agreement unenforceable against
the FDIC simply because of the bank's illegitimate or negligent
actions in failing to comply with § 1823(e)'s administrative
directive to keep the side agreement as a continuous, official
bank record. The law should seek to punish wrongdoers who
violate a legal duty, not innocent bystanders for actions over
which they have no control or responsibility.
C. THE COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY EXPANSION OF THE
D'OENcH DOCTRINE AND SECTION 1823(e) IN GENERAL:
PUTrING IT ALL TOGETHER
The congressional expansion of D'Oench through § 1823(e)
and FIRREA, the creation of the federal HIDC doctrine which
extends D'Oench's application to various additional parties, and
the judicial expansion of D'Oench through stringent interpreta-
tion of§ 1823(e) have multiplied the number and scope of claims
and defenses the D'Oench doctrine prevents. Not surprisingly,
the D'Oench doctrine's cumulative effect has been overwhelming.
This section catalogues many of the claims and defenses now
barred by the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e), as well as those
few claims and defenses that have managed to escape their
purview.
Following is a list of affirmative claims and defenses that
the D'Oench doctrine and/or § 1823(e) prohibit:'
1) Absence of direct dealing with the failed institution;235
233. Even when the FDIC clearly is aware of the side agreement, courts
have held that the agreement is unenforceable under § 1823(e). See FDIC v.
Gardner, 606 F. Supp. 1484, 1487 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (determining that even
though the FDIC produced agreement in discovery and thereby revealed that
it must have found it in the bank's records, the agreement nonetheless was
insufficient).
234. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather is illustrative of
the wide number of defenses asserted. Most of these defenses were compiled
from the following sources: Barry, supra note 106, at 1134-48; Dennis, supra
note 89, at 174-77; Galves, supra note 16, at 474; Gray, supra note 36, at 276-
77; Sacks, supra note 103, at 1428.
235. See Robinowitz v. Gibraltar Sav., 23 F.3d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1994)
(applying D'Oench to wholly owned subsidiaries of a failed bank), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 725 (1995); Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev. Inc., 937 F.2d 845, 857-
58 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying D'Oench to notes acquired by the RTC through the
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2) Accord and satisfaction;2 6
3) Breach of condition precedent;237
4) Breach of a fiduciary duty and breach of duty of good
faith and fair dealing;
28
5) Conspiracy;29
6) Constitutional challenges: procedural due process
and uncompensated taking of private property;' 0
7) Deceptive trade practices;241
8) Doctrine raised for the first time on appeal; 2
9) Failure of consideration;" a
closure of a failed bank, even though the failed bank purchased notes in a
secondary market).
236. See Public Loan Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 803 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1986)
(finding that § 1823(e) bars a defense of oral accord and satisfaction when a
debtor claims he paid the bank the full amount owed on a letter of credit but
the bank did not return the posted letter); FDIC v. Hoover-Morris Enters., 642
F.2d 785, 787-88 (5th Cir. Unit B. Apr. 1981) (holding under Georgia state law
that unexecuted accord and satisfaction is not a valid defense).
237. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 449 (1942).
238. See Texas Refrigeration Supply, Inc. v. FDIC, 953 F.2d 975, 983 (5th
Cir. 1992) (applying the D'Oench doctrine to oral promises made by a bank to
apply a debtor's receivables to further finance the debtor, even though the bank
applied receivables to debt reduction because the debtor's breach of fiduciary
duty claim was based on an oral promise); Timberland Design, Inc. v. First
Serv. Bank for Sav., 932 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1991) (barring a debtor from
asserting a claim of oral agreement, even if the claim is based in tort).
239. See In re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust, 968 F.2d 1332, 1345-46 (1st
Cir. 1992) (prohibiting a debtor from raising a claim that the lender's kickback
scheme siphoned funds from a trust).
240. See California Hous. Sec., Inc. v. U.S., 959 F.2d 955, 960 (Fed. Cir.)
(ruling that the RTC's possession of a debtor's offices is not a Fifth Amendment
taking), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 324 (1992); Chatham Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC,
651 F.2d 355, 362 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981) (holding that a debtor was not
deprived of constitutional rights when the FDIC asserted the D'Oench doctrine
and retroactively altered the debtor's substantive rights), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
972 (1982).
241. See Texas Refrigeration, 953 F.2d at 983 (ruling that D'Oench
unequivocally bars a deceptive trade practice claim). But see FSLIC v. Mackie,
962 F.2d 1144, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1992) (determining that where the deceptive
trade practice is clear from the a written agreement, the D'Oench doctrine does
not bar the defense).
242. Lemaire v. FDIC, 20 F.3d 654,656-57 (5th Cir. 1994) (allowing the RTC
to raise the D'Oench doctrine for the first time on appeal if the FDIC had no
opportunity to raise the issue at the trial court), cert. denied, Scales v. FDIC,
115 S. Ct. 723 (1995); Baumann v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d
1506, 1512-14 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing the D'Oench doctrine to be raised for
the first time on appeal, as long as the RTC was not a proper party at the trial
level), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1936 (1992).
243. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942); CMF
Virginia Land L.P. v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90, 94 (E.D. Va. 1992) (allowing a
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10) Fraud, fraudulent inducement, and misrepresentation;...
11) Oral or written side agreements, promises, or
understandings;245
12) Homestead exemption (simulated sale);246
13) Knowledge or imputed knowledge of side agreements
by regulatory agencies or examiners; 47
14) Laches; 8
15) Mitigation of damages;249
16) Debt instrument modification after borrower's execution;250
17) Mutual mistake;25 '
18) Negligence; 252
19) No actual reliance by FDIC or RTC;211
purchaser of assets from the RTC to bar the defense of lack of consideration on
a loan guaranty by asserting the D'Oench doctrine).
244. FDIC v. Payne, 973 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1992) (prohibiting debtor's
fraudulent inducement defense, and holding that an innocent borrower defense
no longer exists); FSLIC v. Lafayette Inv. Properties, Inc., 855 F.2d 196, 198
(5th Cir. 1988) (barring a fraud claim); Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 91, 93 (1987)
(barring a fraud claim).
245. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 459; Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Amberley
Huntsville, Ltd., 934 F.2d 1201, 1207 (11th Cir. 1991) (blocking a debtor from
asserting a defense based on an oral or written side agreement that was not
part of the initial transaction and that did not appear in the bank's records).
246. Templin v. Weisgram, 867 F.2d 240, 242 (5th Cir.) (disallowing a
defense of simulated sale even if all parties enter into the side agreement), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
247. Twin Constr., Inc. v. Boca Raton, Inc., 925 F.2d 378, 383 (11th Cir.
1991) (stating that the FSLIC's actual knowledge of an S&L's obligation relating
to a construction contract did not prevent the use of the D'Oench doctrine);
FDIC v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 725 F.2d 634, 640 (11th Cir. 1984) (ruling that
the FDIC is not imputed with knowledge which bank examiners may have
discovered; knowledge irrelevant).
248. FDIC v. Fonseca, 795 F.2d 1102, 1109 (1st Cir. 1986) (blocking the
defense of laches to actions brought by the FDIC in its corporate capacity); see
also RTC v. Hecht, 818 F. Supp. 894, 900 (D. Md. 1992) (allowing the RTC to
use the D'Oench doctrine against a defense of laches).
249. FSLIC v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1044, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (ruling
that a banking agency need not mitigate damages when using the D'Oench
doctrine).
250. FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying the
D'Oench doctrine where signature pages were signed in blank and later
appended to documents other than those the maker intended).
251. FDIC v. Dureau, 261 Cal. Rptr. 19, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (barring a
claim that a debtor did not read the document before signing it).
252. RSR Properties, Inc. v. FDIC, 706 F. Supp. 524,531-33 (W.D. Tex. 1989)
(barring debtors' negligence or other tort actions against a bank).
253. FDIC v. First Nat'l Fin. Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1978)
(determining that a showing of actual reliance by the FDIC as a receiver is not
required under the D'Oench doctrine).
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21) Non-promissory note debt instruments; 254
22) Promissory or equitable estoppel and waiver;255
23) Securities law violations;256
24) Setoff;257
25) Tying arrangements;28
26) Undue influence, duress, and coercion;25 9
27) Unjust enrichment;260 and
28) Usury that is evident on the face of the document.2
Neither the D'Oench doctrine nor § 1823(e) have, as yet,
overcome the following defenses:
262
254. FDIC v. Laanen, 769 F.2d 666, 667 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(prohibiting an assumption agreement carried on a bank's books).
255. Texas Refrigeration Supply, Inc. v. FDIC, 953 F.2d 975, 983 (5th Cir.
1992). But see infra note 266 and accompanying text (noting that courts apply
estoppel theory to the FDIC's or RTC's own misconduct).
256. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865-66 (11th Cir.); FDIC v.
Investors Assocs. X, Ltd., 775 F.2d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1985) (preventing a
debtor from asserting securities law violations as a defense), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 826 (1982).
257. Mainland Say. Ass'n v. Riverfront Assocs., 872 F.2d 955, 956(10th Cir.)
(disallowing setoff claims based on fraud, gross negligence, reckless conduct,
breach of agreement to fund, and breach of implied covenant of fair dealing),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890 (1989). But see infra note 264 and accompanying text
(listing cases recognizing an exception in the limited situation where the setoff
claim is based on the breach of a bilateral obligation arising from the
instrument the FDIC seeks to enforce).
258. Newton v. Uniwest Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 340, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1992)
(preventing a defense based on an illegal tying agreement); NCNB Texas Nat'l
Bank v. King, 964 F.2d 1468, 1470-71 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (precluding
defenses based on oral agreements that violate the Bank Tying Act), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 956 (1992).
259. FSLIC v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1988). But see
Desmond v. FDIC, 798 F. Supp. 829, 836-39 (D. Mass. 1992) (allowing a debtor's
duress claim where the lender forced the debtor's counsel to renegotiate due to
a conflict at a crucial point during negotiations to gain an unfair bargaining
position).
260. FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1518 (11th Cir. 1984).
261. Union Fed. Bank v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (holding that the D'Oench doctrine bars claims of usury when usury is
not evident on the face of the document); FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262, 1266
(6th Cir. 1985). But see infra note 273 and accompanying text (noting that the
D'Oench doctrine has not overcome the defense of usury that is not apparent on
the face of the document).
262. This list is meant to demonstrate the small number of defenses
remaining. Most of these defenses were compiled from the following sources:
Barry, supra note 106, at 1134-48; Dennis, supra note 89, at 174-77; Galves,
supra note 16, at 474; Gray, supra note 36, at 276-77; Sacks, supra note 103, at
1428.
1996] BANING LITIGATION 1379
1) Asset deemed not to exist;263
2) Bilateral agreements; 21
3) Conversion; 265
4) Equitable estoppel;266
5) Equitable subordination of mechanic's liens;267
6) Fraud in the factum;261
263. FDIC v. Nemecek, 641 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1986). In Nemecek, the
bank and borrower recorded an accord and satisfaction before the bank's
insolvency. Id. at 742. The Court held that FDIC as receiver never acquired
the debt obligation as an asset from the failed land bank and therefore the
D'Oench doctrine did not apply. Id. at 742-43. Accord FDIC v. McFarland, 33
F.3d 532, 538-39 (1994) (disallowing the application of the D'Oench doctrine to
bar the debtor from asserting a guaranty has been satisfied if the release is in
writing and reflected in the bank's records).
264. RTC v. Oaks Apartments Joint Venture, 966 F.2d 995, 1000-01 (5th Cir.
1992) (prohibiting the application of the D'Oench doctrine where the very
document the RTC seeks to enforce against the debtor imposes obligations on
the lender which the lender has breached); Howell v. Continental Credit Corp.,
655 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that the D'Oench doctrine is
inapplicable where the document the FDIC seeks to enforce "facially manifests
bilateral obligations and serves as the basis of [the other party's] defense").
265. RTC v. Wellington Dev. Group, 761 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Colo. 1991)
(ruling that the RTC could not assert the D'Oench doctrine if the institution did
not apply funds to reduce the debtor's note, and instead converted funds to its
own use).
266. FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Ctr., Inc., 766 F.2d 744, 753-54 (3d Cir.
1985) (preventing the FDIC from asserting the D'Oench doctrine to protect the
FDIC from the consequences of its own misconduct, since it would be aware of
its misconduct and should not profit from it); FDIC v. Harrison, 735 F.2d 408,
411-12 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the FDIC is subject to equitable estoppel
ensuing from acts and representations of FDIC agents). But see FDIC v. Patel,
46 F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that the FDIC is not bound by a
misrepresentations by a bank which purchased a note through a purchase and
assumption transaction from the FDIC in its receivership capacity, and then
gave the note to the FDIC in its corporate capacity to begin collection, since the
D'Oench doctrine barred the debtor's claim).
267. FSLIC v. Dillon Constr. Co., 681 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 n.4 (E.D. Ark.
1988) (allowing a first lender to assert an equitable subordination defense
following the FDIC's attempt to foreclose on a home without allowing the first
lender to collect on the improvements because the first lender was wholly
innocent of any attempt by debtor, who built a home on a lot other than the one
specified in the loan agreement, to deceive the FSLIC); In re C.P.C. Dev. Co. No.
5, 113 B.R. 637, 641 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (determining that a creditor
fraudulently induced by the debtor to subordinate its claim to that of another
creditor was not barred by the D'Oench doctrine from asserting a claim for
equitable subordination and fraudulent nondisclosure).
268. See Langley v. FDIC, 848 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1987) ("[Tlhe real defense of
fraud in the factum - that is, the sort of fraud that procures a party's signature
to an instrument without knowledge of its nature or contents - would take the
instrument out of § 1823(e)."); FDIC v. Turner, 869 F.2d 270, 273-74 (6th Cir.
1989) (stating that where a guarantor is defrauded as to the essential terms of
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7) Non-loan transactions;269
8) Payment;270
9) Torts affecting the value or disposition of collateral;271
10) Transactions between solvent institutions; 272
11) Usury that is not evident on the face of the document;27 3
12) Void liens;274 and
13) Judicially voided debt instruments. 5
a guaranty, there is fraud in the factum and the D'Oench doctrine is inapplica-
ble).
269. John v. RTC, 39 F.3d 773,776 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling that where a bank
fraudulently induced the purchase of a home through a third party and did not
disclose that the house had subsided, § 1823(e) does not apply to the purchase
contract).
270. FDIC v. Bracero & Rivera, Inc., 895 F.2d 824, 827-30 (1st Cir. 1990)
(determining that where a borrower paid the outstanding balance on a note to
a bank and received credit voucher from the bank, the FDIC could not claim
that the note was still valid simply because it had not been stamped "paid,
canceled, void, or otherwise," and a deed subsequently executed; rather, the note
was invalidated by acts independent of a secret agreement and the note
therefore was not an asset protected by § 1823(e)); FDIC v. Grupo Girod Corp.,
869 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the FDIC's actual knowledge of the
payment of a promissory note by a borrower where a ledger at a bank is
stamped "paid" may prevent the FDIC from asserting the D'Oench or HIDC
doctrines).
271. Texas Refrigeration Supply, Inc. v. FDIC, 953 F.2d 975, 981 (5th Cir.
1992) (stating that a lender's obligations to accelerate payment only for good
cause and to dispose of collateral only in a commercially reasonable manner are
"implicit in every promissory note" and are not barred by the D'Oench doctrine);
New Conn. Bank & Trust Co. v. Stadium Management Corp., 132 B.R. 205,209-
10 (D. Mass. 1991) (allowing an impairment of collateral claim because the
D'Oench doctrine's purpose is not to protect "negligent acts by lender").
272. First Interstate Bank of Tex. v. First Nat'l Bank of Jefferson, 928 F.2d
153, 155-56 (5th Cir. 1991) (ruling that a solvent institution may not use the
D'Oench doctrine to bar the enforcement of a transaction between two solvent
institutions simply because it has not been reported to the FDIC).
273. But see FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 161-62 (6th Cir.) (finding that
whether or not the usury is evident from the face of the document, the FDIC's
HIDC power bars debtor from asserting this), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
274. FDIC v. RepublicBank, Lubbock, 883 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1989)
(disallowing the FDIC's use of the D'Oench doctrine to invalidate a first lien
that was not reflected in a bank's records and then to assert a second lien,
because the second lien was at all times subordinate to the first lien under
Texas law). But see Buchanan v. FSLIC, 935 F.2d 83, 85 (5th Cir.) (stating that
although a lien was void under state law because its express recital was not
fulfilled, the D'Oench doctrine barred the borrower's defense that the lien was
void because she "lent herself to a scheme" by signing it), cert. denied,
Buchanan v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB, 502 U.S. 1005 (1991).
275. Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
FDIC could not enforce notes against a debtor where previously a federal court
voided liens due to securities law violations); Olney Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Trinity
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Recently, some courts have complained bitterly about the
harshness of the D'Oench doctrine, and have refused to expand
it further."6 If the D'Oench doctrine truly is reaching its final
expansion, now is an excellent time to consider its reform.2"
III. THE CALL FOR SIGNIFICANT REFORM OF THE
D'OENCH DOCTRINE AND SECTION 1823(e)
A. RESISTING THROWING THE BABY OUT WITH THE BATH
WATER
Moderation in temper is always a virtue.
27 8
In light of the severe injustice caused by the expansive
application of the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e), it is tempting
to call for the complete legislative repeal of § 1823(e) and the
Banc Sav. Ass'n, 885 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that § 1823(e) does
not apply where a court judgement has been entered prior to the FDIC
acquiring the note).
276. See, e.g., Murphy v. FDIC, 38 F.3d 1490 (9th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Murphy Ill. There, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, reversed an earlier decision of
the Ninth Circuit, Murphy v. FDIC, 12 F.3d 1485 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Murphy 11, which had upheld the use of the D'Oench doctrine by the FDIC to
prevent the payment of a standby letter of credit issued by a bank to a parent
company. The Ninth Circuit ruled that a standby letter of credit issued by a
failing bank was a liability, not an asset, and that § 1823(e) therefore did not
apply. Murphy 11, 38 F.3d at 1500. The court based its decision, oddly enough,
on the idea that the D'Oench doctrine cannot be used against a claimant who
is innocent of participating in any misleading scheme. Id. at 1498. However,
as Harris Ominsky notes, FIRREA may yet be used to greater effect in the
future against burdensome contracts, leases, and letters of credit. Letters of
Credit Withstand FDIC Rejection, UCC BULL., Mar. 1995, at 1-3. Similarly, in
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. FDIC, 45 F.3d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
[hereinafter Du Pont Ill, the court refused to reconsider its earlier decision in
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. FDIC, 32 F.3d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
[hereinafter Du Pont 1]. The 1995 decision left intact the 1994 decision that
prevented the FDIC from asserting the D'Oench doctrine against a claim that
the bank had entered into an escrow agreement with Du Pont. See Du Pont I,
32 F.3d at 598 ("Despite the FDIC's suggestion to the contrary, we think the
D'Oench doctrine must have some boundaries ..... when one bears in mind
what is at stake here, namely the negation of potentially valid state law claims
.... "). The court, in the 1994 decision, had ruled that even if the escrow
agreement had been in the bank's files, the FDIC would not have been apprised
of the bank's potential liability for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 600. The
court, interestingly, suggested that it knew of no other court that had applied
the D'Oench doctrine where a regulator had not, or was not likely to be misled.
Du Pont II, 45 F.3d at 459.
277. See infra Part Ill (discussing possible reform of the D'Oench doctrine).
278. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man, 1791, quoted in BARTLEtt's
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 341:8 (16th ed. 1993).
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total elimination of the D'Oench doctrine." 9 Such a hasty
reaction, however, merely would reverse the problems rather
than solve them. Deceitful borrowers once again would be able
to defraud the FDIC, because the FDIC would have no protection
from alleged secret side agreements with financial institu-
tions."' Returning to a pre-D'Oench and pre-§ 1823(e) world
would prevent banking regulators from quickly ascertaining
whether the institution's assets are subject to secret side
agreements or other contingent liabilities,2"' either during a
routine examination or during a bank closure and seizure of
assets. Also, private, solvent third-party banks would be less
willing to purchase assets from the FDIC, or would do so only at
a very low price to protect themselves from the risk of being
unable to determine the value of the assets at the time of
purchase.282 Finally, legitimate claimants and creditors of the
institution would receive reduced claims as a result of deceitful
borrowers who defrauded the FDIC.2"5  That is, the FDIC
would suffer potential fraud by borrowers and bankers, while
some deceitful borrowers would receive the illegitimate windfall.
Merely shifting injustice, however, does not eradicate it.
Therefore, although tempting, such a quick-fix solution would be
279. See, e.g., Flint, supra note 36, at 484 (calling for this drastic step).
280. The purpose of the D'Oench doctrine was to protect the FDIC from
deceit and fraud. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469
(1942).
281. See supra note 87 (quoting the Assistant General Counsel of the FDIC
as stating that the D'Oench doctrine allows the FDIC to enforce obligations due
to failed institutions).
282. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (discussing how private
parties benefit from the D'Oench doctrine); see generally Barry S. Zisman &
Marguerite N. Woung, The Superpowers of the FDIC/RTC and TheirAvailabili-
ty to Third Parties, 108 BANKING L.J. 516 (1991) (discussing this possibility).
283. As the receiver for the failed financial institution, the FDIC has a
legal obligation to the other creditors to protect the receivership estate
for the benefit of the institution's creditors. If the FDIC as receiver
pays unsubstantiated claims, other claimants and creditors of the
receivership estate, such as vendors who provide services to the
institution before it failed, will receive less. Creditors will also receive
less if the FDIC cannot enforce valid obligations owed to the failed
institution. There is a limited pool of assets in each receivership of a
failed institution and anything that reduces the value of the assets or
increases the number of claimants will reduce the recoveries for
creditors.
S. 648 Hearings, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Sharon Powers Sivertsen,
Assistant General Counsel, FDIC).
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unwise and unwarranted.2"
Fortunately, we do not have to be prisoners beholden to
either of these two polar extremes. The D'Oench doctrine and
§ 1823(e) should be reformed to pursue justice for wronged,
innocent borrowers, while maintaining reasonable protection for
federal banking agencies, U.S. taxpayers, other legitimate
claimants and creditors of failed institutions, and the financial
institutions themselves. The critical policy reform question thus
becomes: how can we keep what is "good" about D'Oench and
§ 1823(e), while simultaneously discarding what is "bad"?
Furthermore, how do we do so without causing injustice to
banking customers, banking agencies, or financial institutions?
B. PRACTITIONER AND ACADEMIC PROPOSALS: COPING WITH
THE MADNESS
Some commentators have suggested certain practical ways
for borrowers to cope with the current state of D'Oench by
attempting to comply with § 1823(e)'s strict requirements.
Robert J. Stillman suggests that borrowers sign and record all
agreements with the bank, and then insist that the bank deliver
a certificate confirming factual compliance with the require-
ments of § 1823(e)." 5 Stillman also advises borrowers to
obtain a continuing written pledge from the bank stating that
the institution will maintain the side agreement as part of the
official bank files.2"6 Finally, Stillman counsels borrowers to
request that the bank deliver a legal opinion from its attorney
verifying the bank and borrower's legal compliance with the
requirements of § 1823(e)." 7 Similarly, Professor Sacks pro-
poses that borrowers create a substantial "paper trail," evidenc-
ing the existence of a valid, legally binding side agreement.288
To assist the borrower in creating this paper trial, Sacks advises
284. See Sacks, supra note 103, at 1434-39 (recommending limits to the
expansion of D'Oench rather than its complete elimination).
285. Stillman, supra note 140, at 112.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Sacks, supra note 103, at 1436. Professor Sacks advises borrowers to
obtain: (1) a copy of the loan approval by board or loan committee; (2) an
opinion of bank counsel that the board or loan committee was empowered to act;
(3) a statement in agreement that it is an official bank record; (4) a statement
in the minutes that the agreement is an attachment to the minutes; and (5)
initial and periodic certificates from an officer that the record has been a
continuous bank record. Id.
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that borrowers enlist the services of a good banking law
attorney. 89 He argues that the responsibility for compliance
should be placed solely on the borrower, because borrowers have
had ample time to learn about D'Oench and the requirements of
§ 1823(e).29°
These creative compliance methods may constitute good,
practical legal advice for borrowers, but they merely offer a way
to deal with the problem of D'Oench and § 1823(e) instead of
solving it. For example, a borrower could create a substantial
"paper trail" evidencing the existence of an agreement. 9 He
might even finagle the bank into signing the side agreement,
manage to have it affixed with an official seal, and, for that
matter, convince every bank employee to record his thumbprint
in the upper right hand corner. That agreement might not
satisfy § 1823(e), however, because full compliance with§ 1823(e) remains under the unilateral control of the bank,
regardless of the legal measures the borrower takes to protect
himself. The bank's promises to comply with § 1823(e), in
writing or otherwise, both now and at periodic times in the
future, are worthless once the bank fails and is taken over by
the FDIC.292
289. Id. at 1435-36. Professor Sacks also proposes, quite correctly, that even
if borrowers do not hire their own counsel, they definitely should not rely on the
advice or services of the bank's attorney, as the bank's attorney has no legal
interest or duty in making sure the borrower either is aware of D'Oench and
§ 1823(e) or has sufficiently complied with § 1823(e) because that issue would
be relevant only between the borrower and the FDIC, and long after the bank
has failed. Id.
290. Id. at 1436 ("Borrowers must beware that for over 40 years they have
had 'a reasonable opportunity both to familiarize themselves with [the] general
requirements [of § 1823(e) and] to comply with these requirements.'") (quoting
Campbell Leasing v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1990)). Professor
Sacks' assertions notwithstanding, most borrowers are not aware of D'Oench or
§ 1823(e), and currently a bank has no legal duty or financial incentive to
inform borrowers about the rules. This Article, therefore, advocates a disclosure
requirement. See infra Part III.E. (detailing a disclosure requirement).
291. See also Hudson, supra note 197, at 64 (arguing for the same sort of
paper trail: banks should be as formal as possible in agreements, borrowers
should obtain copies of board or loan committee minutes approving the loan and
side agreements, and agreements should state that they are official bank
records).
292. See id. (suggesting not only that there be a thorough one time paper
trail, but that the borrower periodically obtain written confirmations that the
side agreement is still in force and the bank has kept it in its official files
continuously in compliance with the statute). However, even assuming a
borrower is that diligent, if the bank is not completely up front about it, then
fails and is taken over by the FDIC, the FDIC can use § 1823(e) against the
BANKING LITIGATION
Kevin A. Palmer suggests reforming D'Oench by elevating
the standard of proof regarding the existence of a side agreement
to "clear, precise and convincing evidence."293 With such
persuasive evidence, Palmer argues, no valid reason would exist
to prohibit a borrower's claims and defenses under D'Oench.2"9
Because this heightened proof standard would be subject to
judicial interpretation, however, it would not really assist the
borrower because it would not provide him with any clear
guidance for what he must do to prevail over the FDIC. Instead,
courts would have even more discretion to interpret and possibly
expand the D'Oench doctrine." 5
Palmer's suggested change would give a small number of
borrower-litigants the opportunity to rebutD'Oench's application
in their particular cases, instead of being barred by a pre-trial
motion. Its application, however, would be limited to the
relatively few borrowers with strong cases. Such reform also
does not consider the policy justification for the D'Oench doctrine
in the first place-the FDIC's legitimate concern in being aware
of the existence of side agreements. 6 If a borrower proves by
clear and convincing evidence that a legitimate side agreement
exists, the FDIC still might not know which loan assets are
affected by that side agreement. In an attempt to protect the
FDIC, Palmer argues that borrowers should be required to
demonstrate good faith and clean hands in their dealings with
the bank. This suggestion, although reasonable, is ineffective
because current D'Oench and § 1823(e) practice bars claims and
defenses of borrowers without regard to good faith or clean
hands, and Palmer does not address the changes necessary to
borrower if the bank was not keeping the agreement as an official record, or did
not do so "continuously."
293. Palmer, supra note 36, at 576.
294. Id.
295. One might imagine that the increased standard of proof would provide
the courts with justification to allow the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) to
swallow up even more claims and defenses that so far have escaped the purview
of the doctrine because the borrower would have failed to satisfy the elevated
proof standard. See supra notes 263-75 and accompanying text (listing the
remaining claims and defenses that neither the D'Oench doctrine nor § 1823(e)
bar).
296. This underscores the need for the regulators to recognize existence of
the side agreement without having to rely on the bank's unilateral actions. The
disclosure and filing system proposed infra, directly addresses this issue.
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achieve his goal.29" The suggestion is also ineffective on a
practical level because it does not necessarily guarantee a
writing or notice to the FDIC.
Palmer finally suggests that courts should utilize a rebutta-
ble presumption in favor of the FDIC. Again, this does nothing
to alleviate the unfairness to the borrower, nor does it address
the lack of notice to the FDIC, even when the borrower has a
strong argument that the side agreement exists. Given such a
presumption, secret side agreements may or may not be barred
depending on the course of the impending litigation. Thus,
unlike the current D'Oench practice, neither the FDIC nor
private third-parties would be certain of the result.
Most other commentators, aside from criticizing the broad
scope of the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e), simply argue that
D'Oench and § 1823(e) should be interpreted more narrowly.298
Perhaps most troubling is that they do not offer or consider any
substantial statutory reforms to § 1823(e), nor do they address
the FDIC's new internal agency guidelines regarding the use of
D'Oench and § 1823(e). The FDIC guidelines and recently
proposed statutory reforms are important considerations in
understanding the possible reforms of the D'Oench doctrine and
§ 1823(e).
C. THE FDIC's RECENT INTERNAL GUIDELINES
The FDIC itself has recognized the need to reform D'Oench
and § 1823(e)299 and has offered a proposed solution. In March
of 1994, the FDIC responded to criticism from a host of sourc-
es... by establishing an inter-divisional work group to formu-
late "an appropriate response to concerns about the application
297. Recall that the borrower's actions or lack of knowledge is irrelevant and
no longer required by D'Oench case law or § 1823(e). See supra note 247 and
accompanying text (noting that lack of knowledge is irrelevant).
298. See, e.g., Lake, supra note 18, at 315; MacArthur, supra note 18, at
1271; Weiss & Kraus, supra note 18, at 256.
299. "Although the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) promote critical public
policy goals, the FDIC recognizes that the application of these legal principles
requires a balancing of these goals with the public interest that individuals be
treated fairly." S. 648 Hearings, supra note 1, at 3-4 (statement of Sharon
Powers Sivertsen, Assistant General Counsel, FDIC).
300. Recall that criticism of D'Oench and § 1823(e) has come from:
academics, see supra note 36 and accompanying text; practitioners, see supra
note 39 and accompanying text; the judiciary, see supra notes 37, 276 and
accompanying text; Congress, see supra note 40 and accompanying text; and
private citizens, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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of the D'Oench doctrine and section 1823(e) and to prepare
recommendations."301 Adopting that group's recommendations,
the FDIC implemented formal written internal guidelines
requiring FDIC attorneys to give special review and consider-
ation in deciding whether to use D'Oench and § 1823(e) in seven
specific circumstances.0 2
Although they attempt to promote equity, the guidelines
offer little actual protection to borrowers and creditors. Neither
Congress nor any outside agency can enforce FDIC guidelines.
The FDIC can choose either to comply with, or ignore complete-
ly, its own guidelines.0 3 In addition, although the guidelines
set forth seven circumstances where D'Oench and § 1823(e)
should not be applied, each category has many exceptions and
plenty of room for creative interpretation.0 4 Furthermore, an
301. S. 648 Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Sharon Powers
Sivertsen, Assistant General Counsel, FDIC).
302. Those seven circumstances are as follows:
(1) claims by pre-closing vendors (e.g., a janitor who sells cleaning
services to a bank before it fails);
(2) claims or defenses by a "diligent party" who took all reasonable
steps to document and record the agreement and there is no evidence
that the borrower engaged in any activity likely to mislead the
regulators;
(3) claims or defenses based upon an agreement or documents not in
the bank's official records but upon other documents in the bank's
records reflecting the existence of the agreement;
(4) claims or defenses based on transactions other than loan transac-
tions ("no asset exception"), such as a negligence tort claim;
(5) claims or defenses based on the bank's violation of some part of a
written agreement-bilateral obligations;
(6) statutory defenses, such as an unfair trade practice claim against
the bank violative of statutory law; and
(7) claims or defenses based solely on a loan workout or modification
and the violation is limited to the contemporaneous requirement.
See id.
303. See Memorandum from John F. Bovenzi, Director, FDIC Division of
Depositor and Asset Services, & Thomas A. Rose, FDIC Deputy General
Counsel, to FDIC Regional Directors, Regional Counsel, and Associate Director,
Guidelines for use of D'OenchAnd Section 1823(e) 1 ("It is the responsibility of
the Regional Directors, Associate Director - COMB, and Regional Counsel [of
the FDIC] to ensure compliance with this Directive by all personnel in their
respective service centers.") (copy on file with the author).
304. See id. Take the first of these categories for example. The FDIC may
still convincingly argue that D'Oench should apply. With respect to pre-closing
vendors the guidelines state that "[this does not mean that D'Oench and section
1823(e) may never be asserted against a vendor, but only that each claim must
be examined carefully on its facts." Id. at 3. With respect to the diligent party,
the guidelines allow the application of D'Oench if "the borrower ... participated
in some fraudulent or other activity which could have resulted in deception of
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FDIC attorney's determination that a particular case satisfies
one of the seven categories does not preclude the application of
D'Oench. In such circumstances, the attorney still might
unsheathe D'Oench or § 1823(e) by obtaining approval from
FDIC headquarters in Washington." 5 A loophole of this
magnitude reduces the guidelines to a mere unenforceable vague
promise to be fair. Thus, despite the FDIC's frequent use of the
D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) over the last decade, the FDIC
apparently now invites borrowers simply to trust them to do
what is right.
30 6
To underscore the fact that these guidelines offer no real
protection for innocent borrowers, the FDIC included the
following disclaimer in its guidelines:
These guidelines are intended only to improve the FDIC's review and
management of the utilization of D'Oench and section 1823(e). The
Guidelines do not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedur-
al, that is enforceable at law, in equity, or otherwise by any party
against the FDIC, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person. The Guidelines shall not be construed to create any right to
judicial review, settlement, or any other right involving compliance
with its terms. 307
By including this disclaimer, the FDIC carefully shielded itself
from all liability if it fails to comply with its own guidelines.
Thus, the FDIC offers its internal guidelines as an olive branch,
yet remains poised to wield the D'Oench sword at any time.
It is not surprising that the FDIC is attempting to keep its
basic D'Oench powers intact by conducting its own reform
banking regulators. ... " Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Apparently no actual
deception would be required and presumably even the most remote activity that
conceivably "could have deceived" the regulators would qualify. With respect
to the integral document the guidelines merely state that "[w]hile any number
of cases have held that the terms of the agreement must be ascertainable on the
face of the document, in some circumstances it may be appropriate to consider
all of the failed bank's books and records in determining the agreement, not just
an individual document." Id. at 6. Those circumstances are not defined and
there is enough qualifying language to allow the FDIC to apply the doctrine.
305. Id. at 2. ("These guidelines are intended to aid in the review of matters
where the assertion of D'Oench and/or section 1823(e) is being considered...
to give clear direction as to when D'Oench and section 1823(e) issues must be
referred to Washington ....").
306. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text (discussing the RTC's
treatment of Rhetta B. Sweeney and the government's "Too bad, we win because
D'Oench says we win" attitude); supra text accompanying note 98 (further
demonstrating this "Too bad, we win because D'Oench says we win" attitude in
disputes with former borrowers).
307. Id. at 11.
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through internal guidelines that purportedly address the
unfairness of D'Oench and § 1823(e). If Congress reforms
D'Oench and § 1823(e), then the FDIC will lose an extremely
powerful advantage in many failed bank litigation cases.08
Any reform would reduce the savings the FDIC achieves by
precluding borrower counterclaims and defenses in failed bank
litigation-a savings the FDIC estimates at over $1 billion.309
The high potential expenditures over the next few years increase
the pressure on the FDIC to maximize collections and minimize
expenses for failed institutions.310 The FDIC thus has a strong
incentive to preserve the litigation tool that has facilitated
victory in over ninety-seven percent of the cases in which it was
used. 1' Such resistance, however, should not prevail as a
legitimate and principled reason for blocking efforts designed to
308. The D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) bestow such a powerful litigation
advantage to the FDIC in failed bank litigation against former borrowers that
they have been renamed "Superpowers." Barry, supra note 106, at 1127; James
J. Boteler, Protecting the American Taxpayers: Assigning the FDIC's Six Year
Statute of Limitations to Third Party Purchasers, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1169,
1186-97 (1993); Echevarria, supra note 36, at 807; Galves, supra note 16, at 473;
Zisman & Woung, supra note 282, at 516.
309. See supra note 20 (estimating these savings).
310. The cost of the S&L bailout is estimated as high as $500 billion over the
next few years and more than one trillion dollars over the next several decades.
See DAY, supra note 51, at 9. Others estimate "only" $2,500 per person. See Al
Crass, McConnell and S&L's Quickly Counter Sloane on Contribution Changes,
THE COURIER J., July 27, 1990, at 1B, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. By
comparison, U.S. taxpayers paid a total of $7.4 billion for the 1991 Gulf War,
which is only about 7 to 14% of the total bank and S&L bailout cost.
Washington Roundup Lost Cause, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., May 11, 1992,
at 17, 17. Even the laundering of illegal drug profits worldwide is estimated to
be nearly $300 billion annually, less than half the cost of the bailout. Drug
Money Laundering, Banks and Foreign Policy, Report Submitted by the
Subcomm. on Narcotics, Terrorism and International Operations to the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 101-04 (Feb. 1990). The
political and economic pressures on the FDIC are acute. A WESTLAW search
conducted on March 18, 1996 produced 10,732 stories related to the cost of the
S&L bailout which were published since January 1, 1990. Congress recently
made the reduction of the total bailout cost a clear mandate in the FDICIA,
supra note 49 (requiring the FDIC to execute its duties in a manner "least
costly to the deposit insurance fund of all possible methods of meeting [its]
obligations," § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii), that "maximizes the net present value return
from the sale or disposition of assets," and "minimizes the amount of any loss
realized in the resolution of cases"). 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3) (1994). Under
current law, the easiest way to meet these requirements is to utilize D'Oench
and § 1823(e).
311. See supra text accompanying note 1 (noting Senator Cohen's observation
that 97% of claims that vendors and individuals filed were defeated by the
government's invocation of the D'Oench doctrine).
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revise the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) so they are equitable
to all concerned. 12
The FDIC's record of using D'Oench and § 1823(e) to its
advantage, despite the inequities of the situation, shows that
Congress should not retreat from significant reform legislation
merely because the FDIC, given its new internal guidelines, now
claims that it is being fair to borrowers of failed institutions.313
Moreover, although critics should welcome the FDIC's willing-
ness to be flexible when applying D'Oench and § 1823(e), they
should question the FDIC's motive in taking such action. Given
the FDIC's strong economic interest in deflecting some of the
cost of the banking and S&L bailout,314 the FDIC's new self-
regulation must reflect the FDIC's efforts to bend to today's
prevailing political winds rather than a sudden desire to treat
borrowers fairly.315
D. CONGRESS'S CURRENT REFORM PROPOSAL: S. 648, THE
D'OENCH, DUHME REFORM ACT
On March 30, 1994, Senator Cohen introduced S. 648, The
D'Oench Duhme Reform Act,3"6 which "substantially curbs the
power regulators have through the D'Oench Duhme doctrine to
lay waste to claims of borrowers and vendors in financial
institution insolvencies." 11 Although this proposed legislation
312. Again, the FDIC and RTC both attempted to preempt the D'Oench
Duhme Reform Act by unilaterally enacting internal guidelines designed to
soften the harsh application of the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) in certain
circumstances. See supra notes 299-307 and accompanying text.
313. Indeed, Senator Cohen, co-sponsor of the current legislative reform
proposal, see supra note 40; infra Part II.D., remains unimpressed by the
FDIC's internal agency guidelines.
I am aware that the FDIC has issued new guidelines governing when
D'Oench may be asserted and, in some instances, requiring approval
of the General Counsel's office before D'Oench may be used by
attorneys in the field. I believe this is a step in the right direction ....
These guidelines, however, do not obviate the need for legislation to
restore the D'Oench Duhme doctrine to its original, narrow scope.
S. 648 Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Senator William S. Cohen).
314. See supra note 51 (noting that the FDIC's bailout efforts cost only one
billion dollars less than its insurance fund earned).
315. See supra text accompanying note 307 (quoting the disclaimer from the
FDIC's own internal guidelines).
316. See supra note 40; see also text accompanying note 1 (quoting Senator
Cohen's justification for this legislation).
317. Big Change to Insolvency Doctrine Proposed, THE THRIFT REGULATOR,
April 10, 1995, at 8; see also Sen. Cohen Offers Bill to Curb Abuses, Allow More
Claims Under D'Oench, Duhme, Banking Daily (BNA) at D2 (Apr. 4, 1995),
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goes a long way toward remedying D'Oench's problems, it
contains a number of ambiguous phrases that will hamper its
effectiveness. The following analysis and critique uses S. 648 as
a starting point and highlights the content of ideal reform
legislation.318
1. "Findings and Purposes"
To assist courts in construing the new provisions, the reform
bill should contain sufficient legislative history to provide a clear
understanding of the purposes and policy objectives supporting
the reform and the new limited purview of § 1823(e). The goal
is to ensure that judges and litigants understand the clear
legislative intent to roll back the expansive interpretation and
application of D'Oench and § 1823(e) to their original, limited
scope. Accordingly, a "Findings and Purposes" section 19 of the
available in WESTLAW, BNA-BBD. Two Senate hearings have been held
addressing this issue. See generally Oversight Hearings, supra note 20; S. 648
Hearings, supra note 1.
318. References to the Act in the footnotes of this Part refer to portions of S.
648.
319. Section 2 of the Act sufficiently addresses these concerns, providing:
(a) FINDINGS-The Congress finds that-
(1) in D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. [FDIC], 315 U.S. 447 (1942), the
Supreme Court determined that secret side agreements that were not
recorded in the records of an insured depository institution should not
be enforceable against Federal banking agencies when those agencies
acquired assets following the failure of the institution;
(2) the Supreme Court based its holding (hereinafter in this section
referred to as the "D'Oench doctrine") on its power to develop Federal
common law;
(3) in 1950, the Congress supplemented the D'Oench doctrine by
amending section 13(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [codified
as 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)] to invalidate agreements relating to assets
acquired by the Federal banking agencies that were not recorded in
official depository institution records;
(4) Federal and State courts have expanded the scope of the
D'Oench doctrine and section 13(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act by interpreting them to bar tort claims based on oral representa-
tions, claims that do not relate to assets acquired by Federal banking
agencies, and numerous other claims and defenses beyond the original
scope and intent of those two lines of authority;
(5) the Federal banking agencies' use of the D'Oench doctrine and
section 13(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act in the administra-
tive claims process and litigation and the expansive interpretation of
those authorities by Federal courts have led to fundamentally unfair
results; and
(6) many individuals have been barred from asserting potentially
valid claims and defenses once an insured depository institution has
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reform act should reflect that Congress finds that federal and
state courts have expanded the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e)
beyond their original scope and intent, leading to unfair results
and prohibiting countless valid claims and defenses. Congress
should declare that the common law authority flowing from
D'Oench and the interpretation of § 1823(e) is eliminated, 30
and that the reform legislation revises § 1823(e) significantly.
The revised § 1823(e) would continue to bar unrecorded agree-
ments that otherwise would allow certain borrowers to deceive
the FDIC, while still allowing innocent borrowers to enforce
their legitimate side agreements.
The "Findings and Purposes" section also should emphasize
Congress's strong disapproval of the current overly broad
interpretation of D'Oench by explicitly curtailing Langley's broad
interpretation of "agreement." 2' The interpretation of "agree-
ment" should include neither non-promissory statements nor
mere failures to make statements. Because Langley is the only
case in which the Supreme Court specifically interprets
§ 1823(e), the case should be overruled legislatively3 22 to
remove any argument that Langley's interpretation of "agree-
ment" survives.
2. Clarification: Disregarding D'Oench and Old Section
1823(e); Adopting New and Improved Section 1823(e)
Any reform legislation should enunciate clearly that it
been declared insolvent and taken over by a Federal banking agency.
(b) PURPOSES-The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to eliminate the Federal common law doctrine referred to in
subsection (a)(2); and
(2) to revise section 13(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act so
that it will continue to bar the enforcement of unrecorded agreements,
but allow certain potentially valid intentional tort and other claims and
defenses to be adjudicated on their merits.
S. 648, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
320. See supra note 138 (setting forth the Murphy and Boatman cases, from
the D.C. and Eighth Circuits, respectively, holding that common law D'Oench
is no longer valid and has been superseded by § 1823(e), if not by FIRREA).
321. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
"agreement" with regard to the Langley decision).
322. Congress possesses the authority to overrule a Supreme Court opinion
when the opinion is an interpretation of a congressional statute. See generally
Redwing Carriers Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, Ltd., 875 F. Supp. 1545, 1556
(S.D. Ala. 1995) ("A court should presume Congress means what it says when
it drafts statutes ... Congress, not the courts, has the power to amend
them.").
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overrules the D'Oench common law doctrine and its progeny,
repeals the current § 1823(e), and substitutes a new § 1823(e) in
its place." Many of the unfair interpretations of D'Oench or
323. See "Findings and Purposes" section, supra note 319. In addition, the
first provision of this portion of the Act states that § 1823(e) "is amended to
read as follows." S. 648, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995). This statement
clarifies that proposed § 1823(e) completely repeals and replaces the current
§ 1823(e).
The recommendations that follow in the text for the new § 1823(e) will use
S. 648 as a starting point for analysis. That bill provides, in relevant part:
(e) AGREEMENTS AGAINsT INTERESTS OF THE CORPORATION-
(1) IN GENERAL-No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat
the interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by the Corpora-
tion under this section or under section 11, by purchase or assumption,
or in its capacity as receiver of any insured depository institution, shall
be enforceable against the Corporation unless that agreement-
(A) is in writing and
(B) was executed in the ordinary course of business
(C) by an insured depository institution through an officer or other
employee or representative of the institution having the authority to
execute such an agreement on behalf of the institution.
(2) CLAIMs AGAINST THE CORPORATION-No court may rely on
paragraph (1) to bar or estop a claim or defense against the Corpora-
tion in its corporate capacity or as conservator or receiver of an insured
depository institution if-
(A) the claim or defense does not relate to an agreement affecting
an asset acquired from the insured depository institution by the
Corporation;
(B) the claim or defense relates to a transaction that, in the normal
course of business, would not be included in the official records of the
insured depository institution;
(C) the claim or defense was filed in a judicial proceeding more
than 90 days before the date of the appointment of the corporation as
conservator or receiver for the insured depository institution;
(D) the claim or defense, filed at any time, is based on an alleged
intentional tort or alleged violation of State or Federal statutory or
regulatory law by the insured depository institution, its representa-
tives, or its employees, if-
(I) the party asserting the claim or defense demonstrates that the
party did not-
(H) participate in a scheme to defraud the insured depository
institution; or
(III) knowingly lend itself to a scheme to mislead bank examiners
by misrepresenting the value of the assets of the institution; and
(IV) any oral representations relied upon are not in conflict with
a written agreement contained in the records of the institution.
(3) STATUS AS HOLDER IN DUE COURSE-When the corporation
acquires an asset under this section, or by purchase or assumption, it
shall succeed to the same status as a holder in due course, as defined
by applicable State law, with respect to that asset and shall acquire no
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§ 1823(e) then will not bind courts construing the new legisla-
tion.
a. Preliminary Clarifications
Legislative reform should scale back § 1823(e) to apply to
the FDIC only in its receivership capacity, and not to transac-
tions where the FDIC, in its corporate capacity as an insurer of
deposits, loans capital to a troubled institution. 24 When the
FDIC assists in its corporate capacity, it does so before the
institution fails, and does not need D'Oench protection at that
point. Section 1823(e) explicitly should preserve any right the
FDIC otherwise may have against a former borrower or creditor
where no side agreement affecting an asset is involved, to
protect the FDIC from expansive judicial interpretation illegiti-
mately favoring borrowers. 25  Reform legislation also should
eliminate the Federal HIDC doctrine. Recall that the Federal
HIDC doctrine operates as an overlapping extension of the
D'Oench doctrine in certain situations. Congress should
explicitly eliminate this common law creation to make all
D'Oench and § 1823(e) issues ones of statutory interpretation of
the new § 1823(e). Finally, the statute should reaffirm
Congress's continuing commitment to render unenforceable side
more or no less rights as a holder in due course, as defined by
applicable state law, with respect to that asset as the insured
depository institution had prior to the appointment of the receiver of
conservator.
(4) EXCEPTION FOR VENDOR AGREEMENTS-Subsection (e)(1) does
not apply to an agreement for the sale or purchase of goods or services
actually received by or delivered to an insured depository institution
before the date of an appointment of a receiver for that institution.
(5) PRESERVATION OF OTHER RIGHTS-Nothing in this section shall
impair or affect any rights the Corporation may have under any other
applicable State or Federal statutory or regulatory law.
S. 648, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995).
324. The first portion of the proposed § 1823(e)(1) does this by striking
"security for a loan" from the current § 1823(e). Note that the language of the
proposed § 1823(e)(1) governs agreements that "[tend] to diminish or defeat the
interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by the Corporation under this
section or under section 11, by purchase or assumption, or in its capacity as
receiver of any insured depository institution." See supra note 323 (quoting the
Act). The reference to "section 11" in the proposed § 1823(e)(1) mirrors the
reference to "section 1821" in the current § 1823(e)(1).
325. See supra note 323 (quoting the Act).
326. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text (discussing the
expansion of the D'Oench doctrine and the creation of the federal HIDC
doctrine).
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agreements that diminish the value of an asset acquired by the
FDIC unless they conform to certain requirements.327 The
remaining subsections of the new § 1823(e) should set forth only
necessary prerequisites for enforcing side agreements or verbal
representations against the FDIC.
b. Section 1823(e) Requirements
i. Writing and Execution
Section 1823(e) still should require a writing in most cases,
as under current law,3" but should require that writing to be
executed only in the ordinary course of business rather than
contemporaneously.329 The new § 1823(e) should continue to
require that the side agreement be properly executed,3 ' but
should make it easier to accomplish proper execution.
Congress should retain the flexibility of the execution
process to prevent the FDIC from using a lack of proper
execution or the failure to meet the strict contemporaneous
requirement 331 to invalidate otherwise legitimate side agree-
ments.332 This revision will be especially helpful to borrowers
because most loan modifications or loan workouts, by definition,
occur over the course of the loan, sometimes years after the
327. The proposed § 1823(e)(1) does this by making any agreements that do
not conform to the statutory requirements unenforceable. See supra note 323
(quoting the Act).
328. Current § 1823(e) makes only one minor exception to its strict
requirements, and in no event can unwritten side agreements comply. Although
the proposed § 1823(e)(1) has the same writing requirement, in later subsec-
tions, it sets forth various exceptions to that requirement. Thus, under current
§ 1823(e), a writing is definitely required; however, under the proposed
§ 1823(e), a writing is necessary only if the side agreement does not fit within
the later exceptions. See supra note 323 (quoting the Act).
329. The proposed § 1823(e)(1) eliminates the contemporaneous requirement
in favor of an "ordinary course of business" requirement. See supra note 323
(quoting the Act).
330. See supra note 323 (noting that the proposed § 1823 requires that an
agreement be executed). Under the current § 1823(e) this is a strict require-
ment, but under the proposed § 1823(e)(1) exceptions it would not be. See supra
note 323 (quoting proposed Act); infra text accompanying notes 331-35
(discussing execution requirements).
331. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (noting that some courts
interpret the contemporaneous requirement to require execution on the same
day).
332. The proposed § 1823(e)(1) does not modify "execution" but leaves the
term open to interpretation.
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execution of the original promissory note.33 As a result, most
modification agreements that the current § 1823(e) bars31
would be enforceable under the new § 1823(e) because they
would be "executed in the ordinary course of business."
However, the use of the ambiguous phrase "executed in the
ordinary course of business" could breed litigation over its proper
interpretation, potentially eviscerating the goals of the Act. The
FDIC might argue successfully that the particular side agree-
ment was "unique" or posed "special circumstances" that placed
the execution of the agreement outside the ordinary course of
business. Suppose, for example, that a group of partners enters
into a side agreement. Suppose further that because of the
special nature of the loan, all partners must sign the promissory
note to make it enforceable against the partnership. If only one
partner's agent executed the agreement, and the institution were
to fail, the FDIC could claim that the agreement was not
executed in the ordinary course of business, and therefore is
unenforceable. By allowing this kind of creative wordplay to
continue, the new § 1823(e) would not remedy current § 1823(e)'s
strict interpretation, unless "ordinary course of business" could
be specifically defined. Using a term such as "ordinary course of
business," however, is an attempt to infuse objectivity into an
inherently subjective concept. Although it is easy to critique
that inherent subjectivity, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
define it more specifically. Therefore, using this admittedly
ambiguous phrase may be the best available option.
In addition to proper execution, the new § 1823(e) should
require both that execution only be accomplished by individuals
with apparent authority to make such side agreements, rather
than requiring approval by the board of directors or the loan
committee, and that execution be reflected in the minutes of the
333. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (discussing loan
modifications).
334. See supra notes 195-97 (examining the uncertain adjudication under
current § 1823(e)); see generally FDIC v. Virginia Crossings, 909 F.2d 306, 309
(8th Cir. 1990) ("The plain language of § 1823(e) requires that an agreement,
to be effective against the FDIC, must be executed by the bank and the obligor
contemporaneously with the making of the note. The Janikula and Jensen
memoranda clearly do not meet that requirement."); RTC v. Dubois, 771 F.
Supp. 154, 156 (M.D. La. 1991) ("Although the commitment letter in this case
does provide for a variable interest rate, adjusted quarterly, it was executed
before, and not contemporaneously, with Note 1 or Note 2.").
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appropriate group."' This revision removes some of the
unilateral control over the agreement that a bank is given under
the current § 1823(e). A borrower should not be punished simply
because the bank approves the side agreement without properly
recording or maintaining it in the official minutes of the
appropriate committee. Once the written side agreement is
executed in the ordinary course of business by a bank employee
or other bank representative, that agreement instantly should
become valid.
Allowing a borrower to rely on apparent authority protects
her from a mistaken perception or active deception on the part
of the institution.336 For example, a typical borrower might
believe in good faith that an assistant loan officer has the
authority to execute a side agreement. Whether the assistant
loan officer has actual authority, however, is not within the
borrower's control. Under current law, the FDIC could argue
successfully that the bank officer or employee, upon whom the
innocent borrower relied in reaching the agreement, did not have
actual authority to bind the financial institution within the
meaning of the statute. Thus, under the new § 1823(e), the
FDIC should not prevail with such an argument. Requiring
apparent rather than actual authority to execute an agreement
makes the borrower's innocence and good faith in executing the
side agreement, rather than that of the FDIC or RTC, the
touchstone by which to determine the side agreement's enforce-
ability.337
ii. Continuous Recordation
The new § 1823(e) also should eliminate the continuous
record requirement because borrowers have no way to ensure its
335. The proposed § 1823(e)(1) requires execution "by an insured depository
institution through an officer or other employee or representative of the
institution having the authority to execute such an agreement on behalf of the
institution." See supra note 323 (quoting the Act). It thus expands the pool of
institutional employees who may approve an agreement over the current
§ 1823(e). It does not, however, contain the apparent authority provision
advocated here.
336. The Act should be amended to require execution "by ... a representa-
tive with apparent authority to execute such an agreement on behalf of the
institution." (emphasis added).
337. However, a deceitful borrower who, for example, obtains the signature
of a bank teller trainee or the bank's plumber would not be able to enforce the
side agreement because no credible argument could be made in support of
apparent authority in their situation.
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compliance. 3 ' Although eliminating this requirement339 is a
sound policy decision to protect innocent borrowers, the reform
act should continue to require that institutions keep valid side
agreements as continuous records in their official files. 40 The
legitimate purpose of § 1823(e), in terms of the FDIC's and the
other regulators' responsibilities, would be defeated if valid side
agreements were not discoverable during examinations or
seizures."' But the bank's duty to keep official documents in
the bank's official files to ensure that the examiners and
regulators have access to them during an examination or seizure
is a purely regulatory matter that should be handled exclusively
between the bank and its regulators. The failure of an institu-
tion to comply with its regulatory duties should neither involve
the borrower nor justify rendering unenforceable a borrower's
otherwise valid side agreement. 42  Congress still should
require banks to maintain the integrity of their official files, but§ 1823(e) should not be used as the vehicle to ensure such
maintenance by punishing innocent creditors for regulatory
violations of the bank.
c. Section 1823(e) Exceptions
Current § 1823(e) dispenses with the contemporaneous
requirement for governmental entities.3' Dispensing with the
contemporaneous requirement entirely eliminates the need for
338. See supra notes 225-32 and accompanying text (discussing borrowers'
inability to ensure compliance). Recall that this requirement renders many side
agreements invalid, even though the borrower has complied with § 1823(e) in
all other respects because a bank employee removes the side agreement from
the official files.
339. The Reform Act eliminates the following requirement of the current
§ 1823(e): "has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official
record of the depository institution." See supra note 323 (quoting the proposed
§ 1823(e)(1)).
340. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 9.9 (discussing the audit of a trust depart-
ment); id. § 27.3 (outlining bank record keeping requirements for loan
applications); id. § 563.17-1 (providing requirements for maintaining records).
341. See supra notes 225-229 (providing a hypothetical situation developed
under the current § 1823(e)(1)).
342. Such injustice would not be tolerated in a slightly different context. For
example, assume a bank's balance sheet demonstrates various liabilities to
creditors. A dishonest bank officer could then delete liabilities to certain
creditors to deceive examiners about the bank's financial position. If the bank
fails, those creditors' claims remain valid because the bank's unilateral and
illegal action in underreporting liabilities does not affect the contract between
the bank and its creditor.
343. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(2).
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this exception.3 4 The new § 1823(e), however, should contain
new exceptions to limit its application to those situations where
equity requires its application.
i. Vendor Exception
The new legislation should provide that § 1823(e) does not
apply to vendors of an institution. Recall that, although
borrowers are affected by D'Oench in significantly larger
numbers, creditors perhaps have been subject to the most highly
publicized abuses of D'Oench.345 Some courts have addressed
this problem by adding a judicial "relatedness" requirement to
current § 1823(e).346 Those courts distinguish between typical
claims like employment discrimination and automobile accidents,
freestanding torts not barred by D'Oench, and those relating to
"ordinary banking transactions."347 The relatedness require-
ment directs the court to look beyond the form of the allegation
by the individual to the substance of the claim. 8' The ratio-
nale behind such a requirement goes to the expectations of the
bank examiners that those assets unrelated would not be
expected to be in the records of regular banking transac-
tions.349 Not all courts, however, have accepted the freestand-
ing tort exception. Therefore, § 1823(e) should be revised as
follows.
First, the revised § 1823(e) should apply only to an asset
acquired by the FDIC in its receivership capacity.35 ° The
344. The proposed § 1823(e)(1) contains no contemporaneous requirement.
See supra note 323 (describing the elimination of the contemporaneous
requirement in favor of an "ordinary course of business" requirement).
345. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text (providing a discussion
of cases involving creditors).
346. See OPS Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306,310 (11th Cir. 1993)
("We simply do not think the D'Oench doctrine operates to bar free standing tort
claims that are not related to a specific asset acquired by the FDIC.").
347. RTC v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 595 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting OPS
Shopping Ctr., 992 F.2d at 310)).
348. See Motorcity of Jacksonville Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 39 F.3d 292, 300
(11th Cir. 1994) (deeming an agreement between car dealer and bank for
preparation of audit reports unrelated to regular banking transactions in
dealer's claim for negligence); see also Vernon v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 1230, 1233
(11th Cir. 1993) (deeming a purchase agreement of securities unrelated in claim
for securities law violations).
349. Motorcity of Jacksonville, 39 F.3d at 300.
350. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
FDIC as a receiver).
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assets usually acquired by the FDIC are loan obligations."'
Although some case law limits the current § 1823(e) in the
manner this Article suggests, some courts hold that current
§ 1823(e) can apply to a bank's debts which involve amounts it
owes creditors for services provided to it. Limiting revised
§ 1823(e)'s application to assets the FDIC acquires in its
receivership capacity will exempt claims brought by creditors of
the failed financial institution from § 1823(e) and allow creditors
to collect valid debts regardless of the existence of written
agreements. 52
Second, a revised § 1823(e) should contain an explicit
relatedness requirement because not all courts have read the
exception into the current § 1823(e). 35' For example, in Hawke
Associates v. City Federal Savings Bank,354 a landlord entered
into an agreement with a thrift for the lease of additional space
in the building on favorable terms, in return for the bank's
commitment to continue to occupy its existing space. 55 Short-
ly after the lease was signed, the landlord sued the bank
claiming that the bank had breached the lease by making
misrepresentations during negotiations. The court ignored
the "asset" requirement of § 1823(e) and found that the lease
agreement was not enforceable against the RTC which had taken
over the failed thrift."' The proposed revision to § 1823(e)
351. Loan obligations are assets because they provide revenues to the bank
as the borrower pays both the principal and interest.
352. In 1994, Representative Bill McCullom and Senator William Cohen
introduced similar bills to reform the D'Oench doctrine so that it would not
apply to claims brought by creditors. That bill never made it out of committee,
but the provision requiring that the side agreement relate to an asset was
included in S. 648. See H.R. 4146, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (introduced by
Representative McCullom); S. 1725, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) (introduced by
Senator Cohen).
353. Proposed § 1823(e)(2)(A) does this by providing that § 1823(e)(1) does
not apply if "the claim or defense does not relate to an agreement affecting an
asset acquired from the insured depository institution by the Corporation." See
supra note 323 (quoting the Act).
354. 787 F. Supp. 423, 424 (D. N.J. 1991).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.; see also Hall v. FDIC, 920 F.2d 334, 339 (6th Cir. 1990) ("There are
... instances where FDIC no longer has an interest in an asset, but where the
logic of D'Oench should still apply to protect FDIC."); Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d
1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The agreement need not implicate a specific
obligation, such as a note or other asset held by the FDIC."); Bell & Murphy
and Assocs., Inc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir.
1990) (noting that the "D'Oench, Duhme rule bars affirmative claims based upon
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would reverse this case law.
Although this relatedness requirement to an asset makes an
important "exception," it does present the problem of being open
to a wide range of interpretations. Conceivably, a court might
require only a loose nexus by applying § 1823(e) to claims and
defenses only peripherally affecting some asset. For example,
assume a bank orally agrees to make a $100,000 business loan
to a customer, but actually loans only $10,000. The reduction in
the loan amount hampers the customer's business. If the bank
fails and the customer sues, D'Oench and § 1823(e) might bar
the claim for the additional $90,000 loan and any consequential
damages because the claim is arguably "related" to an asset-the
$10,000 loan. In this case, however, the new § 1823(e) should
not apply because the cause of action is not sufficiently related
to the underlying loan. Legislative history should clarify and
give examples of the required degree of relatedness to guide
courts in interpreting this phrase.358
Creating an explicit vendor agreement 5 9 exception to
§ 1823(e), however, is perhaps a more effective way to protect
vendors without assuming the interpretational problems of a
relatedness exception. 60 Such an exception clearly would
signal that no written agreement is required to enforce a bank's
ordinary creditor's claims against the FDIC. Because the
original D'Oench case never contemplated such agreements,
Congress should restore their exemption from D'Oench and
§ 1823(e). Consistent with the D'Oench case, however, Congress
should require that a vendor come to court with clean hands,
and should prohibit vendors from enforcing an agreement made
pursuant to a scheme to deceive or defraud the FDIC.
unrecorded agreements to extend future loans."); McCaugherty v. Sifferman,
772 F. Supp. 1128, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (citing Bowen to support the
proposition that the agreement does not need to involve a specific asset).
358. Perhaps including additional language so that the legislation reads: 'an
agreement substantially [emphasis added] affecting an asset ... " will help
courts to understand that only agreements that substantially affect the asset
are related to it, and therefore, only those agreements must be written to satisfy
§ 1823(e).
359. A vendor agreement transpires between a seller of goods or services and
a bank.
360. Proposed § 1823(e)(4) contains this explicit exception. See supra note
323 (quoting the Act).
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ii. Transactions Not in the Normal Course of Business
The new § 1823(e) should not provide a new exception for
transactions that would not be included in official records in the
normal course of business, such as nominal subcontracting
construction work.36' The numerous interpretive problems
such an exception would create perhaps outweigh the potential
benefits.
The vague term "normal course of business" is open to
varied interpretations. To create a workable standard, therefore,
legislation would need to determine who decides what qualifies
as "in the normal course of business"36 2-- the judiciary, the
FDIC, or borrowers. It also would need to clarify whether the
standard is objective and uniform for all institutions throughout
the nation, or whether it would allow subjective determina-
tions.363
The interpretation of this vague phrase has significant
implications. For example, a bank's promise to "be understand-
ing" if payments are late might be in the "normal course of
business" for some banks, but even those banks might differ
regarding whether such a promise must be kept in the bank's
files as a formal agreement. The prior course of conduct
between a bank and a long-time customer raises similar
problems. Their business relationship might be characterized by
informal dealings, such that an agreement to allow late pay-
ments might not be included in the bank's official records. The
FDIC could escape responsibility for the agreement if courts
361. The Act proposes to revise § 1823(e) by providing that a court cannot
use § 1823(e) to bar a claim or defense if "the claim or defense relates to a
transaction that, in the normal course of business, would not be included in the
official records of the insured depository institution." S. 648, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (emphasis added). This Article advocates that this revision be
eliminated, or at least revised. Any revision, however, appears to fall victim to
this same critique.
362. It is not clear why the term "normal" course of business is used in this
section, when in a previous section, the term "ordinary" course of business is
used. It does not appear Congress intends anything different from a legal point
of view by using the two terms, but a judge might draw a different interpreta-
tion. Ordinary is defined as "regular; usual; normal; common; often reoccur-
ring." BLACK's, supra note 152, at 1097. Normal is defined as "conform[ing] to
a type, standard or regular form." Id. at 1059.
363. For example, "normal course of business" for a small bank in Pueblo,
Colorado, might be very different than "normal course of business" for Citicorp
Bank in New York City.
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interpret "normal course of business" using an objective stan-
dard, rather than a subjective one.
Although the exception seems redundant, its inclusion will
give judges the flexibility to address unforeseen manifestations
of injustice. If reform legislation includes such an excep-
tion-using a more objective standard, such as the phrase "which
conform to industry standards," in lieu of "normal course of
business"- it might eliminate some of the subjectivity inherent
in the latter phrase. Mandating the use of an objective industry
standard would give courts more guidance in applying the
statute because such standards are more ascertainable. This
requirement would protect the FDIC from secret agreements
that industry-wide standards require to be recorded in the
bank's records.3"
iii. Exception for Pending Claims and the 90-Day Window
The protections available to the FDIC under D'Oench and
§ 1823(e) give borrowers and creditors an incentive to sue to
enforce side agreements with a failing institution before it fails.
A rush of lawsuits, however, could hasten the failure of a bank
already in financial trouble. Therefore, a revised § 1823(e)
should require such claims to have been filed more than 90 days
before the bank fails or is placed into conservatorship.365
Claims filed more than 90 days before the bank fails or is placed
into conservatorship are more likely to result from a valid side
agreement rather than a borrower or vendor simply trying to
record a claim against the institution while it is still solvent. 66
This exception thus protects claimants with pending suits from
the FDIC's use of § 1823(e) late in litigation, as happened to
Mrs. Sweeney. The 90-day window, however, protects the failing
institution and the FDIC from an onslaught of suits filed simply
364. The disclosure and filing system proposed infra Part llI.E. also would
solve this dilemma. If institutions were required to disclose the possible
application of § 1823(e), and if borrowers were allowed to immediately
memorialize their side agreement and file it directly with the regulators, the
need for this exception would be reduced.
365. See supra note 323 (quoting the Act).
366. Note that Senator Cohen's bill did not originally contain this provision
to provide a 90-day period. On April 18, 1995, the author wrote a letter to the
Senate Banking Committee suggesting this change. Letter from Professor Fred
Galves, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, to the Senate
Banking Committee (Apr. 18, 1995) (copy on file with the author). The markup
of the bill contained this provision by the time of the hearings on June 14, 1995.
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in anticipation of bank failure.
Congress should provide an exception to the 90-day period,
however, for intentional torts,"'7 or fraud or knowing misrepre-
sentation by bank employees leading to violations of state or
federal laws or regulations. 65  Suits based on these causes of
action would remain viable regardless of their filing dates. This
exception would reverse much of the case law that has given
D'Oench and § 1823(e) a bad name in banking circles, because
the FDIC no longer could use a bank's fraudulent, dishonest, or
illegal behavior against the innocent borrower. 6 9 To base a
claim or defense on the bank's statutory or regulatory violations,
however, the borrower must come to court with "clean
hands."370 That is, the borrower cannot have engaged in deceit-
ful activity, nor can an alleged oral side agreement or verbal
representation conflict with a written agreement.3 71  These
exceptions to the exception merely reinstate the limited holding
of the original D'Oench case based on equitable considerations. 2
367. The exceptions should apply to the intentional torts of the bank, not
just negligence claims. It is important not to assume that this specific
intentional tort exception means that claims and defenses based on negligence
torts are prohibited by proposed § 1823(e). Under proposed § 1823(e)(2)(A), a
negligence tort claim would not "relate to an agreement affecting an asset
acquired from the insured depository institution." See supra note 323 (quoting
the Act). Thus, an individual who, for example, slips and falls in the bank
lobby, then attempts to claim against the FDIC as receiver when the bank fails,
would be able to pursue a tort claim without having it barred by § 1823(e) for
failure to obtain a writing. So both negligence and intentional torts, serving as
the basis for claims and defenses against the FDIC, would not be barred by the
application of proposed § 1823(e).
368. See supra note 323 (quoting the Act).
369. The Sweeney case, discussed supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text,
for example, would be reversed (assuming the legislation could apply retroac-
tively) because the bank and officers violated statutory and regulatory laws in
dealing with Mrs. Sweeney. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting
ComFed's legal violations).
370. Under the clean hands doctrine, "equity will not grant relief to a party,
who, as actor, seeks to set judicial machinery in motion and obtain some
remedy, if such party in prior conduct has violated conscience or good faith or
other equitable principle." BLACK'S, supra note 152, at 250.
371. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, § 7.2 (discussing the parol
evidence rule). The parol evidence rule bars later verbal statements used to
reform a written agreement "to provide trustworthy evidence of the fact and
terms of their agreement and to avoid reliance on uncertain memory." Id. at
447. The rule also "affirms the primacy of subsequent agreements over prior
negotiations and even prior agreements." Id. at 451.
372. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (arguing for D'Oench's
limited applicability).
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E. THE DISCLOSURE AND FILING REFORM PROPOSAL: MAKING
SECTION 1823(e) A JUSTIFIABLE REQUIREMENT
Although the coping mechanisms and reform proposals
discussed above would help alleviate certain aspects of the
overall D'Oench problem, they either fail to provide a complete
solution or create new interpretive problems. Most importantly,
they fail to address adequately the difficult balance between
fairness to innocent borrowers and protecting the FDIC's
insurance fund. A simple disclosure and filing proposal,
however, would provide a complete solution.
One of the hallmarks of American jurisprudence is the duty
to warn. 73 The heavily regulated banking industry recognizes
and practices this duty, as Congress has required financial
institutions to disclose full information to bank customers about
anti-discrimination laws,374 allowable interest rates, 76 and
various other consumer protection laws.376 This disclosure
373. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 685 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining the two separate goals achieved
by adequate warnings as "risk reduction and the protection of individual
autonomy in decision-making").
374. See Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (encouraging
credit extension to low- and moderate-income citizens); Equal Credit Opportuni-
ty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994) (requiring disclosure of reasons for denying
credit).
375. Usury limits for national banks are contained in 12 U.S.C. § 85.
Section 85 permits national banks to charge the greater of three rates:
(1) the rate allowed by the laws of the state where the national bank
is located, except that where a state sets a different rate for state-
chartered banks, this rate is allowed for national banks; (2) 1 percent
above the discount rate on 90-day commercial paper in effect at the
Federal Reserve bank in the district where the bank is located; or (3)
7 percent if no interest rate is fixed by state law.
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 189-90.
376. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617
(1994) (requiring residential mortgage lenders to disclose details about the
terms of open end home equity loans); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2801-2810 (1994) (requiring depository institutions to compile a variety of
statistics about home mortgage lending); Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 4201-4313 (1994) (requiring disclosure for terms and conditions of interest
paid and fees charged on deposit accounts); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1665 (1994) (requiring disclosure for consumer credit and consumer
lease transactions); Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-583, § 2, 102 Stat. 2960 (1988) (amending the Truth in Lending Act
and requiring disclosures in connection with applications and solicitations for
all credit and charge cards); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t
(1994) (regulating the preparations and distribution of reports by consumer
reporting agencies regarding a customer's credit worthiness or general
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does not create new substantive legal rights for bank customers,
but merely informs them of their existing legal rights and the
legal consequences of failing to protect or preserve those
rights."' Absent a warning, § 1823(e), either in its current or
revised form, likely will continue to bar most otherwise legiti-
mate claims and defenses of borrowers of failed institutions.
Fairness dictates that those borrowers be warned about
§ 1823(e) and the ramifications of failing to comply with it.
To accomplish this delicate but important balance, the
disclosure and filing system would operate somewhat like a
simplified UCC filing system or a state law real property
recording system.378 It involves an easy two-step process.
First, a lender must submit two standard forms to the borrower
whenever it extends a loan or enters into a subsequent agree-
ment regarding that loan."9 At the time it makes a loan or
signs any contract, the financial institution first must inform
creditors and borrowers, through a short "§ 1823(e) Disclosure
Form," of the possible application of the D'Oench doctrine and
§ 1823(e) in the event the financial institution fails.5 ° This
form simply alerts the borrower that any agreement he has with
the bank that is not reflected in the promissory note or loan
documents (hence, a "side agreement") is unenforceable if the
reputation); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720
(1994) (imposing securities law-type disclosure obligations on the sale of large
parcels of unimproved land in interstate commerce).
377. See generally Michael P. Malloy, Public Disclosure as a Tool of Federal
Banking Regulation, 9 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 229 (1990) (arguing that
disclosure in and of itself as a procedural requirement is a prevalent and very
valuable tool in the efficient and legitimate regulation of the banking industry.)
"[S]trides have been made by the regulators in the direction of utilizing
disclosure in more creative ways as an enforcement instrument in the bank
supervision context. The [FDIC] has been consistently ahead of the curve on
this issue." Id. at 235-36.
378. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-404 to 9-408 (1994) (providing procedures for
noting the discharge of secured obligations and the termination of financing
arrangements, permissive devices for a secured party to have their assignment
or release of collateral noted of record, and assurances to the secured party that
the mechanics of the filing system will be complied with). See generally ROGER
A. CUNNiNGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 824 (2d ed. 1993) (outlining the
fundamental concepts behind property recording systems).
379. If S. 648 does not pass, institutions also should be required to submit
these same forms to vendors or other individuals with whom the institution has
a business or transactional relationship so that those individuals or businesses
would be made aware of the possible application of § 1823(e) and the D'Oench
doctrine should the institution fail.
380. See infra Appendix A (setting forth the form).
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bank fails and the FDIC takes over."8' Even if legislative
reform of D'Oench and § 1823(e) opens the courthouse doors
somewhat for borrowers and others in certain circumstances,
innocent borrowers should be prepared for the potential conse-
quences of a possible bank failure.
The second step becomes necessary only when the borrower
or creditor has a side agreement with the bank that is not
reflected in the primary loan or contract documents, and that
borrower or creditor wants to preserve her rights in that side
agreement in the event of bank failure. In such a situation, the
individual and the institution would sign a second form, the
"§ 1823(e) Filing Form."382  The borrower would file the
§ 1823(e) Filing Form directly with the FDIC and the
institution's primary federal regulator.383 Filing will (1) ensure
that the FDIC will recognize the side agreement or verbal
understanding should the institution fail; (2) allow the borrower
to comply with § 1823(e) without having to rely on the bank's
unilateral action;3. and (3) ensure that institutions cannot
deceive regulators about the financial strength of their institu-
tions. Such awareness would promote the FDIC's legitimate
interests in failed financial institution litigation,85 but not at
the expense of legitimate claims and defenses of innocent
borrowers.
The cost and responsibility of the filing would be placed
upon the borrower seeking to memorialize his side agreement
381. The form would simply inform the borrower or creditor of existing law.
The disclosure form further informs the borrower that if they want to
memorialize their side agreement so that it can be enforced later, such must be
done in accordance with § 1823(e).
382. See infra Appendix B (setting forth the form). The "12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)
Filing Form" would be used by borrowers and creditors wanting to properly
memorialize, and ensure the enforceability of, their side agreements should
their lending institutions ever fail.
383. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing primary federal
regulators). Regulators should be privy to this side agreement information
along with the FDIC because it will keep them informed of the bank's activities
and the strength or weakness of the bank's loan portfolio.
384. Filing the side agreement with regulators eliminates the borrower's
vulnerability to a dishonest bank employee who might remove the side
agreement from the bank's official files or who simply might fail to keep it
there. See infra note 394 (noting the possibility of dishonest filing procedures).
385. See supra Part I.A.1. (explaining the original legitimate purposes and
policy behind the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e)).
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with the institution."' A borrower who waives his rights by
failing to act, despite the institution's disclosure, later could not
claim unfairness. The borrower's filing costs would include only
postage, copying costs, and the time to complete the forms. The
benefit to the borrower of not losing potential claims or defenses
against the FDIC if the institution should fail clearly outweighs
these negligible costs. The cost to the regulators also would be
negligible because regulators already must collect, store, and
manage detailed information about the institutions they
regulate.8 " The cost to banks in providing the forms also
would be minimal.
1. The Benefits of the Proposal for Borrowers
The filing system would provide borrowers "enforcement
insurance" for any side agreement they may reach with their
institutions. Filing ensures that an agreement will be enforce-
able both against the institution in the event the institution does
not fail and against the FDIC in the event it does fail."' This
benefit gives borrowers a great incentive to submit the Filing
Form, unless they are trying to hide their agreements from the
financial institution's federal regulatory examiners, in which
case the D'Oench doctrine should apply as it was originally
intended.8 9
The disclosure and filing system provides an important
additional side benefit. This system encourages a writing to
386. The only cost to the financial institutions would be that of printing a
two-page form and the time involved in distributing the two pages at every loan
closing along with all of the existing disclosure requirements. As such, the
additional cost would be negligible.
387. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 577 (describing investigatory
functions of regulators). Institutions must file and regulators must review
quarterly balance sheets, and either quarterly (for larger banks) or semi-annual
(for smaller banks) income statements. If this review reveals unusual
conditions or potentially dangerous deterioration in performance, regulators
schedule an on-site examination and perform a more detailed review. Id.
388. As with most disclosure requirements, the borrower may simply
disregard them, fail to understand them, or be persuaded by the bank officer
not to consider them seriously. Disclosure requirements nonetheless serve a
vital function in making borrowers aware of important information. See, e.g.,
Truth in Lending Act, supra note 376, §§ 1601-1665 (requiring disclosure for
consumer credit and consumer lease transactions). Moreover, the disclosure
would be an improvement over the status quo of no disclosure.
389. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (explaining that the
original purpose of the D'Oench doctrine was to estop a borrower, along with the
bank, from deceiving the bank regulator).
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evidence any agreement or verbal representation upon which a
customer relies-a much more desirable approach to legal
relationships. Borrowers thus will be less likely to fall victim to
a bank's verbal misrepresentations because the disclosure form
forces the bank either to acknowledge its verbal representations
or oral side agreements in writing or to refuse to extend or
modify the loan in conformity therewith. Although courts should
allow borrowers to pursue legitimate lender liability actions, this
proposal would protect innocent borrowers before filing an action
became necessary, thereby reducing the number of such actions.
Even if the close working relationship between the borrower and
the bank breeds sufficient trust that the parties feel no need to
memorialize oral side agreements or representations, disclosure
would make borrowers aware that such trust will not automati-
cally transfer to their relationship with the FDIC.
2. The Benefits of the Proposal for Financial Institutions
Although the proposal principally affects the legal relation-
ship between the borrower and the FDIC, financial institutions
also would benefit, despite the cost and burden of having to
supply additional loan disclosure documents. 390 Currently, a
borrower can use alleged oral side agreements and verbal
misrepresentations39 to defend against a bank's collection
action or as a counterclaim in such an action. Even if that
defense or counterclaim is unsuccessful and the borrower cannot
escape liability on the loan, raising it may promote a favorable
settlement by increasing the bank's cost of collection. The
proposed filing system makes those defenses and counterclaims
harder to maintain, because a bank can argue that the borrower
failed to memorialize any oral side agreement or verbal repre-
sentations with the FDIC when it was clearly in the borrower's
390. Lenders typically balk at laws or regulations requiring them to supply
borrowers with additional forms. See Bill Atkinson, Small Banks, Big
Compliance Load, BANKING WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 1 (noting that Truth in
Savings compliance costs "are especially high for small banks"); Patrick Dalton,
Red Tape Maze Hinders Credit, ABA Tells House Subcommittee, ABA BANKER'S
WKLY., Aug. 11, 1992, at 6. Note, however, that any additional cost or training
of bank officers would be negligible because the requirement would necessitate
only that the borrower read the disclosure statement and that the officer
explain to the borrower that should the bank fail, any side agreement or verbal
representation made by the bank must comport with § 1823(e) to be enforceable
against the FDIC.
391. See, e.g., Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Mich.
1986); In re Roberti, 183 B.R. 991 (D. Conn. June 30, 1995).
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self-interest to do so. Failing to file undercuts the strength and
credibility of the borrower's reliance claim.
3. The Benefits of the Proposal for Regulators
The disclosure and filing system would provide the FDIC
and financial institution regulators with immediate access to
updated information regarding the status and strength of the
loans at each particular financial institution. Although current
law already gives regulators access to extensive financial
information, 92 more information about the strengths and
weaknesses of the institution's loans should lead to more
effective monitoring and control. For example, an increase in
§ 1823(e) Filing Forms at a particular institution might alert the
FDIC or other regulators that the institution is compromising
too many of its loan assets with side agreements and thus
needlessly exposing itself to poor loan collection and poor
management. 393
The filing system also would provide the FDIC and regula-
tors full access to side agreement information as soon as it
becomes available. This immediacy would be a considerable
improvement over the current system, where regulators must
wait sometimes up to a year to conduct annual examinations,
only to have a possibility of discovering some of these side
agreements. 94 This also would help the FDIC in its seizure
and closure of an institution, when it must assess the value of
the institution's loan files often overnight or in a weekend.395
The only drawback of the proposal for the FDIC is the
elimination of potential collection recovery "windfalls" from the
392. See supra note 387; infra note 394 (describing the ability of regulators
to gain access to financial information).
393. Allowing the borrower payment schedule extensions, lowering the
interest rate for the remainder of the loan, and promising additional financing
if the borrower does not default are all examples of loan modifications or side
agreements that might contribute to the bank's weak loan portfolio and thus
overall weakness and perhaps eventual failure.
394. See 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1994) (requiring the OCC to examine banks "as
often as... necessary"); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1440 (1994) (requiring the Federal
Housing Finance Board to examine Federal Home Loan Banks at least on an
annual basis); 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d) (1994) (requiring the FDIC, as the insurer,
to examine banks at least annually to ensure compliance with FDIC insurance
regulations). This assumes the institution's officers have not hidden records,
or simply failed to keep them as part of the institution's "official" loan records.
395. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (noting the importance of
quickness and efficiency in examining an insolvent institution's accounts).
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automatic application of D'Oench to defeat most of the borrower's
claims and defenses related to side agreements. The fact that
current interpretation gives the FDIC an unjustified windfall in
certain cases, however, cannot justify the operation of an
equitable, legitimate D'Oench doctrine. Similarly, the FDIC's
administrative convenience during a bank seizure of not having
to address claims or defenses relating to side agreements or
verbal representations should not justify a windfall to the
FDIC.39 6
CONCLUSION
A corporation cannot blush. It is a body, it is true; has certainly a
head-a new one every year; arms it has and very long ones, for it can
reach at anything;... a throat to swallow the rights of the community,
and a stomach to digest them! But who ever yet discovered, in the
anatomy of any corporation, either bowels or a heart?3"
Congress created the FDIC during the Great Depression to
protect banking customers and all U.S. citizens from disastrous
bank runs.39 Indeed, the New Deal represented hope in a new
kind of federal government that would not bow to the power of
corporations and their financiers, hope in a new government that
would be responsible to common folk and not the powerful
banking industry, and hope that, no matter what, our democratic
government would not abuse its power against our people. That
was then.
After the New Deal, and especially during the last decade,
that hope has turned into disappointment and despair for many
individuals who have faced the FDIC in failed bank litigation.
The federal government, through the FDIC, has changed from a
helpful guardian into a mighty enemy. Although D'Oench and
§ 1823(e) originally rested on legitimate equitable concerns, the
courts and Congress have extended the doctrine's scope to the
point that it now gives the FDIC a powerful and often unjust
396. One of the arguments justifying the D'Oench doctrine is that the FDIC
and other regulators should not be required to investigate all possible side
agreements with former borrowers in order to determine the true value of the
loan asset. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (describing the
difficulty of discovering unrecorded side agreements).
397. Howell Walsh, Speech, Tralee assizes, (1825), quoted in THE QUOTABLE
LAWYER 27 (David S. Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986).
398. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (describing the rationale
for the creation of the FDIC).
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litigation weapon to bar most claims and defenses of borrowers
and creditors of failed financial institutions. The FDIC's use of
D'Oench has become an excess of the banking industry.399
Because of the doctrine's tremendous legislative and judicial
growth, the only workable solution now appears to be significant
legislative reform rewriting § 1823(e) and eliminating common
law D'Oench. Even the FDIC's own voluntary policy guidelines
cannot address the problem effectively. Although admirable, the
Senate's recent legislative reform effort-S. 648, the D'Oench
Duhme Reform Act-also fails to remedy the problem.
In setting forth the history and unsettling current status of
the D'Oench doctrine, this Article has advocated a complete
rewrite of§ 1823(e), reining in the D'Oench doctrine, and institut-
ing a disclosure and filing system that balances the many
competing rights and responsibilities of all parties concerned after
a bank failure. The filing system avoids many of the logistical
problems and injustices suffered by unsuspecting individuals
without sacrificing the FDIC's interests in protecting its insurance
fund. This disclosure and filing arrangement will return the
D'Oench doctrine to a legitimate equitable doctrine used to
preserve justice.
When the government abuses its power, our core democratic
ideals call for the kind of significant reform this Article advocates.
We cannot trust the FDIC to police itself, and nothing but
significant congressional action will restrict the FDIC's oppressive
use of D'Oench. Justice demands that the powers of D'Oench and
§ 1823(e) be curtailed and that customers be warned of its
existence. Only then will customers of financial institutions and
the FDIC's insurance fund be protected fully and fairly. The
D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) as they currently stand give the
government great and even unfair powers to defeat individuals in
failed bank litigation. But might does not make right.
399. The FDIC should not be allowed to escape responsibility for legitimate
side agreements or actual representations between the former solvent financial
institution (in whose shoes the FDIC now stands) and a borrower or other
individual if those agreements were later recorded pursuant to the disclosure
and filing system. The financial institutions would have been responsible for
the agreements or representations had they not failed. Accordingly, the FDIC
should bear a similar responsibility. To decide otherwise would be to justify an
unfair windfall unrelated to the original intent or purpose of the D'Oench
doctrine or § 1823(e). Legislative reform and this Article's disclosure and filing
proposal strike the proper balance between fairness to the borrower and
meeting the legitimate needs and policy concerns of the FDIC.
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APPENDIX A
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) DISCLOSURE FORM
WARNING TO BORROWER IN THE EVENT OF A BANK FAILURE
This Disclosure Form is for the express purpose of making you, the
BORROWER, aware that any side agreement or additional agreement made
with the LENDING INSTITUTION, or any verbal representation made by the
LENDING INSTITUTION upon which BORROWER relies, neither of which is
specifically set forth in these loan documents, WILL NOT BE ACKNOWL-
EDGED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT THE LENDING
INSTITUTION FAILS, UNLESS SUCH AGREEMENT IS IN WRITING AND
COMPLIES WITH 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
THEREFORE YOU ARE ADVISED THAT YOU MUST COMPLETE AND
FILE the attached 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) FILING FORM with (1) THE FDIC
(address below), (2) THE OCC or OTS or NCUA (addresses below), AND (3)
YOUR LENDER IN ORDER FOR THE SIDE AGREEMENT OR VERBAL
REPRESENTATION TO BE LEGALLY RECOGNIZED BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT THE YOUR LENDING INSTITUTION
FAILS.
If the BORROWER represents that there is no such side agreement with
the LENDING INSTITUTION or there is no verbal representation made by the
LENDING INSTITUTION upon which the BORROWER is relying in making
this loan, or all such agreements and representations are ALREADY reflected
in the loan agreement, the BORROWER should sign here
However, if there is any side agreement or verbal representation upon
which the BORROWER relies that is not specifically reflected in the loan
agreement, the BORROWER must complete and file the attached 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e) FILING FORM SO THAT THE AGREEMENT OR REPRESENTA-
TION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT YOUR LENDING INSTITUTION FAILS.
Moreover, in the future, if you ever modify, change, or add to this loan
agreement, you must file this form again SO THAT THE AGREEMENT OR
REPRESENTATION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT YOUR LENDING INSTITUTION
FAILS.
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APPENDIX B
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) FILING FORM
SEND THIS COMPLETED FORM WITH THE SIDE AGREEMENT TO THE
FEDERAL AGENCIES SET FORTH BELOW. FAILURE TO DO SO MAY
PRECLUDE THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE SIDE AGREEMENT AGAINST
THE FDIC. THIS APPLIES TO ANY FUTURE AGREEMENTS MADE WITH
YOUR LENDER.
The BORROWER, by filling out and filing this Form, is ensuring that the
side agreement with the LENDING INSTITUTION and/or the verbal
representations made by the LENDING INSTITUTION will be acknowledged
by the federal government in the event that the LENDING INSTITUTION
FAILS.
THE BORROWER states that the following constitutes an agreement
made with the LENDING INSTITUTION and/or constitutes a verbal represen-
tation made by the LENDING INSTITUTION and relied upon by the
BORROWER.
ATTACH WRITTEN AND SIGNED AGREEMENT
The BORROWER is required to send this form to the FDIC:
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) Compliance Program
550 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20429
AND to the applicable agency (choose (1) one from below);
If the lending institution is a thrift, savings bank, or savings and loan:
Office of Thrift Supervision
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) Compliance Program
1700 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20552
OR
If the lending institution is a commercial bank:
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) Compliance Program
250 E Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20219
OR
If the lending institution is a credit union:
National Credit Union Association
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) Compliance Program
1775 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
